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It is undeniable that databases are an essential building block of the Information 
Society. Today, every business in developed countries operates fully based upon clientele 
databases, economic statistics, and industries profiles; and innovation and invention rely 
heavily on collections of facts, data and information that scientists discovered in research 
and development or exchanged among them. Legislatures have envisaged a need and 
significance of the free flow of access to information, thereby prescribing copyright 
protection only to creative selection and arrangement of the contents of databases, not the 
factual contents contained within. However, the advent of technology avails 
unconventional methods of copying, altering, and recompiling to manipulate the contents 
of databases. Anyone can make use of technology, gather information, recompile them, 
and take this opportunity to enter into market, being possessed by original players and 
creating unfair competition. Original database makers, therefore, are suffering from 
losses in investment and crying for a legal solution, giving rise to possible intellectual 
property right of sui generis databases or a right of "its own kind." 
Throughout history, it is clear that copyright extends only to the creative or 
expressive contents, not the underlying facts, data, or information. Although there were 
battles between publishers or authors, copyright law meant to reward creative genius 
rather than contribution of finance or pure labor. Over centuries, its rationale remained 
unchanged, promoting a proper balance of author's incentive to complement creativity 
cycle and the public's free and open access to information to keep the market place of 
ideas intact. For the protection of collections and compilations, Article 2(5) of the Berne 
Convention makes clear that it extends only to the creative elements of the selection and 
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arrangement of the contents. However, it is insufficient for database industries who have 
contributed capitals and entrepreneurial efforts in the making of databases. 
The threat of the free flow of access to information has been driven by the 
legislative battle and politics between two powerful economic parties, the United States 
and Member States of the European Union. To maximize profit, lobbyists from database 
industries have urged their governments to recognize a property right in the compiled 
facts and information resulted from entrepreneurial effort alone. This endeavor has 
reached not only national level, but also international. Such concept of protection, thus, 
opposes the principle of the free flow of access to information that copyright law has 
promoted. The scientists and those, who are in the educational field, express concern that 
such regime impedes the free flow of access to facts, data, and information by increasing 
a cost to access them. Developing and least developed countries worry about negative 
impacts of sui generis protection on their socio-economic infrastructure, particularly 
human resources development, not only because of an increasing cost to access, but a fear 
of loosing their traditional knowledge, such as collections of undeveloped medical plants 
and compilations of unimproved medical treatments. A justifiable intellectual property 
right in sui generis databases, if any, must be considered and based upon the concept to 
achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, 
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedom for all in the global society to benefit from the 
progress of science and the use of arts and literatures. 
This dissertation is intended to reexamine the concept of protection of sui generis 
databases. Chapter I identifies legal issues relating to the protection of sui generis 
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databases between countries, especially, between the United States and the European 
Union. Chapter II surveys the provisions of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty that has 
been heavily influenced by these two parties. Chapter III is based upon a question of 
economic justification for sui generis databases explores important economic 
mechanisms and competition law that have been used to promote the competitiveness of 
the database industries. Chapter IV reexamines the notion of public interest in relation to 
the principle of the free flow of access to information and addresses on a possible 
violation of human rights of sui generis right. Last, Chapter V concludes considerable 
concepts of sui generis right, addressing the notion of "state responsibility" to both its 
citizens and other countries, and suggesting that advanced technological means provides 
a self-help solution for the sui generis databases. 
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Chapter I 
Identification of Legal Issues Relating to Databases 
I. Introduction 
There is an impending legislative battle that could impact significantly the market 
for information and all sectors dependent upon that information, from commercial 
database compilers to academic researchers. At stake is nothing less than the human right 
"to education,"} and the societal interest in "the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications"Z through the public free flow of access to information. Until recent times, 
legislatures and courts around the world have embraced the concept that free access to 
information should be secured as robustly as possible. They have granted legal protection 
to compilations, but primarily only to the creative selection and arrangement of the 
contents, not to the facts or data contained within the compilation. 
I Universal Declaration of Human Rights [hereinafter UDHR], G.C. RES. 217 (III 1948), adopted by the 
}J.N. General Assembly on December 10, 1948, art. 26(1). 
!d. art. 27(1) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [hereinafter ICESCR], 
adopted 16 December 1966,933 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), p. 49, U.N. Doc. A'6316 (1966), art. 15(1)(b). 
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The rise of the Information Age has added great complexity to issues of legal 
protection, especially with the proliferation of digital networks. The Internet, for instance, 
has enabled even the most moderately sophisticated users of digital networks to compile 
and publish databases that they themselves may have created from other compilations. 
Creators of databases - the lifeblood of many businesses - are fearful that their work can 
be used easily for profit without their permission and even to their economic or moral 
detriment. 
Legal rights for creators of databases can either come from copyright or from a 
sui generis right, a right of "its own kind." Database creators in Europe concluded that 
copyright protection was inadequate because it extended only to creative data 
(photographic works, musical contents, literary, and so forth) and to copying, viewing, 
obtaining, and using information in their databases, but did not protect the factual 
contents (statistics, raw scientific data, and the like) of the database. They therefore urged 
their national governments to secure and safeguard their investment in database industries 
by granting them a new right in factual and data contents - so-called sui generis rights -
over and above the existing copyright protection afforded to creative selection and 
arrangement of information. Sui generis protection is not an authentic intellectual 
property right. Rather, it is a unique, economic criteria used to protect the compiler's 
substantial investments in the databases. 
However, this scheme of protecting sui generis databases, such as collections of 
information regarding the human genome, international economic statistics, traditional 
medicine, and weather information, threatens to erode the public benefits derived from 
the free flow of access to information. Science is a prime example of a discipline or field 
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of knowledge that flourishes only with open access to compilations of data. Scientific and 
technological endeavors almost always require extracting a substantial part or whole 
content of databases, which is severely limited under a regime of sui generis protection. 
As the International Council for Science and the Committee on Data for Science and 
Technology pointed out in their 2002 Principles for Dissemination of Scientific Data: 
"Scientists are both users and producers of databases. However, scientific 
databases are seldom static; in the course of their research, scientists 
frequently draw on several existing databases to create a new database 
tailored to specific research objectives. The synthesis of data from 
different sources to provide new insights and advance our understanding of 
nature is an essential part of the scientific process. The history of science is 
rich with examples of data collections that played a crucial part in a 
scientific revolution which in turn had a major impact on society. It may 
truly be said that data are the lifeblood of science.,,3 
"Owners" of a database who have sui generis protection are given the power to force 
users (such as scientists and software developers) to enter into restrictive, costly, and 
potentially prohibitive, contractual arrangements. In the long run, this could have a 
chilling effect on scientific and technological development, and a likewise detrimental 
effect on other fields that are reliant on immense amounts of free flowing data. 
The ongoing debate concerning database protection is part of the larger historical 
confrontation between two conflicting philosophies of legal rights for compilations.4 On 
the one hand are proponents of the idea that compilations should be protected per se, 
3 
4 http://www.codata.org/codataldata_access/principles.html. 
Jonathan Band and Jonathan S. Gowdy, Sui Generis Database Protection: Has Its Time Come?, D-Lib 
Magazine, June 199, at http://www.dlib.org/dlib/june97/06band.html (last visited March 7,2005). 
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without considering creativity or original authorship, as a means of rewarding and 
creating incentives for the intense work and investment required to compile data. This is 
commonly referred to as the "sweat of the brow" or "industrious collection" doctrine. 
According to this doctrine, protection extends to the otherwise unprotected facts 
contained in the compilation. If this doctrine prevails worldwide, it may well come to 
pass that a Swiss company, for example, will be able to invest the time and money to 
collect data regarding traditional medicines used in China for thousands of years, and 
then block Chinese researchers from freely sharing the very data that their culture created 
and utilized for millennia. Such a system could have a profound impact on the future 
distribution of not only information, but also of knowledge wealth in the world. 
On the other hand, there is the philosophy that the databases without any original 
or creative content should not be protected. Legal protection under this philosophy 
would be limited only to the original selection, coordination, or arrangement of facts in 
the databases, but not the facts themselves. In the aforementioned example, the Swiss 
company would claim legal protection to how the traditional medicine data is searched 
and presented, but the data itself would remain in the public domain. 
Though the Supreme Court of the United States ruled against the protection of sui 
generis databases (discussed below),5 there remains a powerful movement within the 
United States to grant a property right to the factual data contained in the databases. 6 
Proponents include the American Intellectual Property Law Association, the Information 
Industry Association, the American Association of Publishers, and many commercial 
5 F . 
6 ~lst Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991). 
Fmal Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Library of 
Congress, (July 31, 1978). Report on Legal Protection for Databases, U.S. Copyright Office, ISBN 0-16-
049211-4 (August 1997) [hereinafter Copyright Office Report] at 63-70. 
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database providers and publishers.7 Sui generis legislation was first introduced in the 
United States in 1996, but so far it has failed to pass.8 Opponents have successfully 
argued that sui generis protection will add needless costs to research activities, would 
restrict access even to publicly funded data, would cause software systems that are reliant 
upon open sources of information to cease to work, and would hinder software 
interoperability.9 The National Research Council (part of the National Academies), for 
instance, strongly cautions that the sui generis protection could retard scientific research, 
and further argues that current trade-secret controls and licensing restrictions already 
afford sufficient protection. 10 The American Association of Law Libraries opposes the sui 
generis protection, in part, because it "would violate the public good by removing from 
the public domain government information whose contents have not been substantially 
changed or modified," and would "provide protection well beyond what has traditionally 
7 Copyright Office Report, supra note 6, at 65. "In general, many members of the library and scientific 
communities, as well as some educational groups, telephone companies and Internet-related businesses, 
expressed opposition, while a majority of database producers, including producers of a variety of scientific 
and scholarly databases, and the owner of a major on-line retrieval service advocated legislation. It must be 
stressed, however, that positions were not uniform within all of these communities. Some commercial 
database producers, including one of the largest in the global marketplace, oppose legislation at this time; 
many scientific researchers, particularly those working for industry, favor it. The reasons for the differences 
among those who appear to be similarly situated were not always clear. In some case, it may simply be that 
they hold differing perception of the law or the potential dangers posed." 
8 
H.R. 3531, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). 
9 Copyright Office Report, supra note 6, at 69. "Copyright law embodies an appropriate balance between 
incentives for creation and the free flow of information, by granting rights but leaving ideas and facts in the 
public domain and providing leeway for public interest activities through the doctrine of fair use and other 
exceptions. This balance furthers Constitutional policies and should not lightly be disturbed. New rights 
should not be provided, especially if they give equivalent or greater protection than copyright, without the 
{~stification of creativity; facts should be left free for all to use." 
A Quest of Balance: Private Rights and the Public Interest in Scientific and Technical Databases, 
National Research Council (1999) at 3. "Numerous legal, technical, and market-based approaches already 
exist to protect proprietary rights in databases. Existing legal measures include (1) copyright law, recently 
~p~ted and strengthened for the online digital environment; (2) licensing, a subset of contract law, which 
IS mcreasingly the method of choice for online vendors of proprietary databases and other information 
products; (3) trade secret law, used in conjunction with contract law and various new technologies 
protections; and (4) unfair competition law in state cornmon law, which is of limited value of database 
protection at this time but is viewed as a potential model for a new federal database protection statute." 
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been contemplated by Congress or the courts, glYmg to non-copyrightable works 
protection greater than that given to creative works that are copyrightable."ll 
One of the chief threats to the public free flow of access to information is a 
proposed intellectual property treaty being considered by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization ("WIPO"). The draft treaty is entitled "Basic Proposal for the Substantive 
Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases"l2 ("WIPO 
Draft Database Treaty"), which aims to extend legal rights to intellectual property right 
for sui generis databases. The WIPO Draft Database Treaty backs the database 
industries' economic interests even though the proposal contradicts the WIPO's stated 
objective "to promote economic, cultural and technological advancement.,,13 Put simply, 
the Draft Database Treaty would undermine the public free flow of access to information 
and all the societal benefits that principle generates. 
The objective of this introductory chapter is to identify the legal issues relating to 
the protection of sui generis databases between countries. Section II gives a historical 
account of copyright law in relation to the protection of "collection works" and the 
development of databases. Section III proposes a consistent legal definition of 
"database." Section IV contains an analysis of existing protection of sui generis databases 
in national legal systems, particularly in the United States and Member States of the 
\J Resolution on the Sui Generis Protection of Databases, Approved by the Executive Board of the 
Association of American Law Libraries (November 1996), at 
~ttp:/I~.aallnet.org/aboutlresolution _ sui_generis.asp (last visited March 8, 2005). 
BaSIC Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Databases to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. CRNRIDC/6 (December 1996) 
~ereinafter WIPO Draft Database Treaty]. 
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967 (amended 
September 28, 1979) [hereinafter WIPO Convention] art. 3(i). MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE 
~IPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1998), at 127-139. 
Largely through the diplomacy of the director general, WIPO joined the UN system in 1974. The 
PostcolOnial enlargement of the United Nations in the 1960s and 1970s, in the judgment of the director 
general~ offered the best institutional setting to become a universal organization with the global of 
promoting 'the protection of intellectual property throughout the world. ", 
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European Union, and the proposed supranational protections of the WIPO. Section V 
examines the economic and social implications of the measures designed to protect the 
sui generis databases. Section VI offers a possible means of balancing the two public 
goods: the public good of promoting data sources by rewarding sui generis database 
creation and the public good of allowing the free flow of information. 
II. History of the Legal Protection of Databases 
The history of copyright is instructive concerning its legal principles, but it does 
not speak adequately to the protection of "collections and compilations." Collection 
refers to "a work such as a periodical issue, an anthology or encyclopedia, in which a 
number of contributions constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are 
assembled into a collective whole.,,14 Compilation means a literary production composed 
of the works or selected extracts of others and arranged in methodical manner. IS In 
copyright law, a compilation is a work formed by the collection and assembling of 
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way 
that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.I6 The term 
compilation includes collective works. 
Though the scholars of Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire were concerned 
about being recognized as the authors of their works (the "right of paternity"), they did 
14 
HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, M.A., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, DEFINITIONS OF TERMS AND PHRASES OF 
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE, ANCIENT AND MODERN (Abridged Sixth ed.) (1991) [hereinafter 
Black's Law Dictionary]. 
15 fd "'C .. tha· ompllatton' is a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data 
. t .are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an 
?6ngmal work of authorship." 
17 U.S.C.A. § 101. 
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not have under the law any economic rights to control their work. l ? In any event, books 
were primarily copied by hand, mostly by monks, and the vast majority ofthe public was 
illiterate and could not afford books in the first place. So there was no economy of scale 
that necessitated copyright protection. It was not until the invention of printing in 
Western Europe in the late fifteenth century that a form of copyright protection was 
d . d 18 eVlse . 
The technology of the printing press allowed multiple copies of books to be 
printed easily and cheaply. That in tum gave rise to piracy. Printers could readily steal 
and distribute the works of others for their own benefit. To combat this problem, many 
jurisdictions in Europe began to adopt certain legal measures to deal with the distribution 
of printed materials, and the local economy that printing industries enhanced. 19 One of 
the more interesting early legal protections was the decree passed in 1545 by the Council 
of Ten in Venice prohibiting publication of an author's work without proof of his 
permission. In Germany in 1511, author Albrecht DUrer used a remarkable copyright 
warning: 
"Hold! You crafty ones, strangers to work, and pilferers of other men's 
brains. Think not rashly to lay your thievish hands upon my works. 
Beware! Know you not that I have a grant from the most glorious 
17 C . h opyng t and Culture, Christopher D. Hunter (May 2000), at 
~ttp:1 Iwww.asc.upenn.edu/usr/chunter/copyright_and_culture.html#neo . 
. lA.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 7 (1998). "All this changed with the introduction of printing 
mto Western Europe, after Guttenberg perfected the use of molded metal type around 1450. Literary texts 
and their accompanying illustrations could now be reproduced rapidly in large number of copies for sale or 
?9ther methods of distribution to the public." 
!d. at 7. "Within a few years after the introduction of printing, European States begun to adopt legal 
measures to deal with both consequences. The simplest way to control the distribution of printed materials, 
an~ ~rotect local printing industries against piracy and foreign import, was to introduce control of the 
prmtmg presses, so that the state authority would know what was being printed and by whom." 
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Emperor Maximillian, that not one throughout the imperial dominion 
shall be allowed to print or sell fictitious imitations of these engravings? 
Listen! And bear in mind that if you do so, through spite or through 
covetousness, not only will your goods be confiscated, but your bodies 
also placed in mortal danger.,,2o 
In 1528, Diirer's widow obtained an exclusive right to publish his works, and in 1532 she 
obtained an injunction against an unauthorized copy of his engraving. 
At this stage, however, legal rights were granted either to publishers or authors, 
but not to both at the same time/1 and the laws were highly inconsistent. An ability to 
print numerous copies of books easily and cheaply did not only raise the issue of piracy, 
it also increased the circulation of material thought to be dangerous to the political order. 
As a result, the Monarch of a country exercised his or her royal prerogative to regulate 
book printing and trade, keeping out unwanted thought or controversial ideas such as 
Lutheranism or Catholicism. 
The next big leap forward came in 171 0 in the form of the Statute of Anne, "An 
Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the 
Authors or Purchasers of such Copies.,,22 This landmark legislation, commonly thought 
20 "Copyright Law and Practice," William Patry, Chapter 1; available at http://digital-law-
flnline.info/patry/patry2.html (last visited March 7, 2005). 
ld. at 8. "The fIrst printing privileges were apparently the Decree issued by the State Councilors of 
Venice in the fIfteenth century. The fIrst Venetian privilege in this area was granted to a printer (Johannes 
of Speyer, by Decree of September 18, 1469), conferring an exclusive right to carry on the art of printing. 
The second of these privileges was granted to an author (Marc Anthony Sabellico, by Decree of December 
1486), conferring the exclusive right of authorizing printing of one of the author's named works. The 1486 
Recree is thus the fIrst recorded instance of the formal grant of an author's right to an author." 
.ld. at 9. "The initiative of the printing trade and the publications of distinguished authors and 
philosophers (Defoe, Locke and others) provided the climate for the passing in 1710 of the Act 8 Anne, c. 
19 generally referred to as the fIrst Copyright Act." 
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to be the first copyright act, finnly established two concepts: that the author was the 
owner of the copyright and that the protection granted to the author's published work was 
for a limited period of time.23 The author controlled distribution of his works and the 
publisher could only acquire such right by the author's assignment. The statute prevented 
a monopoly by the booksellers and carved out a "public domain" for literature by limiting 
the tenns of the copyright and stating that the copyright owner no longer had control over 
its use once the work was purchased. 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was widely realized that the works 
produced in one country could be profitably used in another and that some method of 
achieving cross-border protection was needed?4 National governments started to provide 
foreign authors the same protection afforded to local authors contingent upon a foreign 
country's grant of reciprocal protection.25 A number of bilateral and multilateral treaties 
were concluded with different tenns rendering complex legal issues and unfair treatments 
23 [d. at 10. "The Act is remarkable in a number of respects. First and foremost, the law gave to the author 
(not to the publisher, as the printing trade had probably expected) "the sole right and liberty" of printing his 
books: publishers could only acquire the right by assignment ... The principal provisions of the 1710 Act 
may be summarized as follows: 
(1) Authors were given the sole right of printing their books for the term provided by the statute 
(section 1). 
(2) Printers, booksellers and other persons who had for publishing purposes purchased or acquired 
the manuscripts ("copies") of books were given the sole right of printing such manuscripts for the term 
provided by the statute (section 1). 
(3) The term provided by the statute was (a) 21 years from April 10, 1710, for books printed 
?e.f~re that date, and (b) 14 years of protection for the author if the author was still living at the end of the 
Ulltial period of 14 years (section 11). 
. (4) Books printed or imported without the consent of the owner ofthe statutory right were liable to 
forfeIture and offenders were liable to a fme (section 1). 
(5) Remedies under the Act were conditional on registration of the title of the book in the Register 
of the Stationers' Company (section 2). 
(6) Just and reasonable prices for books could be fixed where the prices charged were to high and 
~easonable (section 3)." 
~. at 13. "At the national level, the question soon arose as to whether foreign authors could claim rights 
:~r the local st.atute. To deal ~ith the problem, states a~o~ted the practice of making bilateral treaties 
o~er countnes: these were m general based on the pnnclple that each country would grant the same 
ff~~~ction to citizens of the other country as it granted to its own citizens." 
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between countries.26 In order to navigate this tangle of complex and disparate laws, 
nations concluded a general multilateral copyright treaty, the Berne Convention of 
1886.27 
Article 2(5) of the Berne Convention provided copyright on authors' literary and 
artistic collections "which by reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents 
constitutes an intellectual creation. ,,28 The definition of "collections of literary and artistic 
works" was very broad, capturing nearly every conceivable creation in material form/9 
including encyclopedias, anthologies, dictionaries, collections of articles, stamps or coins, 
biographical directories, catalogues, databases of any kind, newspapers and periodicals. 30 
26 !d. "By the end of the nineteenth century, there were many bilateral treaties in force. The treaties 
contained different terms, so that, for example, the assessment of the legal situation of a work by a national 
of one country, fIrst published in another country, and copied in a third country could be extremely 
complex." 
27 !d. at 13-14. "By the middle of the nineteenth century, it was realized that some form of international co-
operation was necessary so the common rules could be established for the protection of authors and their 
works. There was an international Congress in Brussels in 1858, but the international meetings held in Paris 
in 1878 provided the impetus which led to the adoption of the fIrst international Convention in the fIeld 
some eight years late. The Paris meetings of 1878 saw the founding of L' Association Litteraire et 
Artistique fnternationale, the International Literary and Artistic Association (ALAI), under the Presidency 
of Victor Hugo. ALAI promoted conferences and studies which led to the preparation of a draft 
Convention, considered in its various stages at Diplomatic Conferences in Berne, Switzerland in 1884, and 
1885. Finally, the new Convention was adopted in Berne in 1886." Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, September 9, 1886 (Paris Act of July 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
28 Berne Convention art. 2(5). 
29 fd. art. 2(1) "The expression 'literary and artistic works' shall include every production in the literary, 
scientifIc and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such as books, 
pamphlets and other writings; lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the same nature; dramatic or 
dramatico-musical works; choreographic works and entertainments in dumb show; musical compositions 
with or without words; cinematographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process 
analogous to cinematography; works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and 
lithography; photographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to 
photography; works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and three-dimensional works relative 
to geography, topography, architecture or science." 
30 fd. art. 2(5) "Collections of literary or artistic works such as encyclopaedias and anthologies which, by 
reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual creations shall be protected 
as such, without prejudice to the copyright in each of the works forming part of such collections." PAUL 
GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLE, LAWS AND PRACTICES 163 (2001). "The generalized 
standard of originality applies to all classes of literary and artistic works, from high art to lowly directories, 
catalogues and instruction manuals. Because, however, factual works like catalogues draw so heavily on 
unprotectible data, and because functional works like instruction manuals must, if they are to have any 
value, precisely track relevant scientifIc principles or technological requirements, courts in both civil law 
and common law countries scrutinize these classes of subject matter with particular care." 
11 
The Convention specifically excluded "facts" and "contents of facts" such as news of the 
day or miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information. 
Copyright protected only an author's creative expressions but not the factual contents or 
information contained within the work,31 in order to permit the public free flow of access 
to factual and data contents. In fact, the Convention specifically intends to provide 
incentive to authors and complement creativity cycle to upcoming authors on one hand 
and to promote the public free flow access to information on the other hand. 
The protection granted by the Convention to authors was also broad with respect 
to nationality, the principle of national treatment. Authors were covered by the treaty if 
they were nationals of a Union country (whether the work was published or not)/2 if they 
were habitual residents of a Union country, or if their work was first or simultaneously 
published in a Union country.33 According to the Convention, each Union country had to 
accord to the nationals of other Union countries treatment no less favorable than that it 
accords to its own nationals. 
The Berne Convention was subject to a number of revisions from time to time to 
accommodate the technological changes that affected exploitation and dissemination of 
authors' literary and artistic works.34 The intention of the Convention, however, 
remained unchanged: maintaining a proper balance between the public free flow of 
access to information and the author's incentive to create new artistic and literary 
expressions. 
31 
32 Berne Convention art. 2(8). 
ld. art. 5. 
33 
34 1d. art. 3( 1 )-(2). 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of September 9, 1886, completed at 
Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on November 13, 1908, completed at Berne on March 20, 1914, 
revised at Rome n June 2, 1928, at Brussels on June 26, 1948, at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and at Paris 
on july 24, 1971, and amended on September 28, 1979. 
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It was under this system of protection that databases developed. One clear 
example of the development of database industries is the Reuters news agency. Paul 
Julius Reuter, a German-born immigrant, established a news agency company in the City 
of London that transmitted stock market quotations between London and Paris via the 
new Calais-Dover cable in October 1851.35 Reuters soon became widely known, and 
eventually extended its service to the whole British press as well as to other European 
countries.36 It also expanded the content services to include general and economic news 
from all around the world. 
Newly developed technology enhanc~d Reuters' ability to become the world's 
leading news agency. Given new advanced methods of dissemination and reproduction of 
contents, the business expanded.37 Such technologies as overland telegraph and undersea 
cable facilities, the column printer, radio, teleprinter and computer devices contributed to 
this expansion.38 Through the advent of computer technology, Reuters gained the most 
efficient techniques to process, gather and collect data, and to arrange its own databases, 
making its databases easy to access and commercially valuable. Thus, technology has its 
own cost. Not only did Reuters substantially invest its skills, labor, and capital in the 
creation process of databases, but also in the computer technology infrastructure that 
facilitated the creating of these databases. Accordingly, such investment deserves to be 
rewarded and protected. 
35 
36 http://www.about.reuters.comlhome. 
http://www.about.reuters.comlaboutuslhistory ... Reutersbecameknownasatransnationalcorporation.it 
was floated as a public company in 1984 on the London Stock Exchange and on NASDAQ in the US with 




Databases have become an essential tool for business investment. Reuters 
supplies information services and databases such as stock market indexes and country 
profiles for transnational corporations interested in overseas business opportunities and 
investments in other countries. This international giant advances with technology and is 
the world's biggest information service provider. Local information firms in most 
developing countries cannot compete with Reuters' technology and database assets. Yet 
they have to rely on Reuters' sources of information and databases. Clearly, in a number 
of developing countries such as Thailand and Singapore, Reuters is the main source of 
information services, and, as such, holds a dominant position in these countries.39 
Many examples show how many different businesses, in every industry, rely 
heavily on the use of databases. Fidelity National Financial, Inc. offers online property 
databases such as property tax data, map images, recorded land records and other 
information to customers and entities within the company that need this information.4o 
Telemarketing companies use customer, business or even medical directories to sell their 
products and services via telephone or the Internet.41 Most importantly, the scientific and 
educational sectors use databases to exchange and communicate information regarding 
recent innovations and discoveries. Exelixis, a Research & Development firm, exchanges 
research databases with other laboratories via the Internet.42 These databases are often of 











of human cellular function; it is through such exchanges that the progress of science 
advanced. 
The Berne Convention contains no definition of "databases." Article 2(5) of the 
Berne Convention merely suggests the term "collection," granting an author of this kind 
of work copyright protection if the selection and arrangement of their contents constitute 
intellectual creation.43 Further, Article 2(5) furnishes examples of collection works such 
as encyclopedias and anthologies, but gives no definition of the term "collection.,,44 The 
vagueness of "collection" or "collective work" appears also in Black's Law Dictionary, 
as cited earlier, referring merely to "a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or 
encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent 
works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.,,45 
The nature of collections must contain original contents and creative expression in 
the selection and arrangement of data. Article 2(5) of the Berne Convention requires only 
a creative element attached to the selection and arrangement of the contents of collections 
which is "thin.,,46 Neither factual nor data contents nor protected materials forming part 
of, or contained in the works within the collection are included in the scope of protection. 
43 Berne Convention art. 2(5). 
44 Id. art. 2(1) "The expression 'literary and artistic works' shall include every production in the literary, 
scientific and artistic domal·n " 45 ••• 
46 Black's Law Dictionary. 
Berne Convention art. 2(5). Richard L. Stone and John D. Pernick, Protecting Databases: Copyright? We 
Don't Need No Stinkin' Copyright, THE COMPUTER LAWYER, Vol. 16, No.2, February, 1999, at 17. 
"Because the protection is "thin," ... the more comprehensive and useful the selection and arrangement of 
the data, the less likely it will be protected by copyright. For instance, a comprehensive database that 
contains the entire universe of relevant data may be novel and commercially useful, but not copyrightable 
be~ause "selection" requires the exercise of creativity or judgment in culling facts from the relevant 
uruverse. Similarly, arrangements of data that flow inexorably from basic organizing principles such as 
alp~a?etizing, cross-referencing, geographic areas, or chronological order, lack sufficient originality." 
;:ISting National and Regional Legislation Concerning Intellectual Property in Databases, WIPO Doc. 
BJlMJ2 (1997). "Article 2(5) of the Berne Convention limits its scope to original collections of literary 
and artistic works." 
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It is important to note that any labor, skills, or capital contributed in the making process 
will not be counted, nor will they satisfy the need for protection. 
Successive legal instruments, namely the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS,,)47 and the WIPO Copyright Treaty ("WCT"),48 
which incorporate the Berne Convention in their own terms, provide no definition of 
"databases." Article 10(2) of the TRIPS Agreement and Article 5 of the WCT provide 
copyright protection on compilations of data or other materials which "by reason of the 
selection and arrangement" of their contents constitute an intellectual creation.49 
Furthermore, both instruments make clear that "the protection does not extend to the data 
or material itself and is without prejudice to any copyright subsisting in the data or 
material contained in the compilation.,,5o They also do not define "compilation." Both 
instruments merely repeat the language of Article 2(5) of the Berne Convention and add 
wording declaring that such protection will extend to compilations "in any form." Such 
explicit reference is useful insofar as it applies to compilations not only to paper versions 
of databases, but also to electronic databases. 51 
47 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods, April 15, 1994 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
48 WIPO Copyright Treaty, December 20, 1996 [hereinafter WCT]. 
49 Compare TRIPS art. 10(2) with WCT art. 5. Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty 
on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to be Considered by the 
Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. CRNRlDC/4 (1996). (According to the Explanatory Notes, no 
differences were seen between the words "collection" and "compilation".) 
50 
Compare TRIPS art. 10(2) with WCT art. 5. 
51 
Thomas C. Vinji, New International Copyright Rules: The WIPO Copyright Treaty, in One 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, VALUATION, AND 
PROTECTION, 17.3-17.4 (Melvin Simensky, Lanning Bryer and Neil J. Wilkof ed., 1999). "However, 
Article 2(5) of the Berne Convention explicitly refers only to "collections ofliterary and artistic works such 
as encyclopedias and anthologies," so the WCT's explicit reference to "compilations of data or other 
material" is useful, insofar as many databases consist of original selections and arrangements of material 
other than literary and artistic works. In addition, it is helpful that Article 5 of the WCT appears to apply 
not only to the paper versions of databases, but also, insofar as it applies to compilations "in any form," to 
electrOnic databases." 
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The intent of these agreements should be noted. Article 7 of the TRIPS 
Agreement states: 
"The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations.,,52 
Article 8.2 states: 
"Appropriate measures, provided they are consistent with the provisions 
of the Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual 
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer 
of technology. ,,53 
In the same extent, the WeT recognizes: 
"the need to maintain a balance between the rights to authors and the 
larger public interest, particularly education, research and access to 
information, as reflects in the Berne Convention.,,54 
52 
53 TRIPS art. 7 
54 !d. art. 8(2). 
WeT Preamble. 
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III. Definition of Databases 
The importance of the debate about the protection of sui generis databases IS 
amplified by the murky definition of what constitutes a database. The legal definition of 
"database" is often absent, vague, or inconsistent. First, the term "database" can be 
defined as a general collection of facts, raw data or information. 55 This definition of 
databases is considered in connection with their own collective nature. They are sets of 
collected information, possibly including facts or raw data, which are normally available 
within public andlor protected materials. For instance, a database may contain personal 
information such as name, address or email address, telephone number, age, and gender; 
factual information such as statistics or records; creative expressions such as sounds and 
Images; or protected information such as recipes, scientific formulas or medical 
processes.56 Copyright law clearly extends to the selection and arrangement of this 
information if there is any creativity in such selection and arrangement. 
55 NATIONAL SCIENCE REpORT, What Are Facts (Data) and What Is Information?, No. 12,20 March 1947 
at 47. (Stating there's no trouble with the history of the word data or datum; it meant and still means 
something given, that is, fact or facts ... Information is basically the act or process of informing, that is, of 
giving somethingform or identifiable and comprehensible shape ... Thus the word inform meant basically to 
endow with some quality, originally shape, that makes something identifiable and comprehensible in the 
mind ... With this history of word in mind, one can easily fmd so difficult-that is, distinguishing between 
data or facts and what is called information. The former has no 'shape' and is relevant to a particular 
viewpoint. It must be given relevance, arrangement, coherence, usefulness within a definite framework of 
meaning, intent, or interest. Then data or facts become information, they do inform the mind, or going back 
~~ the basic concept of cast light upon a subject.) 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: PRIV ATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
IN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATABASES, NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS (1999) at 15-16. "Data are facts, 
numbers, letters, and symbols that describe an object, idea, condition, situation, or other factors ... Data in a 
database may be characterized as predominantly word oriented (e.g., as in a text, bibliography. directory, 
dictionary), numeric (e.g. properties, statistics, experimental values), image (e.g., fixed or moving video, 
such as a film of microbes under magnification or time-lapse photography of a flower opening), or sound 
(e.g., a sound recording of a tornado or a fire) ... A database is a collection of related data and information-
generally numeric, word oriented, sound, and/or image-organized to permit search and retrieval or 
processing and reorganizing." 
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Second, the term "database" can refer to the technical definition of databases used 
in relation to "computer programs.,,57 Thus, for the protection of computer databases or 
computer programs, Article 10(1) of the TRIPS Agreement and Article 4 of the WCT 
explicitly include this kind of work as "literary works" within the meaning of Article 2 of 
the Berne Convention.58 Like paper versions of databases, their electronic counterparts 
should contain direct human creative contribution attached to the selection and 
arrangement separating them from computer program databases. 59 
Last, some databases are defined as "sole source databases." These types of 
specific databases usually contain facts, data or information used for scientific research 
such as measurements of solar flares during a specific period of time that are perceived 
through only one telescope; temperature and air content measurements made inside a 
cave by the initial spelunkers who discovered it and opened it to the surface; and historic 
climatologic measurements for a specific location.6o The sole source databases also 
include collections of medicinal plants and traditional knowledge originated from social, 
57 RAMKRISHNA S. TARE, DATA PROCESSING IN THE UNIX ENVIRONMENT (1989). "The electronic database 
is a collection of facts (data), but is subject to frequent updates and human's interaction. For instance, the 
SQL standard is an application program that operates on just one database at a time and defmed to be the 
aggregate of all data defined by all schemas in a certain environment which can be perceived by the user as 
a collection of named tables. So, it is a large collection of data or information organized for rapid search 
and retrieval by a computer by means of method of selecting or arranging, not human." C.J. DATE, A GUIDE 
TO THE SQL STANDARD (2d ed. 1989). "The data in the database is perceived by the user as a collection of 
~8amed tables, no two of which have the same name." 
59 Compare TRIPS art. 10(1) with WCT art. 4. 
Mary Maureen Brown, Robert M. Bryan and John M. Conley, Database Protection in a Digital World, 6 
RICH. 1. 1. & TECH. 2 (1999). "There must be intellectual creation by a human author for copyright 
prot:ction to exist, raising questions about the extent to which a database can be protected under copyright 
law If the selection and arrangement of data is accomplished by a computer program with Ininimal human 
contribution ... However, the requirement of arrangement would presumably exclude protection for a 
database that is no more than an unorganized compilation of data that can be searched and retrieved by a 
search engine" 60 • 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REpORT ON RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE APRIL 1998 CONFERENCE 
~ DATABASE PROTECTION AND ACCESS ISSUES, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF 
MMERCE (July 1998), at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcomlolia/dbconf/dbase498.htrn. 
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cultural, environmental and technological activities of certain communities or countries.61 
The Berne Convention and its successors do not provide legal protection for such factual 
or data collections, thereby maintaining the benefits of free access to information for 
scientific and educational institutes. 
The common characteristics of databases are their collective nature. They must be 
verified, collected, selected, and arranged in one format; and must be organized to permit 
search and retrieval. The format used in the selection and arrangement is usually limited 
by alphabetical or numerical order. In addition, the making of databases demands 
substantial contribution such as labor, skill or finance, referred to as "entrepreneurial 
effort," making the databases commercially useful and economically valuable. 
Consequently, the investment in the making process needs to be recovered by the creator. 
The economic significance of databases gives rise to the argument for a new 
scheme to protect sui generis databases. Advanced by technology, people around the 
world can view and make use of databases in various forms - both in "hard copies" such 
as printed materials, sound records, and films, and in "electronic formats" such as 
broadcasting and electronic transmission. All kinds of businesses operate upon clientele 
databases and telemarketing strategies to direct potential customers. According to 
statistical records in developed countries such as the E.U. and the U.S., the worldwide 
database industries present revenues in the billions of U.S. dollars and continue to be a 
fast-growing sector of the economy.62 The database producers, who are usually both 
61 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge 
~2nd Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/I/4/8 (September 30, 2002). 
Communication from the Connnission Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology; 
~o.Pyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action, COM (88) 172 fmal, at 207 [hereinafter Green Paper]. 
FIgures collected by the International Publishers Association and quoted in a recent Memorandum of 
DNESCOIWIPO would seem to indicate that the market for databases is evolving as follows: the number 
of databases in existence for use by the public has grown from 400 in 1980 to 2,901 in 1986. The 
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consumers and creators of databases, gain an interest in the sui generis protection to 
ensure their return on investment. The European Union has been successful in this 
endeavor by granting a property right to factual or data collections or technically called 
sui generis databases. However, the B.U. Commission did not attempt to define the term 
sui generis databases. The E.U. Commission merely required substantial investment in 
the making process rather than the author's creative expression as required by the 
traditional copyright law. Therefore, the meaning of databases is parallel to the meaning 
of copyrightable collections or compilations. 
Legislatures should consider two main factors when defining databases. First is 
the collective nature of databases that have been verified, collected, selected, and 
arranged in one format and accessible. Second is the economic and/or social value of 
databases. In this sense, it should distinguish, on the one hand, the commercial databases 
that contain economic value for the database makers, from, on the other hand, the 
databases that have social value to scientists, researchers, and those who are in 
educational fields. 
worldwide turnover of electronic publishing in 1985 amounted to 5 billion US dollars. Of this, the United 
States were responsible for more than 4/5 of the total turnover but the value of the total market produced by 
?ermany, France and the United Kingdom represented 350 million dollars. Obstacles to the free flow of 
information between Member States must be removed of the Community is to develop a competitive role in 
the information services market." STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 
2000 REpORT, PREPARED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE (2000). (Stating 
they.s. exported database products generating revenuit e of $677.9 billions or approximately 7.33% of 
national GDP in 1999.) 
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IV. Analysis of the Sui Generis Databases 
Nations adhering to the Berne Convention must ratify the convention affording an 
author copyright protection to his or her collections of literary or artistic works. The 
Berne Convention requires its member countries to provide minimum copyright 
protection on collections.63 This minimum requirement does not preclude any divergent 
protection on factual collections in national legal systems. Some member countries, such 
as the Nordic countries, provide neighboring rights for factual collections or catalogues.64 
Other member countries, particularly common law countries, attach greater weight to 
labor contribution to the factual collections than the creativity in the selection and 
arrangement. 65 
Without sufficient protection for factual or data collections, the European Union 
and its Member States who are original members of the Berne Convention have 
considered a separate devising system to protect their sui generis databases. The 
European Union enacted the Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases ("Database 
63 
ANTHONY D' AMATO AND DORIS ESTELLE LONG, INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY (1996) at 228-
229. "Signatory nations must grant protection at a level equal to or above the minimum standards espoused 
by the Convention. Unless otherwise provided in a given article, national discretion to rely on its own 
domestic law is not permitted. Convention provisions maintain Primacy, Coverage, Activation of 
Coverage, Exclusive Rights, and Term of Protection over national legislation." PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLE, LAWS AND PRACTICES (2001). "Article 2 establishes a floor, not a 
~eiling,.to protectible subject matter, and leaves member countries free to add other categories." 
Shenf EI-Kassas, Study on the Protection of Unoriginal Databases, WIPO Doc. SCCR/7/3 (April 4, 
2002), at 6. "The survey identified sui generis legal protection for databases which do not meet the criterion 
of originality in the following countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden." Jorg Reinbothe, 
The Legal Protection of Non-Creative Databases, WIPO Doc. EC/CONF/99/SPKl22-A (September, 1999), 
at 3. "Apart from the compilation copyright in the UK and in Ireland, which provided "sweat of the brow" 
databases with true copyright protection, a similar neighboring right existed in the five Nordic States for 
several decades in form of the so-called "catalogue rule"." Michael J. Bastian, Protection of "Noncreative " 
Database: Harmonization of United States, Foreign and International Law, 22 B.c. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 
425 (1999). ''The Nordic nations-Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden-have instituted a 
frsyste~ of "neighboring rights" to protect investments of capital and labor in noncreative databases from ee-nders" 
6S • 
C 17 ~.S.C.A. § 101. The United Kingdom Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, art. 3(1) (Eng.). 
oPynght Act, (1963) art. 2(1) (Ir.). 
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Directive,,)66 in 1996, introducing a sui generis right for databases as the result of 
substantial investment in obtaining, verification, or presentation of the contents67 which 
parallels the creative collections under the Berne regime. Such a system has been 
criticized as creating a monopoly for the database industries, thereby impeding the free 
flow of information to the public sectors. One such criticism is that this sui generis right 
will, in the long run, impede the advance of science, which relies so heavily on 
databases.68 Whether the criticisms are true or not, the European database industries do 
need a quantifiable return on their investment and must be able to compete with its major 
trading partner, the United States. To prevent economic loss and to strengthen the 
competitiveness of European database industries in the world market, E.U. delegates 
proactively submitted to the WIPO their own version of a possible draft database treaty in 
66 Council Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. L 77/20 [hereinafter Database 
Directive]. 
67 Id. art. 7(1). 
68 Debra B. RosIer, The European Union's Proposed Directive for the Legal Protection of Databases: A 
New Treat to the Free Flow of Information, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 105, 148 (1995). "The database rights 
would result in a "limitation on the free flow of ideas," ... the Directive could allow a limited group of 
database creators to control the dissemination of information." J.H. Reichman and Paul F. Uhlir, Database 
Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793, 813 (1999). "We believe that the long-term implications of the proposed regime 
are potentially very damaging for science and technology. All science operates on databases. The near-
complete digitalization of data collection, manipulation, and dissemination over the past thirty years has 
ushered in what many regard as the transparency revolution. Every aspect of the natural world, from the 
nano-scale, all human activities, and indeed every life form, can now be observed and captured as 
electronic databases." Mark Schneider, VII. Foreign and International Law: b) International law and 
Treaties: The European Union Database Directive, 13 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 551, 561 (1998). "The 
Directive may create serious problems for the makers of U.S. databases and CD-ROM products because of 
the different levels of protection for Member-State and non-Member-State works." Memorandum prepared 
by the International Bureau, Agenda 5: Protection of Databases, Information Received from the 
Intergovernmental and Non-governmental Organizations, WIPO Doc. SCCRllJINF/3 (June 30, 1998) at 8. 
International Council for Science (ICSU) asserted: "Such data sharing is possible only when the data are 
affordable within tight research budgets. If data are formally made available for scientific access, but the 
prices charged for such access are prohibitively high, the negative impact on science is the same as if 
access had been legally denied. This is especially the case for scientists in developing countries ... Under 
these circumstances, the potential harm to the scientific enterprise is enormous. Basic science needs 
abundant, unrestricted flows of both raw and evaluated data at price it can accommodate within the present 
severely restricted research budgets." 
23 
1996.69 The U.S. (which possesses a larger share of the world database assets) was 
alanned, and responded by preparing its own version of a draft database treaty for 
submission to the WIPO in the same year.70 The U.S. version of the draft database treaty 
also appears to introduce a sui generis right for databases that represent a substantial 
investment in the collection, assembly, verification, organization, or representation of the 
database contents.7! 
Taken as a convenient point of departure, the WIPO (being an administrative 
body of the Berne Convention), adopted a resolution of a draft database treaty.72 Heavily 
influenced by the competitive proposals of the E.U. and the U.S., it appears that the 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty contains several provisions in favor of database industries 
constituting a sui generis right in factual or raw databases that prove a substantial 
investment in the collection, assembly, verification, organization, or presentation of the 
contents.73 Moreover, such provisions are in contrast to, and challenge the traditional 
copyright law on the promotion of the public free flow of access to information. To 
identify possible legal issues of sui generis databases in accordance with the Berne 
Convention, it is instructive to survey the current situation of database protection in the 
national legal systems of the United States and Member States of the European Union. 
69 
The Sui Generis Right Provided for in the Proposal for a Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases, 
WIPO Doc. BCP/CENI5 (September, 1995). The European Community and its Member States Proposal 
for the International Harmonization of the Sui Generis Protection of Databases, WIPO Doc. BCP/CENI13 
~~ebruary 1996) [hereinafter E.U. Proposal]. 
The Us. Proposal for Sui Generis Protection of Databases, WIPO Doc. BCP/CENIII2-INR/CENII2 
(May 1996) [hereinafter U.S. Proposal]. Pamela Samuelson, Digital Agenda of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization: Principal Paper: The Us. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (1997). 
~'A late-added component of the U.S. digital agenda at WIPO was acceptance of the U.S proposal for an 
~ternational treaty to protect investments in database development by granting database makers exclusive 
~ghts to authorize or prevent extractions and uses of database contents." 
72 U.S. Proposal art. 1(1.3). 
73 WIPO Draft Database Treaty. 




A. Database Protection in the U.S. 
The U.S. Congress has long recognized copyright in compilations of facts and 
data. Section 102 of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 requires compilations be "original 
works of authorship" fixed in any medium of expression in order to qualify for copyright 
protection.74 Section 101 defines a "compilation" as "a work formed by the collection 
and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or 
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of 
authorship.,,75 The compilations under the U.S. copyright statute are collective works 
such as periodicals, anthologies or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions 
constitute separate and independent works within each collection. The protection only 
extends to the material contribution by the author of such work distinct from the 
preexisting materials employed in the work, and does not imply or embrace any exclusive 
right in the preexisting materials.76 
Interestingly, prior to 1991, the U.S. courts mainly applied the "sweat of the 
brow" doctrine to afford copyright protection on factual compilations, or "industrial 
collections." A number of cases showed that the U.S. courts considered labor, skill, and 
expenses contributed in the making process in addition to author's creativity. These 
include Hutchison Telephone Company v. Fronteer Directory Company of Minnesota, 
Inc. (1985)77 (Concerning copyrightable telephone directories); Regents of University of 
Minnesota v. Applied Innovations, Inc. (1989)78 (Concerning copyrightable data of a 
7417 V.S.C.A. § 102. 
75 
Id .. § 10l. 
76 Id. § 103(b) 
77 • 
Hutchison Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Company of Minnesota, Inc., 770 F.2d. 128, 131 (8th Cir. 
1985). 
78 Regents ofUniv. of Minn. v. Applied Innovations, Inc., 876 F. 2d 626 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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psychological test only as compilations); Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Board of Trade of the 
City of Chicago (1982)79 (Concerning copyrightable lists of component stocks) and in 
List Publishing Co. v. Keller (1887)80 (Concerning copyrightable society directories). 
In conformity with the U.S. ratification of the Berne Convention in 1989,81 the 
U.S. courts began to realize and recognize the author's creativity in his works rather than 
just his sweat. The "sweat of the brow" doctrine was coming to an end. Two years after 
ratification, the U.S. courts reversed their earlier decisions, rejecting the "sweat of the 
brow" doctrine that had long dominated, and began to apply rules to establish copyright 
protection of factual compilations. The labor contributions in the collection and gathering 
of facts or data were no longer applicable to copyright protection in factual compilations 
in the U.S. 
In the landmark case, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc. 
(1991),82 the Supreme Court required proof of an author's creative expression attaching 
to the selection and arrangement of the contents of factual compilations. The subject-
matter in the case was facts or raw data, names and addresses of subscribers appearing in 
telephone directories. The U.S. Supreme Court established two propositions: (a) facts are 
not copyrightable and (b) compilations of facts are.83 
Rural, the respondent, brought a copyright infringement claim before the court on 
the proposition that Feist, the petitioner, in compiling its own directory, could not use the 
information contained in Rural's white pages directory.84 Rural was a certified public 
79 
80 D.ow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 546 F. Supp. 113,115 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
81 LIst Publishing Co. v. Keller, 30 F. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1887). 
82 http://www.wipo.intitreaties/enlRemarks.jsp?cnty_id=1045C, entered into force March 1, 1989. 
83 499 U.S. 340, supra note 5. 
Id. at 345 
84 • 
Id. at 344-345. 
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utility with a state concession to provide telephone services to several communities 
including a typical telephone directory, consisting of white pages and yellow pages.85 It 
obtained data for the directory from subscribers who must provide their names and 
addresses as they signed up for telephone services.86 Feist was a publishing company that 
specializes in area-wide telephone directories, covering a much larger geographic range 
than such directories as Rural's.87 Feist contacted Rural to obtain infonnation covering 11 
different telephone service areas in Kansas, and was refused the right to license its white 
pages listings. 88 Feist, therefore, extracted the listings it needed from Rural's directory 
without Rural's consent.89 In appearance, Feist's several listings were identical to the 
listings in Rural's white pages.90 Even though the District Court found Rural's refusal 
was motivated by an unlawful purpose "to extend its monopoly in telephone service to a 
monopoly pages advertising,,,91 it granted summary judgment in favor of Rural in its 
copyright infringement claim, holding that telephone directories are copyrightable.92 The 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affinned.93 
The Supreme Court reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Feist. The 
Supreme Court held that the selection, coordination, and arrangement of the respondent's 
white pages did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright 
protection.94 The Supreme Court found that Rural's white pages, which contained only 
85 Id. at 342. 
86 Id. 
87 
88 Id. at 343. 




92 Id. at 368. 
93 Rural Tel. Service Co. v. Feist Publications Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 218 (1987). 
94 Rural Tel. Service Co. v. Feist Publications Inc., 916 F. 2d 718 (1990). 
499 U.S. 340, supra note 5, at 351-361. 
27 
factual infonnation, i.e., phone numbers, addresses, and names listed in alphabetical 
order, lacked the requisite originality as follows: 
"The key to resolving the tension lies in understanding why facts are not 
copyrightable. The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify 
for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author. Original, 
as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was 
independently created by author (as opposed to copied from the other 
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. 
To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight 
amount will suffice ... Originality does not signify novelty; a work may 
be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the 
similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying."95 
There was no valid copyright of facts because no author may copyright the facts he 
narrates. 
The factual compilations, on the other hand, may possess the requisite 
originality.96 If the author chose which facts to include, in what order to place them, and 
how to arrange the collected data so that readers may use them effectively, these choices 
as to selection and arrangement might be sufficiently original, so long as they are made 
independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity.97 The Supreme 
Court further suggested that the degree of creativity in compilations is "thin" in regard to 
the limited nature of the selection and arrangement, such as the mere sequence of Arabic 
numbers and alphabets.98 Because they were merely alphabetical and numerical, Rural's 
95 
!d. at 346 
96 • 
Id. at 371. 
97 Id. 
98 
!d. at 349. 
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selection and arrangement of its listings did not satisfy the minimum requirements for the 
u.s. copyright protection because they lacked "the modicum of creativity necessary to 
transform mere selection and arrangement into copyrightable expression.,,99 
In regard to the doctrine of the sweat of the brow, the Supreme Court clearly 
rejected, holding that Rural's labor used in the gathering or collecting of facts or data did 
not require a creative contribution: 
"The 'sweat of the brow' doctrine had numerous flaws, the most glaring 
being that it extended copyright protection in a compilation beyond 
selection and arrangement - the compiler's original contributions - to 
the facts themselves. Under the doctrine, the only defense to 
infringement was independent creation. A subsequent compiler was 'not 
entitled to take one word of information previously published,' but rather 
had to 'independently work out the matter for himself, so far as to arrive 
at the same result from the same common sources of information. 'Sweat 
of the brow' courts thereby eschewed the most fundamental axiom of 
copyright law - that no one may copyright facts or ideas."loo 
Therefore, the "sweat of the brow" doctrine no longer applied to the factual compilations 
in order to merit copyright protection. 
In addition, the Supreme Court stated the rationale of the copyright statute: a 
proper balance between authors and the public. Referring to Article I, Section 8, Clause 
8 of the U.S. Constitution, or the "Intellectual Property Clause," the Supreme Court 
reasoned that the U.S. copyright law meant "to promote the progress of science and 
99 [d. 
100 
!d. at 374. 
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useful arts" by condition that the duration of protection should be limited.lOl This Clause 
mandates originality as a prerequisite for copyright protection. The constitutional 
requirement necessitates independent creation plus a modicum of creativity.102 Since 
facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship, they are not original and, thus, are 
not copyrightable.103 Copyright law meant to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts by maintaining a proper balance between the author's incentive as to complete 
creativity cycle and the public access to useful facts and infonnation. 
Thus, the Supreme Court in Feist set a finn standard for original compilations. 
First, the compilations must be assembled from pre-existing materials, facts, or data 
whether or not protected.104 Second, the compilations must result from the process of 
selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials. lOS Finally, the creation, by 
virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement, must be an "original" 
work of authorship.lo6 To make his or her compilation work subject to protection, he or 
she must prove that there is some creative expression used in the selection and 
arrangement of the contents sufficient to justify copyright protection in such works. 
The Feist decision impacted the U.S. database industries by no longer affording 
copyright protection for any of their industrial collections or assets.107 The subsequent 
compilers are free to obtain, use, and compile the same facts and data, and enter into the 
market competing against the original compilers. To date, legislation in Congress aimed 
at overturning Feist and instituting sui generis protections for databases have failed. 
101 
102 U.S. Constitution art. I, sect. 8, cl. 8. 
10 
499 U.S. 340, supra note 5, at 344-351. 
3/d. 
104 
[d. at 357 
105 [d. . 
106/d. 
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ProCD, Inc. v. Matthew Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640 (1996). 
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B. Database Protection in the European Union 
To protect the European database industries, the European Parliament extended 
legal protection to the sui generis databases. In particular, in the field of intellectual 
property relating to technology, the European Community needed to adopt unified legal 
measures to strengthen the economic and political cohesion of sui generis protection in 
the region.108 Technological advances had revealed a continuing tension in the region 
between the free movement of goods and services among Member States and the regime 
of existing intellectual property protection in the national legal systems. The European 
Court of Justice moved with deliberate speed to establish the principle that, where goods 
are lawfully placed on the market in a Member State, copyright cannot be relied upon to 
restrict the free circulation of those goods elsewhere in the Community. 109 
According to a survey of technology copyright, the "Green Paper on Copyright 
and the Challenge of Technology-copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action" ("Green 
Paper") 1988,110 the European Commission noted the need to re-examine the existing 
108 The Treaty of European Union or Maastricht Treaty, Dec. 10, 1991 [hereinafter TEU] art. B. "The Union 
shall set itself the following objectives: 
-to promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable, in particular through 
the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social 
cohesion and through the establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single 
currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty; 
-to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a 
Common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which 
might in time lead to a common defence; 
-to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States 
through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union; 
-to develop close cooperation on justice and home affairs; 
-to maintain in full the 'acquis communautaire' and build on it with a view to considering, through 
the procedure referred to in Article N(2), to what extent the policies and forms of cooperation introduced 
by this Treaty may need to be revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanism and the 
institutions of the Community " 
109 • 
110 Green Paper, para. 1.1.2, at 1. 
Id. Copyright and Information: Limits to the Protection of Literary and Pseudo-literary Works in the 
Member States of the European Communities (DG IV) (1992) [hereinafter DG IV Report]. ADOLF DIETZ, 
COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A COMPARATIVE INVESTIGATION OF NATIONAL 

















protection relating to sui generis databases in several ways. First, regarding the distinct 
legal traditions among member countries, the European Commission noted that the 
various forms of legal protection of sui generis databases that existed in the national legal 
systems may restrict the free circulation of information goods and services in the 
Community as a single internal market. l11 Member States of the E.U. had agreed to 
provide copyright protection to creative collections in conformity with Article 2(5) of the 
Berne Convention as a minimum requirement, but not necessarily to the sui generis 
databases. The allowance of the Berne Convention's minimum principle was based upon 
distinct legal traditions or economic significance of the subject matters of member 
countries. For instance, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland provided 
copyright protection on factual or data collections based on the labor and skill which 
contributed to the works.l12 The Nordic countries, in contrast, extended neighboring 
rights to catalogues and like works. 1 13 The divergence of protection had to be eliminated 
because it was seen as substantially disruptive to the functioning of the market; it 
obstructed or distorted cross-frontier trade in goods and services, and distorted 
competition. 1 14 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1978). "The concept of collective work appears to be superfluous 
alongside the concept of compilation, although it is separately regulated in, for example, French Copyright 
Law (Article 9, Para 3 and Article 13). The reason for the French regulation lies in the fact that in the case 
of so-called collective works (as the case of compilations). There are several participating authors; that is, 
on the other hand, the authors of the individual contributions who are associated with the collective work or 
compilation, and on the other hand the author of the collective work or the collection itself, who as we have 
said acquires a separate copyright without prejudice to copyright works included if a protectab1e effort is 
present in the selection or arrangement ... Finally, the Belgian, British and Irish Copyright Laws in no way 
cover the question of the relation of the various participating copyrights in compilations (collective works), 
leaving it to the J·udgment of the courts." 
111 
112 Green Paper, at 3. 
DG IV Report. 
113 /d. 
114 
Green Paper para. 1.3.1, at 3. 
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Second, the E.U. Commission was concerned with the impact of computer 
technology on the sui generis protection of databases. 1 IS The advent of computer 
technology afforded new, efficient techniques to create or construct the database 
contents, but also brought a number of new legal issues to copyright law. For instance, 
the Commission could not determine whether the acts of copying and retrieving would 
constitute an infringement inasmuch as a computer would process temporary copying and 
storing before it could present an outcome. 116 Or in reference to fair use exemptions, the 
Commission could not determine whether the incorporation of the work in extenso would 
constitute a reproduction and presuppose the consent of the author or his successor in title 
unless the reproduction falls within a recognized exception to the restricted acts under the 
copyright laws of Member States.1l7 Given the fact that a computerized information 
system normally aims at giving extensive access to the information stored, the normal 
exemptions from restricted acts in the laws of Member States for certain uses, such as 
private use, or fair use, are of little practical relevance to the storage of copyright works 
in information systems.1l8 Consequently, bibliographical information relating to 
published works and authors thereof, indexes, references, and similar information can be 
compiled freely since the use of such information in no way implies that works are 
reproduced in full or in part. 119 
Last, the E.U. Commission was well aware of the impending economic losses 
incurred by the European database industries engaged in global trading. 120 Based upon 
115 
116 Id. paras. 6.3, at 208-216. 
lI7 Id. paras. 6.3.5-6.3.9, at 208-21l. 
118 !d. para. 6.3.5, at 209. 
Id. 
119 Id 
120 . para. 6.3.6, at 209. 
!d. para. 6.2, at 207-208. 
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statistical information in 1988, the E.U. recognized that the database industry was its 
fastest growing sector. 121 At the Community level, the volume of public use had grown 
from 400 in 1980 to 2,901 in 1986.122 The worldwide revenue of electronic publishing in 
1985 amounted to $5 billion.123 The U.S. was responsible for more than four of five of 
the total revenue, but Germany, France and the United Kingdom altogether were only 
responsible for an amount of 350 million dollars. The E.U. Commission advised that any 
legal problems in relation to the transborder data flow must be removed if the 
Community was to develop a competitive role in the information services market.
124 
To form a standard regime of protection for sui generis databases, the E.U. 
Commission enacted the Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases in 1996.
125 
Clearly stated in the recitals, the E.U. Commission recognized the importance of 
investment of financial resources and the expending of time, effort, and energy involved 
in the making of databases.126 Distinguishing the copyright protection in the selection 
and arrangement from the sui generis protection,127 the Database Directive grants the 
database makers a second tier protection on the factual contents. In other word, the 
Database Directive constitutes double property rights in the selection and arrangement, as 
well as the non-creative contents of databases. 
121 
Id. para. 6.2.1, at 207. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 I d. 
:25 Database Directive, supra note 66. 
26 Id. recital (38) "Whereas the increasing use of digital recording technology exposes the database maker 
to the risk that the contents of his database may be copied and rearranged electronically, without his 
authorization, to produce a database of identical content which, however, does not infringe any copyright in 
~e arrangement of his database;" and recital (39) "Whereas, in addition to aiming to protect the copyright 
m the original selection or arrangement of the contents of a database, this Directive seeks to safeguard the 
~osition of makers of databases against misappropriation of the results of the financial and professional 
mVestment made in obtaining and collection the contents by protecting the whole or substantial parts of a 
~~tabase against certain acts by a user or competitor." 
/d. arts. 3 and 7(1). 
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1. The Flaws ofthe E.U. Database Directive 
The European regime of sui generis database protection creates a number of 
potential socio-economic and legal issues. Undoubtedly, provisions in the Database 
Directive give rise to a property right in factual or data contents. Some legal scholars 
argue that such a regime will lead naturally to a monopoly for the European database 
industries and detrimentally impact established social, economic and legal policies.128 
They even warn that the broad definition of databases and the duration of protection, as 
stipulated in Articles 1 and 10 respectively, would block the public free flow of access to 
information in several ways. 129 First, the definition of databases is overly broad. Article 
1 (2) of the Database Directive defines "database" as "a collection of independent works, 
data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and individually 
accessible by electronic means.,,130 This broad definition embraces a wide range of 
databases such as "literary, artistic or other collections of works or collection of other 
material such as texts, sound, images, numbers, facts, and data", and covers collections of 
independent works, data or other materials that are systematically or methodically 
arranged and can be individually accessed. l3l Although it is apparent that the definition 
does not refer to a recording or an audiovisual and cinematographic work, nor does it 
apply to computer programs used in the making or operation of databases accessible by 
electronic means,132 the definition does not suggest that the referring databases must be 
128 
129 Debra B. RosIer, J.H. Reichman and Paul F. Uhlir, and Mark Schneider, supra note 68. 
130 Database Directive, supra note 66, arts. 1(2) and 7(1) and recital 38. 
131 ld. art. 1(2) and recital 17. 
Id. recital 20 " ... protection under the Directive may also apply to the materials necessary for the 
operation or consultation of certain databases, such as thesaurus and indexation systems.", recital 21 " ... the 
condition that the contents of the database are arranged systematically or methodically does not necessitate 
that it is physically stored in an organized manner.", and recital 22 " ... the term "electronic database" 
mthin the meaning of the Directive also may include devices such as CD-ROM and CD-i." 
!d. art. 1(3). 
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"commercialized." It merely specifies in Article 7 that for the sui generis databases to be 
protected, the makers must show that there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a 
substantial investment in the making of databases. 133 
Second, the E.U. Database Directive could create an unlimited duration of 
protection. Compared to the traditional copyright duration (the author's life plus fifty 
years), Article 10 of the E.U. Database Directive provides a shorter duration of fifteen 
years running from January 1 of the year following the date ofcompletion134 or from the 
first year making it available to the public thereby ending legal protection.13s In effect, 
however, the Directive may generate a virtually limitless duration of protection. Article 
10(3) of the E.U. Directive stipulates that it could endure infinitely longer if there is a 
proof of "any substantial change, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, to the contents 
of a database, including any substantial change resulting from the accumulation of 
successive additions, deletions or alterations,,,136 which would result in the database 
being considered to be a substantial new investment, evaluated qualitatively or 
quantitatively. Such repeating duration of protection would create a lengthy and almost 
unlimited duration leading to a monopoly in the European database industries. 
133 
Id . . art. 7(1) and recital 40. " ... to ensure protection of any investment in obtaining, verifying or 
pres~n~g the contents of a database for the limited duration of the right; whereas such investment may 
~~nslst m the deployment of financial resources and/or the expending of time, effort and energy." 
da Id. art. 10(1) and recital 53. " ... the burden of proof regarding the date of completion of the making of a 
. 13stabase lies with the maker of the database." 
. 136/d· art. 10(2). 
In ~fi art .. 10(3) and recital 54. " ... the burden of proof that the criteria exist for concluding that a substantial 
. 0 lcatlOn of the contents of a database is to be regarded as a substantial new investment lies with the 
of the database resulting from such investment." 
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2. Implementation of the E.U. Database Directive in the National 
Legal Systems of the E.U. Member States 
The E.U. Database Directive has taken effect in the national legal systems of its 
Member States. Member States of the European Union, notably Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom (without counting the ten 
new Members), were required to transpose the provisions of the Directive into their 
national legislation before January 1, 1998.137 To date, there is clear evidence that 
national courts in Member States have consistently applied the sui generis protection to 
factual or information databases. 
English courts have extended legal protection to sui generis databases, such as 
online statistical data or information regarding horseracing. In British Horseracing Board 
Ltd. and others v. William Hill Organization Ltd. case (2001),138 the Chancery Court 
recognized that the online compiled statistical data regarding horseracing should be 
protected in accordance with the E.U. Database Directive, Article 7(1). The claimant, the 
British Horseracing Board Limited (BHB), which owns an exclusive right in publishing 
horseracing statistics and data, filed an infringement claim before the Court on the 
grounds that the defendant, William Hill Organization Ltd. (William Hill), had illegally 
used unlicensed on-line horseracing statistics and data obtained from an authorized 
infonnation service provider, Satellite Information Services Limited (SIS), for William 
Hill's own commercial purpose. 139 
137 13/d .. ~rt. 16(1). 
139 Bntish Horseracing Board Ltd. v. William Hill Organization Ltd., 151 NJC 271 (Ch. 2001). 
Id. paras. 3-20. 
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I. 
BHB proved that its databases ("BHB Database") had required substantial and 
continuing investment. The BHB Database needed substantial investment as a result of 
the necessity of verifying, gathering, and constantly updating it with the latest 
information. 140 Its maintenance and development, accordingly, entailed extensive work, 
including the collection of raw data, the design of the database, the selection and 
verification of data for inclusion in the database, and the insertion and arrangement of 
selected data in the database. 141 This process cost approximately £4 million per annum 
(and accounted for about 25% of BHB' s total expenditure) and involved approximately 
80 employees and extensive computer software and hardware. 142 
Information service providers such as SIS made the BHB Database available in an 
electronic form. The data contained an accurate, up-to-the-minute list of races, declared 
runners and jockeys, distance and name of races, race times, and number of runners in 
each race together with other information. 143 SIS was allowed to use data from BHB 
Database for certain purposes, including for onward transmission to, and use by, its own 
subscribers including bookmakers. 144 William Hill, who was one of the leading providers 
of off-track bookmaking services in the United Kingdom for both British and 
international customers, relied on horseracing information supported by the SIS which 
came, directly or indirectly, from the BHB Database. 145 In other words, BHB licensed 
such information only to SIS, not to William Hill. 
140 
Id. paras. 6-11. 
141 Id. 
142 
!d. para. 10 
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The Court found that William Hill's activities constituted breaches of BHB's 
database right. The Court held that: first, each day of use by William Hill of data taken 
from SIS and other sources was an extraction or re-utilization of a substantial part of the 
contents of its databases contrary to Article 7(1) of the E.U. Database Directive; 146 and 
second, even if the individual extracts were not substantial, nevertheless the totality of 
William Hill's actions amounted to repeated and systematic extraction or re-utilization of 
substantial parts of the contents of the database contrary to Article 7(5) of the E.U. 
Database Directive. 147 The Court recognized that there must be substantial investment in 
obtaining, verifying, or presenting database contents in order to justify protection. As 
BHB had satisfactorily proved its substantial investment in obtaining, verification, and 
representation of databases, the Court delivered a summary judgment in favor of BHB.148 
This case provides clear evidence that British courts have fully adopted the Database 
Directive by extending higher protection for the factual database contents, apart from 
copyright law. 
c. Impact of Berne's National Treatment Principle on Databases 
The legal issue of sui generis databases appears to be problematic between 
countries. Inasmuch as the nature of copyright and other kinds of intellectual property is 
territorial, the authors of artistic and literary works need to rely on the universal rules 
under the Berne Convention to extend the legal protection to the subject matter outside 
146 
147 !d. paras. 31-60. 
148 !d. paras. 61-76. 







the borders of their home country.149 Governments of Member Countries are obligated to 
comply with the Berne principles, providing both foreign and their national authors with 
equal protection as clearly prescribed in Article 5, as follows: 
"Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected 
under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country 
of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter 
grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this 
C . "ISO onventton. 
Country-by-country treatment of database protection is troublesome. lsl Under the 
Berne regime, a country that is a party to the Convention must afford foreign authors the 
same standard of protection offered to their own nationals. However, countries have 
disparate levels of protection, which results in unequal treatment under the laws. 152 In 
the B.D., for example, the level of protection is comparatively high. In the United States, 
the level of protection is restrictive and comparatively low. When an author from the 
u.s. has his work utilized in the E.D., he benefits from the higher level of protection. 
When an author from the E.D., however, has his work utilized in the D.S., he receives 
less protection and places his work at a higher level of risk. 
~ .. . 
ANTHONY D'AMATO AND DORlS ESTELLE LONG, supra note 63, at 199. "The "temtonal" VIew of 
intellectual property, which maintained that an owner's rights ended at the border, necessarily gave rise to 
multinational efforts to establish international protection nonns, culminating in the Berne and Paris 
~onventions in the latter part of Nineteenth Century. Because of the accepted territorial nature of 
mtellectual property rights, both Conventions relied largely upon a "national treatment" standard to assure 
unifonn protection" 150 • 
151 Berne Convention art. 5. 
ANTHONY D'AMATO AND DORlS ESTELLE LONG, supra note 63, at 52-60 (The "Economics" of 
R:tabases Protection: A Case Study) and at 201-203 (c. The Continuing Viability of National Treatment). 
Id. at 205-206. "NT creates a disparate level of protection in different countries. It does not ensure 
SUbstantive equivalence. Thus, according to NT principles, a country with a high level of protection must 
~~t this higher protection even to foreigners of countries with a lower level of protection. However, when 
CItizens from the country with a higher level of protection visit the country with a lower level of protection, 
they must settle for the lower protection of the country." 
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D. Effect of the European Sui Generis System 
Unlike the abovementioned scenano, the regIme protection of sui generis 
databases creates unfair treatment. According to Article 11 (3) of the Database Directive, 
the E.D. Commission has adopted the principle of reciprocity treatment for cross-border 
trading in databases as follows: 
"Agreements extending the right provided for in Article 7 to databases 
made in third countries and falling outside the provisions of paragraphs 1 
and 2 shall be concluded by the Council acting on a proposal from the 
Commission.,,153 
The E.D. Commission clearly requires that, for any third country's sui generis 
databases to be protected in the Community, there must be a special agreement between 
that country and the E. D. Comparable to the reciprocity treatment in regard to the rental 
rights in videos and sound recordings under Article 13 of the Berne Convention, 154 
Article 11(3) of the E. D. Database Directive imposes reciprocal treatment, requiring that 
the contracting countries must prove the same higher standard of protection of sui generis 
databases. If the governments of contracting countries proved or upgraded the same 
higher standard of protection, the E.D. Commission would afford the foreign compilers 
from the contracting countries the same benefit as their own citizens. 
153 
154 Database Directive, supra note 66, art. 11(3). 
!d. art. 13. "Each country of the Union may impose for itself reservations and conditions on the 
eXclusive rights granted to the author of a musical work and to the author of any words, the recording of 
which together with the musical work has already been authorized by the latter, to authorize the sound 
recording of that musical work, together with such words, if any; but all such reservations and conditions 
sha!l apply only in the countries which have imposed them and shall not, in any circumstances, be 
prejudicial to the rights of these authors to obtain equitable remuneration which, in the absence of 






The effect of Article 11(3) of the E.U. Database Directive reflects in the decision 
ofthe William Hill case of the British court, which confirms the vulnerability of the U.S. 
database industry. The British court in that case recognized the property right in the 
factual contents by implementing the E.U. Databases Directive if the database maker 
satisfactorily presents substantial investment of labor, expertise, and finance in the 
collection, gathering, selection, and arrangement of databases. I55 In contrast, in order to 
enable American copyright legislation to obtain the universal standard under the Berne 
regime, the U.S. Supreme Court in the Feist case has set a new standard of protection for 
factual or data compilations. I56 The reversed concept is that the factual contents of 
databases are not copyrightable and the copyright protection, if any, will attach only to 
the creative selection and arrangement of databases. I57 By alleging the requirement of 
reciprocal treatment prescribed under Article 11(3) of the Database Directive, the 
European database makers will have an advantage over the U.S. database makers once 
the foreign works are exhibited and exploited in the Community.I58 The U.S. database 
makers who possess most of the databases in the world market are being made vulnerable 
to the European database makers who are free to take, in whole or part, U.S. databases 
without violation, and worse, without any remuneration. The unfair treatment will 
pressure the fearful U.S. database makers to lobby their governments to engage in 
negotiation or adopt new domestic legislation that the European Commission would 
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151 NJC 271 supra note 137. 
156 
499 U.S. 340, supra note 6. 
157 
Id. at 344-364. 
158 
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 60, at 8. "There was 
much discussion at the April conference of the effect of the EU Directive's "reciprocity" provision on 
American database producers. Unlike irI a "national treatment" scheme, US companies do not automatically 
enjoy the protections afforded by the Directive's sui generis protection scheme ... "the existirIg disparity 
between US and EU database protection gives European database producers a distirIct advantage" and that 
"it may argue that this reciprocity requirement enables European database producers to grow by exploiting 






consider to be compatible with the E.U. Database Directive. 159 For the U.S. sui generis 
databases to be protected in the European Community, the U.S. government must show 
its willingness to protect sui generis databases. The U.S. government, however, has not 
made any special agreement with the E.U. Instead, the U.S. government reserves its 
position, submitting its own version of a possible draft of database treaty at the WIPO. 160 
In addition, Article 11(3) of the E.U. Database Directive is a protective clause and 
it creates unfair treatment to others. The E.U. Commission invoked the need to establish 
uniform protection in the Community on copyright-technology-related matters, including 
databases, for the purpose of economic and social integration. The E.U. Database 
Directive is a regional mandate implemented among Member States of the European 
Union. Any country, particularly developing countries, wishing to contract with the 
Community, needs to upgrade their legal system, which may be parallel to their existing 
legal tradition and the socio-economic situation. For example, the databases of medical 
plants that have been collected and passed on from generation to generation in India, 
Thailand and other tropical countries will be forever lost to their originators once they 
enter the Community. The European database makers benefit from the E.U. Database 
Directive, having a legitimate access to unprotected databases, and the European 
phannaceutical companies will benefit from patents of developed drugs that have already 
been discovered but have never been developed as such in developing countries. 
159 
Mark Schneider, supra note 68, at 562. "The reciprocal requirement of the Database Directive has 
created pressure on the Untied States to adopt sui generis protection." Contrast Doug Isenberg, The 
Database Debate; Will States Regulate Where the Feds Have Fears to Tread?, e-Business: Policy Watch, 
April 15 (2001). "Database protection laws may not be necessary, worthwhile, or constitutional. Rather, 
with the wealth of information created and disseminated online, U.S. companies should use existing laws to 
their advantage and ensure that their business models depend on more than the mere distribution of data, 
~~ether that data consists of stock prices, addresses, or lottery picks." 
Thomas C. Vinji, supra note 51 at 17.4. "The rest of the world would be wise to await the result of the 
European Union's experiment with sui generis protection for databases contents before proceeding toward 




Last, there is clear evidence that the E.U. policy tends to create political tension 
between countries outside the Community. Besides the forceful objectives set forth under 
the TEU, Member States of the E.U. must implement the policy of "supranationalism" to 
achieve its federal goal. 161 The Court of First Instance of the E.U. in Luxemburg 
declared: "Berne provisions no longer apply to determine cases between B.U. member 
countries if they conflict with the B.U. law on point.,,]62 Although the European nations 
had formed the Berne Union in 1886 and played important roles in various revisions of 
the Berne Convention, it appears that the E.U. member countries no longer need to rely 
on the principles set forth in the Berne Convention to stabilize legal conditions in 
European and global markets. 
E. Effect of European Sui Generis System in International Law 
The new form of intellectual property right challenges the conceptual balance of 
protection that establishes adequate incentive to encourage the creativity and that 
generates the public free flow of access to information. The European creation of sui 
generis protection has attracted attention from all in the global community by means of 
privatizing the public assets of knowledge and access to information. The Berne 
Convention and other international intellectual instruments strive to maintain a proper 
balance between the private rights to their ingenuity and the public right to enjoy the 
161 
DAMIAN CHALMERS, EUROPEAN UNION LAW VOLUME I: LAW AND EU GOVERNMENT (1998). "In the 
initial draft of the TEU it was stated that the 'Treaty marks a new stage in the process leading gradually to a 
Union with a federal goal'. Such a statement implied the eventually bringing of macroeconomic, defence, 
f~2reign policy under a single central authority and was vigorously opposed by the United Kingdom." 
STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE RULE OF LAW IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1977). "The judicial structure 
of "supranationalism" which is the basic fundamental federal system of the European Communities 
construct the task of European polity, constitutional judiciary, and normative and political role of the 
courts." 
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benefits of scientific progress and its applications, complimenting the means and nonns 
prescribed within the scope of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights163 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural RightS. 164 The sui generis 
protection, therefore, raises a primary issue of whether such a system is in violation or in 
furtherance of international human rights. 
The contrasting idea of sui generis protection was calculated in accordance with 
the economic scale of the database industries rather than the approach of intellectual 
property that takes an implicit balance between the rights of inventors and creators and 
the interests of the wider society. The sui generis protection of databases has proven to 
fulfill the economic expectations of the database industries particularly in developed 
countries, and the courts in a number of Member States of the European Union have 
already shown their ability to address issues arising in this matter (such as the 
interpretation of "substantial investment, substantial part of the content or substantial new 
investment,,).165 But there is no indication that the sui generis protection does not 
interfere with research or with the exchange of infonnation. Giving the private sector a 
means of control over the dissemination of contents will definitely block the free flow of 
access to infonnation to scientific research and educational communities. 166 
163 UDHR art. 27(1). 
:: ICESCR art. 15( 1 )(b). 
The Legal Protection of Databases (submitted by the European Community and its Member States), 
WIPO Doc. SCCR/8/8 (November 4. 2002) at 3. "First, the sui generis protection of databases has proven 
to fulfill the economic expectations. Since the entry into force of the Database Directive, the European CD-
ROM and onlirIe markets have grown at enormous rates ... Secondly, the application irI practice of the sui 
generis right has demonstrated that the protection is operational in the markets, that the Courts have already 
~~own their ability to address issues arising under the Directive." 
~ttp:1 164.233.161.1 04/search ?q=cache:C8pBMUhwGksI :www.spatial.mairIe.eduJ-onsrudiCourses/SIE52 
5/SlidesDtbs.pdf+database+protection+irI+europe&hl=en&client=fIfefox-a. "In a study irIvolving a 
quantitative comparison of 1164 database providers irI Canada, the US, the UK, Germany, and France from 
1993-2001, and extended irIterviews with academic scholars, officials, practicirIg lawyers, and business 
executives, with first hand knowledge of the EU Database Directive, it was concluded that the Directive 
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Consequently, the private control over the free flow of access to infonnation will 
incur a cost to access to education in developing countries where their national legal 
systems are far behind those in the developed countries. Inasmuch as Article 11(3) of the 
Database Directive imposes on the contracting countries an equivalent level of protection, 
the developing countries that could not upgrade to the level of protection compatible with 
the E.D. regime would be disadvantaged and vulnerable to possible unfair treatment. 
Such a system will directly impact on the development of human resources and, 
consequently, on the development of global infrastructure. 
v. The Draft Database Treaty at the Forum of the WIPO 
The WIPO Committees of Experts have been considering the Draft Treaty on 
Intellectual Property in Respect to Databases ("WIPO Draft Database Treaty,,).167 With 
political pressures from the two powerful economic parties, the B.U. and the U.S., the 
WIPO Director-General adopted the draft database treaty introducing the sui generis right 
for the protection of databases that have been created with a substantial investment such 
as capital, labor, or effort in the collection, assembly, verification, organization, or 
presentation of their contents. 168 The objectives have been set forth as follows: 
"Desiring to enhance and stimulate the production, distribution and 
international trade in databases, 
resulted in excessive protection for certain types of databases (i.e. telephone directories) and in new barriers 
to data aggregation. Probable secondary side effects included new opportunities for dominant fInns to 
harass competitors with threats of litigation, increased transactional gridlock, and inadvertent impediments 
~~d disincentives for non-commercial database providers." 
168 WIPO Draft Database Treaty. 






Recognizing that databases are a vital element in the development of a 
global information infrastructure and an essential tool for promoting 
economic, cultural and technological advancement, 
Recognizing that the making of databases requires the investment of 
considerable human, technical and financial resources but that such 
databases can be copied or accessed at a fraction of the cost needed to 
design them independently, 
Desiring to establish a new form of protection for databases by granting 
rights adequate to enable the makers of databases to recover the 
investment they have made in their databases and by providing 
international protection in a manner as effective and uniform as 
possible. ,,169 
The sui generis protection for existing databases laden with substantial investment 
in their cumulative contents is to be recognized as a new "intellectual property right." 
The objectives of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty are targeted to promote economic 
significance of databases in respect to the production, distribution, and international trade 
in databases. The reasons for the protection of sui generis databases are clearly 
articulated as a means to ensure a return on investment of the database industries, which 
was made necessary by the advancement of computer technology. Furthermore, the 
WIPO Committees of Experts questioned the adequacy of existing protection as stated in 
the Memorandum: "the copyright protection is inadequate and inefficient to safeguard the 
unfair competition of database industries in the global scene. ,,170 
169 
170 Id. Preamble Clause. 
/d. Memorandum. "The global information infrastructure is truly international, and the international 
commerce in the new millennium heavily relies on advanced computer technology in conducting business. 








There is a possible blurring of lines by extending copyright protection to 
industrial property. Copyright is a government-granted right, and governments are acting 
on behalf of the public interest to reward authors and artists who have contributed to 
society through their extraordinary expression, creativity, and genius.17l Article 2(5) of 
the Berne Convention has extended copyright protection only to the creative selection 
and arrangement by means of promoting the public free flow of access to information. 
Though the production and maintenance of databases have their own costs, it is doubtful 
if the invisible economic hand is not present to foster an incentive to encourage the 
production and development of the database industries, so that subsequent database 
makers would have to generate the same database from scratch. In addition, most 
businesses are "database consumers" relying heavily on the free flow of information to 
advance their business, but also operating in connection with technological means that 
makes every business both consumer and creator of databases. 172 That is to suggest that 
the technological measures, along with the existing protection available under contract 
and unfair competition laws, are sufficient to maintain appropriate incentive to the 
production and dissemination of the database industries. 173 As a result, it raises a concern 
of whether the protection of sui generis databases as a possible international intellectual 
property norm is desirable. 
development; and consequently these contents respect no national boundaries. While the protection under 
the Berne Convention and its successive international instruments is concerned with protecting rights and 
creating incentives associated with them, the competition law seeks to protect the process of competition 
~?m restraints on trade." 
Andres Lopez, The Impact of Protection of Non-original Databases on the Countries of Latin America 
~~d the Caribbean, WIPO Doc. SCCRJ8/6 (October 15,2002). 











People around the world have a right to free access to infonnation. Legislatures 
understand this concept of free access to infonnation, giving copyright protection only 
for the creative selection and arrangement of the contents, but not for the facts or data 
contained therein. Businesses expand; the scientific and educational communities 
continue to grow; and the authors complete the creativity cycle by having a free access to 
well-composed infonnation. Thus, the database makers are aware that the use of 
computer technology in this Infonnation Age would create problems of free-riding and 
unfair competition for them. They urge their national governments to secure and 
safeguard investment in the database industries by granting them a property right in 
factual and data contents, adding to the creative selection and arrangement already 
protected by the copyright law. 
No one can deny that databases are an essential building block of the Infonnation 
Society. The database makers in developed countries are making every effort to lobby 
their governments to engage in drafting database legislation. The Parliament of the 
European Union has successfully enacted its Database Directive and established the sui 
generis system to secure investment in the European database industries. It appears that 
the provisions set forth under the Database Directive create the sui generis right, but fail 
either to provide a clear definition of databases or to specify what types of databases, for 
instance, commercial and non-commercial, should be embraced in its umbrella of 
protection. The European Database Directive creates fear in the scientific and educational 
communities. In addition, Article 11 (3) of the Database Directive, requiring a special 










treatment, creates fear of unfair treatment to all and particularly the European major 
trading partners, the United States. The European database compilers can take the whole 
or substantial parts of U.S. databases without a fair compensation as long as the U.S. 
courts recognize only creative contribution attached to compilations. Most developing 
countries whose copyright systems are far behind will confront the same situation 
regarding the U.S., and their national knowledge wealth, such as collections of herbal 
medications that have been collected for generations, will be forever lost to the European 
market. The sui generis protection will widen the gap between "Have" and "Have-Not" 
countries. 
The WIPO Committees of Experts are considering this form of protection as a 
new intellectual property right. If enacted, the sui generis protection would represent 
privatization of community or societal knowledge: wealth that traditional copyright law 
has long been envisaged to exist unhindered in the free flow of facts, data, or information. 
According to the WIPO Draft Database Treaty, their objectives clearly recognize that 
"the information is an important tool to allow a vital development of a global socio-
economic infrastructure.,,174 Granting the property right in respect of facts or data 
contents would definitely lead the database industries to a monopoly, and consequently 
impair the ability of the public sector, as well as developing countries, to acquire free 
access to facts, data, and information. This is to suggest that the existing protection of 
competition law along with technical measures should be sufficient to enhance the 
production and creation of databases. 
174 
Thomas Riis, Economic Impact of the Protection of Unoriginal Databases in Developing Countries and 
Countries in Transition, WIPO Doc. SCCRl7/3 (2002). 
50 
Copyright law is now at a critical stage of its development. Rapid changes in 
technology, economic significance, and social need for the free flow of access to 
infonnation are all important factors that interact with and magnify each other and that 
challenge the existing protection based on the Berne Convention. How the right course of 
action will be determined and navigated will depend upon the consideration and 
conclusion of the WIPO Committees of Experts as to the role the WIPO will play in the 
establishment of international intellectual property norms arising from the ever-
increasing electronic use of facts, data or information. The Committees of Experts are 
expected to achieve all this while maintaining a proper balance of appropriate 
remuneration for investment in the database industries, and assuring vital access of 
information to all sectors of society. r'" .. ... -... 
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Chapter II 
Draft Treaty of Sui Generis Databases 
I. Introduction 
The investment of resources has become a justifiable criterion in the area of 
international intellectual property rights. As previously stated, the Director-General of the 
WIPO proposed a resolution adopted in 1996 that produced a draft treaty entitled "Basic 
Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect 
of Databases" ("WIPO Draft Database Treaty").] It sets forth a sui generis right modeled 
on competing proposals submitted by two powerful economic parties, Member States of 
the European Union2 and the United States of America.3 Its intention is to enable the 
makers of databases to recover the investment4 they claim in the making process, 
1 Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Databases to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. CRNRIDC/6 (December 1996) 
!hereinafter WIPO Draft Database Treaty]. 
The Sui Generis Right Provided for in the Proposal for a Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases, 
WIPO Doc. BCP/CENI5 (September, 1995). The European Community and its Member States Proposal 
for the International Harmonization of the Sui Generis Protection of Databases, WIPO Doc. BCP/CENI13 
~February 1996) [hereinafter E.U. Proposal]. 
The u.s. Proposal for Sui Generis Protection of Databases, WIPO Doc. BCP/CENIII2-INRICENII2 
~May 1996) [hereinafter U.S. Proposal]. 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty Preamble Clause. 
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collection, assembly, verification, organization, or presentation of the contents of 
databases.5 However, representatives of developing countries, such as African and Asian 
Pacific countries,6 express concern about the possible impact of sui generis right on the 
free flow of access to information in the fields of education, science, and research. 
Inasmuch as the databases are recognized as a vital element in the development of a 
global information infrastructure and an essential tool for promoting economic, cultural, 
and technological advancement around the globe, a primary question is raised whether 
such a regime is at all desirable. 
This Chapter surveys the provisions of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty. Section 
II introduces the history of the WIPO and provides an understanding of the administrative 
role of major conventions in regard to intellectual property rights. Section III analyzes the 
provisions of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty as a result of competing proposals of the 
E.D. and the U.S., and addresses questions concerning definitions, appropriate exceptions 
and limitations, and appropriate duration of protection for sui generis databases. Last, 
Section IV concludes with the concept of the nature of sui generis databases and suggests 
a need for specific protection of sui generis databases. 
5 /d. art. 1(1). 
Statement Adopted at the Regional Roundtable for Countries of Asia and the Pacific on the Protection of 
Databases and on the Protection of the Rights of Broadcasting Organizations, WIPO Doc. SCCRl3/6 
(August 30, 1999). "With regard to the protection of databases, it was the consensus that the need for 
additional protection whether at the national, regional or international level had not been established at this 
point. A variety of concerns were raised including those relating to scientific and educational fields and as 
to whether protection should extend to data in the public domain." 
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II. History of the WIPO and Its Roles 
Caused by the territorial nature, an effort to extend limited intellectual property 
rights across borders gave rise to the formation of an international administrative and 
monitoring body, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The WIPO was 
established in 1967 by a group of developed countries to administer significant 
intellectual property instruments such as the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property of 1883 ("Paris Convention") and the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886 ("Berne Convention")/ The Paris and 
Berne Conventions were established to reconcile unfair treatment that resulted from 
numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements between countries, particularly European 
countries in the late nineteenth century. It took several decades to recognize the need for 
a neutral body to administer these conventions. 
The long history of the WIPO has been influenced by juridical, economic, and 
political turbulence. Since intellectual property protection had been treated differently 
among member countries, the initial function of the WIPO was to set standards of 
protection. After the Second World War, the organization expanded to include some 
developing countries who were prepared to join the system and implement universal 
7 
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967 (amended 
September 28, 1979) [hereinafter WIPO Convention] art. 3(ii). MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE 
DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 126 (1998). "WIPO is 
among the most venerable of international governmental organization, dating its origins to the secretariats 
established to administer the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1883 and the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Work in 1886, which were united by the Swiss 
Federation into a single secretariat in 1893. In 1962 the U.S. representative to the Paris Union and Berne 
Union (as the membership are formally known to this day), Arpad Bogsch, took the lead in drafting a 
proposal for a reformed organization, becoming its deputy director general the next year in order to tum the 
~roposals into treaty text. He organized the 1967 diplomatic conference that resulted in fifty-one mostly 
Industrialized country governments promulgating the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual 
~roperty Organization and ascended to the position of director general in 1973. The WIPO story of 
Institution-building leadership by one person matched in the history of international governmental 
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protections of intellectual properties.8 The organization had been perceived as a rich 
man's club of industrialized countries, especially, when it came to a matter of 
international negotiations in regard to trade.9 Inasmuch as the industrialized countries had 
fonned the original organization, at an early stage of its development, they had exerted 
pressure at the forum. As a result of joining the UN system in 1974,10 the WIPO 
successfully adapted to necessary changes. In the opinion of the Director General, the 
WIPO offered the best institutional setting to become a universal organization with the 
goal of promoting "the protection of intellectual property throughout the world."!! The 
organization developed more effective administrative mechanisms and procedures that 
disadvantaged developed countries.!2 One clear example was the voting system. The 
organization used a one-country-one-vote system.13 With that change, developing 
countries which held the majority became a winner at the negotiations. Because of this 
shift, many developed countries perceived the organization as ineffective and opted out to 
use alternative forums such as the GATT!4 through the Agreement on Trade-Related 
8 Id. "In the past WIPO has, however, successfully adapted to change imposed upon it by its member states. 
The 1974 agreement to join the UN system turned the organization from a rich man's club of industrialized 
countries into a potentially universal membership, international governmental organization of developing 
countries that needed considerable educational services." 
9 Id. 
10 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, signed July 14, 1967, amended 
September 28, 1979 at http://www.wipo.intltreaties/enlconventionltrtdocs wo029.html. 
11 -
MrCHAELP. RYAN, supra note 7, at 127. WIPO Convention art. 4. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. WIPO Convention art. 8(5). 
"(a) Each State whether a member of one or both of the Executive Committees referred to in 
paragraph (l)(a), shall have one vote in the Coordination Committee. 
(b) One-half of the members of the Coordination Committee shall constitute a quorum. 
14 (c) A delegate may represent, and vote in the name of, one State only." 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994. MrCHAEL P. RYAN, supra note 7, at 132. 
"It is no surprise then that beginning in the early 1980s, globally ambitious, U.S.-based intellectual 
property-intensive industries and associations, along with the government representatives, turned away 
from WIPO with its domination by less developed countries and toward the GATT multilateral trade 
negotiations as the main way to establish American standards of intellectual property protection. It may 
well be that the patent issue (especially the pirating of pharmaceuticals), debated furiously between the 
United States and many developing country governments, could not have been settled anywhere but in the 
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Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS,,)I5 that guaranteed their preferable 
results in international negotiations. 
There are three major factors that affect the administrative roles ofthe WIPO. The 
first factor was due to the advent of modem technologies. In regard to the copyright-
technology related issue, the new technologies such as sound recording, films and 
broadcasting/6 afforded new forms of reproduction and dissemination of author's literary 
and artistic works in the new mediums and platforms. There were efforts to interpret such 
acts from all sources. Lawyers and legal scholars provided advice and comments, while 
legislatures responded to this challenge by enacting, amending, or repealing rules and 
regulations to accommodate these changes. National governments promoted their need to 
extend legal protection in these issues by participating in the forum. A number of 
proposals were submitted for consideration to the WIPO to update international 
intellectual property protection and improve services in accordance with the needs of 
member countries. 
The second factor involved the politics between "Have" and "Have-Not" 
countries. I7 Business firms in developed countries were dissatisfied with the level of 
GATT negotiations. The final TRIPS agreement, however, refers to and amends WIPO-administrated 
treaties on patents, copyrights, trademarks, semiconductor masks, industrial designs, and trade secrets. 
15 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods, April 15, 1994 [hereinafter TRIPS]. MICHAEL P. RYAN, supra note 7, at 132. "The agreement 
establishing the World Trade Organization, the GATT's successor, requiring member states to accept all 
WTO agreements, which means most developing countries will be party to the TRIPS agreement. This 
brings a new urgency to WIPO development cooperation. Because the countries must be in compliance 
with the provisions of the treaty within no more than decade, the organization must offer more training 
programs and more one-or-one consulting mission, greatly straining its human resources." Agreement 
?6etween the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, Dec. 22, 1995. 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sep. 9, 1886 (Paris Act of July 
1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention] arts. 9 (The right to authorize reproduction of literary and artistic 
~orks in "any manner or fonn") & Ilbis (The right to control broadcasting and cable transmissions). 
DORIS ESTELLE LONG AND ANTHONY D' AMATO, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 134 (2000). 
"p art of the reluctant to use GATT as a forum for addressing the desirability of new or additional 
international standards for intellectual property protection derived from the perception of many of these 
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protection offered by the existing international intellectual property instruments. For 
instance, the principle of national treatment ensures sufficient protection in developing 
countries, but dissatisfies remuneration, an important issue in developed countries. 18 In 
addition, the WIPO forum which was dominated by a majority of developing countries 
had developed loose rules and lacked a mechanism to settle disputes.19 It appeared that 
the WIPO, which had no enforcement mechanism, had no ability to enforce any 
violations of intellectual property treaties.2o When there was an issue between member 
countries, developed countries had to comply with the proceeding by submitting a 
petition to the International Court of Justice, which was time consuming. This 
incapability to deal with disputes became a weakness of the organization. Developed 
countries began to withdraw from the WIPO forum and engaged in more effective forums 
where an efficient enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms are provided. 
countries that GATT was primarily a forum for the "have" nations. Thus, many developing countries were 
concerned that their needs would not be given sufficient consideration in the GATT arena. Furthermore, to 
the extent that international norms might be required, these countries believed that the Berne Convention, 
with its emphasis on national treatment, had already dealt with the issue and that any changes which might 
be required should be dealt with only by WIPO, which had responsibility overseeing the Convention." 
18 !d. at 135. "By contrast, the developed countries, including the United States, were strongly dissatisfied 
with efforts to resolve existing copyright issues under WIPO auspices. While developing countries saw 
WIPO as a generally hospitable forum for their concerns, many developed countries considered it to be 
indifferent to their needs at best and hostile at worst, in view of renewed efforts by some developing 
countries to use WIPO to lessen the level of protection established under the Berne Convention. The 
developed countries perceived GATT as providing a forum where an international consensus could be 
reached regarding the scope of protection for works not covered by the Berne Convention-including 
software and computer databases-outside the potentially politicized open meetings required by WIPO. 
Finally, developed countries sought to rectify a perceived lack of adequate enforcement mechanisms under 
the Berne Convention. Although Article 33 of the Berne Convention provides that disputes can be brought 
before the International Court of Justice, at the time of Uruguay Round negotiations not one dispute had 
been referred to that court in over forty-five years. Because WIPO had no other enforcement procedures for 
aSsuring that a member's law compiled with Berne's agree-upon minimums, the developed countries 





The last factor was the shift toward a nonnative "universal organization." When 
the WIPO joined the Untied Nations system in 1974,21 it changed from a somewhat 
exclusive organization to a more universal organization. Instead of being used as a forum 
for trade negotiations in matters relating to intellectual property rights, the WIPO had 
focused on its primary goal "to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout 
the world.',22 The Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization 
sets its major functions as follows: (1) to help member countries create multilateral 
norms; (2) to help developing countries write and administer national laws; and (3) to 
serve the member countries through administration of the treaties.23 It rendered the 
organization a strong administrative body of conventions. 
The organization continues to serve its members through the administration of 
international instruments in regard to intellectual property rightS.24 This function also 
21 MICHAELP. RYAN, supra note 7, at 125-139. 
22 WIPO Convention art. 3(i). "to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world 
through cooperation among States and, where appropriate, in collaboration with any other international 
organization." 
23 Id. art. 4. "In order to attain the objectives described in Article 3, the Organization, through its 
appropriate organs, and subject to the competence of each of the Unions: 
(i) shall promote the development of measures designed to facilitate the efficient protection of 
intellectual property throughout the world and to harmonize national legislation in this field; 
(ii) shall perform the administrative tasks of the Paris Union, the Special Unions established in 
relation with that Union, and the Berne Union; 
(iii) may agree to assume, or participate in, the administration of any other international agreement 
designed to promote the protection of intellectual property; 
(iv) shall encourage the conclusion of international agreements designed to promote the protection 
of intellectual property; 
(v) shall offer its cooperation to States requesting legal-technical assistance in the field of 
intellectual property; 
(vi) shall assemble and disseminate information concerning the protection of intellectual property, 
carry out and promote studies in this field, and publish the results of such studies; 
(vii) shall maintain services facilitating the international protection of intellectual property and, 
where appropriate, provide for registration in this field and the publication of the data concerning the 
registrations; 
24 (viii) shall take all other appropriate action." 
DORIS ESTELLE LONG AND ANTHONY D'AMATO, supra note 17, at 135. "The strong international links 
between economy, science, technology and culture do not exclude other organization or agreements in their 
activities to be concerned with the problems of implementing intellectual property rights. However, for 
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includes drafting and enacting of possible treaties. For the legal issue of sui generis 
databases, instead of adopting either the European Union or the United States version, the 
WIPO Director-General produced and adopted its own version of a draft database treaty 
at the end of 1996, calling on all member countries, intergovernmental organizations and 
non-governmental organizations to survey the possibility and need of sui generis 
protection.z5 The majority's views emphasized the importance of free exchange and open 
access to information "of the larger public interest, such as science, education and 
national security."Z6 Others criticized the scope and duration of protection and said that if 
such a system were established, "it should reflect a proper balance between the rights and 
interests of right owners and the larger public interest, including the science, research and 
education sectors."Z7 
legal certainty and comprehensiveness, the competence of WIPO and its direct participation should be 
maintained since the solution of these problems belongs to the scope of its duties." 
25 Information Meeting on Intellectual Property of Databases: Report, WIPO Doc. DB/IMl6 (September 
19, 1997). 
26 Id. at 2. "Several delegations expressed the view that they were not convinced of the need for this kind of 
protection; many of them, however, said that they would not deny the possible need for some kind of 
protection for valuable databases. A number of delegations stressed that also the applicability of existing 
forms of protection should be explored. The importance of free and open access to information was 
emphasized by delegations, especially in the domain of high public interests, such as science, education and 
national security. The importance of free exchange of scientific data, and especially meteorological data, 
was also underlined. Many delegations emphasized that if a system of specific protection of databases were 
established, it should reflect a proper balance between the rights and interests of right owners and the larger 
public interest, including the science, research and education sectors, and without forgetting the role of 
libraries." Information Meeting on Intellectual Property in Databases: Observations: Submitted by the 
!V0rld Meteorological Organization (WMO) at 6, WIPO Doc. DB/IMl4 (September 4, 1997). "The 
mternational exchange of meteorological and other environmental data should be unfettered. This should be 
addressed in any databases protection mechanism at an intemationallevel where it, as well as other global 
~~vironmental issues, rightly belongs." 
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III. An Analysis of the WlPO Draft Database Treaty 
A. The Development of WlPO Draft Database Treaty 
The initiative approach of the delegate of Member States of the European Union 
gave rise to the concept of sui generis protection.28 Since 1988, the European Union had 
discussed the question whether there should be a new intellectual property regime of 
protection of sui generis databases?9 The E.U. Commissions recognized the increasing 
economic significance of databases, particularly the electronic databases that were 
vulnerable to exploitation in every technical environment. 30 Thus, there was no legal 
certainty that databases would be protected with the same logic afforded to other 
intellectual property rights. To resolve the issue, the Parliament of the European Union 
enacted Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases ("Database Directive,,)31 in 1996, 
thereby providing sufficient legal certainty for the benefit of European database 
industries and for healthy development of internal market. 
To strengthen the internal economic and social development of the Community, 
the E.D. took further step to expand the sui generis protection outside the Community. 
After a failure of its first approach in 1995, the delegation of Member States of the 
European Union submitted "The European Community and its Member States Proposal 
for the International Harmonization of the Sui Generis Protection of Databases" ("E.U. 
28 
29 WIPO BCP/CEN/5, supra note 2. 
Connnunication from the Commission Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology 
Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action, COM(88)172 fmal [hereinafter Green Paper]. Copyright 
and Information Limits to the Protection of Literary and Pseudo-literary Works in the Member States of the 
European Communities: A Report Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities (DG IV) 
(1992). 
30 
31 G:een Paper at 205-216. 
DIrective 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection 
of Databases, 0.1. L 77120 [hereinafter Database Directive]. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive 




proposal,,)32 or its own Database Directive as a draft database treaty in the first quarter of 
the following year. This submission placed economic-political pressure on the United 
States. The U S. representative, consequently, submitted a proposal entitled "The Us. 
Proposal for Sui Generis Protection of Databases" ("US. Proposal,,)33 as a possible draft 
database treaty. Though it was assumed to be a pro-competition version, the US. 
Proposal, however, contained similar details introducing the protection of sui generis 
databases and providing an incentive for innovation and investment in information goods 
and services. Instead, the WIPO Director-General adopted the resolution of the WIPO 
Draft Database Treaty at the Diplomatic Conference at the end of 1996.34 The provisions 
contained in the draft accomplished two important goals by introducing the sui generis 
right: it enabled the database makers to recover their investment in the making of 
databases, and it allowed sui generis right to be recognized as a new form of intellectual 
property rights. 
32 
33 E.U. Proposal, supra note 2. 
U.S. Proposal, supra note 3. Pamela Samuelson, The Digital Agenda of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization: Principal Paper: The u.s. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. 1. INT'L L. 369, 419 (1997). 
"B ecause of substantial U.S. industry objections to some parts of the European approach to database 
protection, including its reciprocity provision, the U.S. delegation decided to submit a counterproposal so 
that the United States could have some influence on the text of whatever database treaty might emerge from 
Shairman Leides' word processor." 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty, supra note 1. 
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B. Objective of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty 
Unwittingly or otherwise, the WIPO Draft Database Treaty contains an unclear 
message. As stated in the Preamble Clause, the Chairman of the Committees of Experts 
desires "to enhance and stimulate the production, distribution and international trade in 
databases.,,35 In the following paragraphs, it recognizes that "the databases are a vital 
element in the development of a global information infrastructure and an essential tool 
for promoting economic, cultural and technological advancement.,,36 At the same time, it 
recognizes an impact of technology on the database industries, stating that "the making of 
databases requires the investment of considerable human, technical and financial 
resources but that such databases can be copied or accessed at a fraction of the cost 
needed to design them independently.,,37 It formulates a regime to enable the database 
makers to recover their investment. In so doing, it raises a primary question: If the 
databases were truly to be recognized as a vital element in the development of a global 
information infrastructure and as an essential tool for promoting economic, cultural and 
technological advancement, would the sui generis protection violate the principle of 
copyright law: the free flow of access to facts and information? The sui generis right, by 
protecting the database makers from loss of investment, allows the makers to be 
compensated by charging everyone who wishes to be informed by or have access to facts 
and information that are already available in the public domain. 
35 
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C. Analysis of Substantive Provisions of WIPO Draft Database Treaty 
1. Definition and Scope of Sui Generis Databases 
The WIPO Draft Database Treaty defines the term "database" in a broad sense. 
Article 2(i) defines the term "database" as "a collection of independent works, data or 
other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and capable of being 
individually accessed by electronic or other means.,,38 Such a definition may embrace all 
categories of databases, with the exception of computer databases, musical compilations, 
and other copyrightable collections that Article 1 distinguishes from its scope.39 It is 
interesting to note that the definition of "database" described in Article 2(i) does not refer 
to the commercial nature of databases, nor the significant economics valuable to the 
database makers, a drive or incentive to induce them to invest in the making of databases. 
In comparison with the competing E.U. and U.S. Proposals, the WIPO Draft 
Database Treaty appears to use a similar approach. Article 1(2) of the E.U. Proposal 
defines "database" as "a collection of independent works, data or other materials 
arranged in a systematic or methodical way and individually accessed by electronic or 
other means",40 whereas Article 2.1 of the U.S. Proposal defines "database" as "a 
collection, assembly, or compilation of works, data, information or other materials 
arranged in a systematical way.,,41 Like the WIPO Draft Database Treaty, both proposals 
38 
!d. art. 2(i) 
39 
40Id. art. 1(3)-(4). 
E.U. Proposal art. 1(2). GUY TRITTON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 356 (2d ed. 2002). "The 
Database Directive potentially covers a very wide field of subject-matter. This is because the Directive's 
definition of what amounts to a "database" goes much further than what is meant by that word in common 
place. When people speak of a "database", they generally mean a collection of data held in the electronic 
memory of a computer-for example, the names and e-mail addresses of the customers of a business. But 
the Database Directive is not confined to electronic databases. It potentially bites where there is any 
~~l1ection of "works, data, or materials", provided certain stipulated requirements are made out." 
U.S. Proposal art. 2.1. Compare DATABASE INVESTMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTIPlRACY 
ACT, H.R. 3531, 104th Congo (1996). PETER JASZI, SOME PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO 
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exclude computer databases, musical compilations and copyrightable collections from the 
scope of "database." This also means the term "database," as defined by both proposals 
broadly embraces all commercial and noncommercial databases. 
The scope of "database" can be analyzed as follows: 
(i) Substantial Investment 
The nature of sui generis databases is unique. No creativity in the selection and 
arrangement of data is needed in the making process. The substantial contribution of 
capital, labor, or skill is the only requirement and is a sufficient cause to earn sui generis 
protection. Article 1 (1) of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty requires contracting parties to 
"protect any database that represents a substantial investment in the collection, assembly, 
verification, organization or presentation of the contents of the database.,,42 The term 
"substantial investment" is defined in Article 2(iv) as "any qualitatively or quantitatively 
significant investment of human, financial, technical or other resources in the collection, 
assembly, verification, organization or presentation of the database contents.,,43 For their 
databases to be protected, the database makers must satisfactorily prove that their 
contribution, whether of labor, skill, or capital, is quantitatively or qualitatively 
H.R. 3531, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF H.R. 35313 (1996), at http://ar1.cni.org/info/frn/copy/peter.html. 
"Protection would be available under H.R. 3531 for any "database" (broadly defined) which was "the result 
of a qualitatively or quantitatively substantial investment of human technical, financial or other resources in 
the collection, assembly, verification, organization or representation of the database contents." This would 
include most (if not all) directories, anthologies, CD-ROM and on-line databases, reference works, and 
much more " 42 • 
43 WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 1(1) . 
. Id. art. 2(iv) and Notes on Article 2, 2.08. "The activities listed in Article 1(1) that may comprise the 
mVestrnent are the collection, assembly, verification, organization or presentation of the contents of the 
database. In practice, these are the steps in the production of a database that are most likely to involve 
substantial investments. A substantial investment in anyone of the listed activities will fulfill the 
requirements for protection. It is recognized that "collection" and "assembly" are often interlinked, and 
"organization" and "presentation" of the contents may take place simultaneously. Any subsequent 





substantial and is in conjunction with the production of the database.44 The methods in 
the production of the contents of databases are categorized as collection, assembly, 
verification, organization, or presentation. Hence, such contribution they have invested is 
similar to the doctrine of "sweat of the brow." 
The E.U. and the U.S. Proposals are similar to the WIPO Draft Database Treaty in 
regard to the scope of substantial investment. Both proposals demand the database 
makers to identify the "substantial investment" in their databases.45 Article 7 of the E.u. 
Proposal stipulates that a maker of a database "shows that there has been qualitatively 
and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or 
presentation of the contents.'>46 In the same extent, Article 1.1.3 of the U.S. Proposal 
simply requires that the databases present "a substantial investment in the collection, 
assembly, verification, organization, or representation of the database contents.,,47 
The E.U. Proposal differs from the WIPO Draft Database Treaty and the U.S. 
Proposal by its unique two-tier protection. It separates the copyrightable databases from 
the sui generis databases. Article 3.1 of the E.U. Proposal stipulates that "databases 
which, by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author's 
own intellectual creation shall be protected as such by copyright.',48 The E.U. Proposal 
provides two-tiers of protection, one is the copyright protection for the creative selection 
44 
Protection of Databases Addendum to Document SCCRIlIINFI3: Information Received From the 
International Publishers Copyright Council (IPCC), at 5, WIPO Doc. SCCRJ1/INF/3 Add. (July 8, 1998). 
"It will be neither possible nor helpful to attempt, at intemationallevel, to pin down in statutory language 
the meaning of qualifying language such as "'substantial" in relation to investment, or "insubstantial" in 
relation to extraction. In the long term judicial interpretation is a safer procedure. Thus, in the UK, the 
COPyright Acts contain no definitions of either originality or substantiality, but cases decided over time 
have given considerable security of meaning to interested parties. Admittedly "over time" can mean a 
considerable number of years or even decades, but the procedure is, on balance, preferable to what may be 
~ery damaging over-restrictive language in a digital world we are only just entering." 
46 Compare WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 1.1 with U.S. Proposal art. 1.3 and E.U. Proposal art. 7(1). 
47 E.U. Proposal art. 7. 
48 U.S. Proposal art. 1.1.3. 
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and arrangement and the other is the sui generis protection for the factual or detail 
contents.49 As stipulated in Article 3.2 ofthe E.U. Proposal: "The copyright protection of 
databases provided for by this Directive shall not extend to their contents and shall be 
without prejudice to any rights subsisting in those contents themselves.,,5o 
Distinct from the E.D. Proposal, the D.S. Proposal does define the term 
"substantial investment." In fact, using language very similar to that used in the WIPO 
Draft Database Treaty, Article 2.2.4 of the D.S. Proposal defines "substantial investment" 
as "any qualitatively or quantitatively significant investment of human, financial, 
technical or other resources in the making of a database.,,51 The E.D. Proposal, in 
contrast, merely states that the "substantial investment" must be "qualitatively or 
quantitatively sufficient.,,52 To assure that the referral subject matter treated IS 
economically qualified and sufficient for the protection, all three draft versions make 
clear that the substantial contribution must attach directly to the production of the 
databases. 
(ii) Form or Medium 
The WIPO Committees of Experts recognize that the databases are exhibited and 
embodied in any "form or medium.,,53 Article 1(2) of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty 
states: "the protection extends to a database regardless of the form or medium in which 
49 GUY TRITTON, supra note 40, at 356. "In relation to this vast array of potential subject-matter, the 
Directive provides a two-tier system of protection. First, there is the possibility of ordinary copyright 
protection for that aspect of the database that is the result of personal intellectual creativity in the selection 
and arrangement of content. In addition, or alternatively, there may be a sui generis "database right" 
protecting the content (irrespectively of whether there has been creativity in its arrangement), provided that 
~~ere has been substantial investment in obtaining, verifying or presenting the material." 
51 E.u. Proposal art. 3.2. 
52 U.S. Proposal art. 2(iv). 
53 B.U. Proposal art. 7.l. 






the database is embodied, and regardless of whether or not the database is made available 
to the public.,,54 The development of technology automatically implies mUltiple 
variations of mediums or platforms in which the contents of databases might be 
embedded. They can be softcopies such as CD-ROMs or DVDs, or hardcopies, such as 
printed copies of statistical reports or periodical records. The databases should be usable 
and communicable. The contents of databases must be individually accessed and 
retrievable by electronic or other means. Thus, since the wording of Article 1 (2) fails to 
identify or make mention of undeveloped technologies, it is doubtful whether this article 
was intended to cover any future forms or mediums yet to be developed. Article 1 (2) also 
states that this protection will apply to all databases whether or not they are made 
available to the public. Such language implies both commercial and noncommercial 
databases. The latter tends to involve laboratory research and governmental and 
education databases that are available in the public domain and should remain there. 
Similar to the WIPO Draft Database Treaty, the E.U and the US. Proposals 
extend protection to the databases embodied in any "form or medium." Article 1.1 of the 
E.D. Proposal concerns "the legal protection of databases in any form.,,55 Article 1.2 of 
the E.U Proposal confirms its predecessor provision that the databases are "individually 
accessible by electronic or other means.,,56 In the same manner, Article 1.1.1 of the US. 
54 Id. Notes on Article 1, at 1.13. "Paragraph (2) makes clear that protection shall be granted to databases 
irrespective of the form or medium in which they are embodied. Protection extends to databases on both 
electronic and non-electronic form. Moreover, this wording embraces all forms or media now know or later 
developed. Paragraph (2) also makes clear that protection shall be granted to databases regardless of 
Whether they are made available to the public. This means that databases that are made generally available 
to the public, commercial or otherwise, as well as databases that remain within the exclusive possession 
~~d control of their developers enjoy protection on the same footing." 
56 E.U. Proposal art. 1.1. 
Id. art. 1.2. 
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Proposal extends to databases "in any fonn,,57 regardless of whether such databases are 
commercially available or otherwise made available to the pUblic. 
(iii) Exclusion of Existing Protection 
The protection of sui generis databases does not diminish or obviate previously 
existing protection. Article 1(3) of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty prescribes: "the 
protection granted under this Treaty shall be provided irrespective of any protection 
provided for a database or its contents by copyright or by other rights granted by 
Contracting Parties in their national legislation.,,58 The sui generis databases may be 
compiled using creativity in the selection and arrangement of contents protected by 
copyright law, infonnation regarding trade secrets, patentable fonnulas, and data 
protected by other laws. The protection of sui generis databases only intends to cover 
facts, statistical data, and unprotected infonnation. It should be understood that the 
protection will not replace, disrupt, or demolish any previously existing fonns of 
protection. 
Similar to the WIPO Draft Database Treaty, the E.U. Proposal does not cover, 
interrupt, or reduce existing protections. Not only does the E.U. Proposal explicitly 
distinguish between the protection of sui generis databases and the copyright protection 
for compilations,59 but also asserts an inexhaustible list that guarantees a continuation of 
existing protection. Article 13 of the E.D. Proposal states: This Directive shall be without 
prejudice to provisions concerning in particular copyright, rights related to copyright or 
any other rights or obligations subsisting in the data, works or other materials 
57 
58 U.S. Proposal art. 1.3. 
59 WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 1(3). 
Compare E.D. Proposal Chapter 2 with 3. 
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incorporated into a database, patent rights, trade marks, design rights, the protection of 
national treasures, laws on restrictive practices and unfair competition, trade secrets, 
security, confidentiality, data protection and privacy, access to public documents, and the 
60 
law of contract. 
On the other hand, the U.S. Proposal disregards the existing protection in the 
same manner as the tenor of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty. Article 1.3 of the U.S. 
Proposal declares: "regardless of whether the database or any of its contents are 
intellectual creations or are protected under the other domestic legislation.,,61 Article 7.1 
of the U.S. Proposal affirms this declaration, mentioning that its protection is "without 
prejudice to provisions concerning copyright, rights related to copyright or any other 
rights or obligations in the database or its contents, including laws in respect to patent, 
trademark, design rights, antitrust or competition, trade secrets, data protection and 
privacy, access to public documents, and the law of contract.,,62 
(iv) Computer Program Databases 
The protection of sui generis databases does not apply to computer program 
databases. Article 1(4) of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty states that this protection 
"does not extend to any computer program used in manufacture, operation or 
maintenance of a database.,,63 The computer program IS a set of programmmg 
instructions that may cause a computer to perform certain functions or achieve certain 
60 
Id. art. 13 and recital 19. " ... the compilation of several recordings of musical performances on a CD does 
~ot come within the scope of this Directive ... " 
62 U.S. Proposal art. 1.3. 
63 Id. art. 7.1. 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 1(4). 
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results and there is no human contribution in retrieving such computer databases. Thus, 
some computer databases may be qualified for this protection if they are collections of 
data or other materials that are not part of the set of instructions that form the operational 
core of the computer program. 
The E.U. and the U.S. Proposals also exclude computer program databases. 
Article 1(3) of the E.U. Proposal prescribes that the sui generis protection "does not 
extend to the computer programs used in the making or operating of databases accessible 
by electronic means,,,64 while Article 1.4 of the U.S. Proposal proscribes that the sui 
generis protection "does not extend to any computer programs including without 
" 
limitation any computer programs used in the manufacture, operation or maintenance of a 
database. ,,65 
The definition and scope of sui generis databases should be carefully examined. 
Since national legislatures have an interest in protecting database industries from 
economic loss, there is a need to stress the economic significance of databases and their 
commercial value to their makers. The scientific, governmental and educational databases ,foo, • .' , 
must be identified and excluded from sui generis protection, thus allowing free exchange 
with and access to this category of databases. The Preamble Clause of the WIPO Draft 
Database Treaty recognizes that databases are a vital element essential to the global 
information infrastructure and an important tool for promoting economic, cultural and 
technological advancement. Therefore, the language used to describe and discuss sui 
generis protection must clearly identify the type of databases that are covered. 
64 
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2. Database Makers and Exclusive Owner Rights 
(i) Database Makers 
Unlike copyright legislation that attaches only to author's originality, Article 4(1) 
of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty grants sui generis rights to database makers who 
substantially contributed their labor, skill and capital in obtaining, verifying, or 
presenting database contents.66 Article 2(iii) defines a database maker as "the natural 
person or legal person with control and responsibility for the undertaking of a substantial 
investment in making a database.,,67 The database maker can be an individual or legal 
entity who undertakes business of compiling facts, data and information with substantial 
investment of capitals, labor and skills. Several makers can jointly enjoy the same bundle 
of owner rights. Such rights are transferable,68 for instance, through licensing agreement. 
Accordingly, a lawful user needs authorization or consent of every rightholder before 
performing an act of extraction or utilization of a substantial part of that database. 
Likewise, the E.U. and the US. Proposals also refer to the database maker as the 
rightholder. Article 2.2.3 of the US. Proposal defines the database maker as "the natural 
or legal person or persons making a substantial investment in the collection, assembly, 
verification, organization, or presentation of the contents of the database,,69 and Article 4 
of the U.S. Proposal asserts that "the maker ofa database can be both one maker and joint 
makers.,,7o The E.U Proposal, by contrast, does not include a definition of "database 
maker." Article 7(1) of the E.U Proposal merely states: "the maker of a database who 
shows that there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in 
66 
67 WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 4(1). 
6/d. art. 2( iii). 
69 Id. art. 4(2). 
70 U.S. Proposal art. 2.2.3. 
!d. art. 4. 
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either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents" has a right to "prevent 
extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated 
qualitatively and/or quantitatively, ofthe contents of that database.,,7! 
(ii) Exclusive Rights 
Within the scope of Article 3 of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty, the database 
maker obtains exclusive rights to authorize or prohibit the relevant acts of extraction and 
utilization. 
~':' 
(1) Extraction: Article 2(ii) of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty defines 
"extraction" as an act of "the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial part 
of the contents of a database to another medium by any means or in any form.,,72 The 
term "extraction" is a synonym for "copying" or "reproduction," the terms used in the ", 
copyright law. Within the scope of this provision, the database makers have the exclusive 
rights to authorize or prohibit any person to copy or reproduce all or substantial part of 
the contents. The permanent or temporarily transfer of the contents can be done in the 
same or different medium by any means or in any form. However, such acts of extraction 
will render any change or devaluation the original material. The database still remains on 
that original medium. 
(2) Utilization: Article 2(vi) of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty defines 
"utilization" as "the making available to the public of all or a substantial part of the 
contents of databases by any means, including by the distribution of copies, by renting, 
or by online or other forms of transmission, including making the same available to the 
71 
72 E.U. Proposal art. 7(1). 
WIPO Database Draft Treaty art. 2(ii). 
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public at a place and at a time individually chosen by each member of the public.,,73 The 
meaning of "utilization" is broad. It covers any act of utilization by way of both tangible 
and intangible dissemination, diffusion and distribution of physical copies and all forms 
of transmission by wire or wireless means. The database makers have the exclusive rights 
to authorize or prohibit any act of making new databases composed of all or substantial 
part of the contents of existing databases available to the public. 
(3) Substantial Part: Article 2(v) of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty defines the 
term "substantial part" as "any portion of the database content including an accumulation 
of small portions that is of qualitative or quantitative significance to the value of the 
database.,,74 Taking substantial part of database contents must be "qualitatively or 
quantitatively significant to the value of the contents" to constitute an act of infringement. 
Since "any portion" or "an accumulation of small portions," as quoted above, hardly 
provides precise standards against which to measure what is "substantial," one must rely 
on qualitative or quantitative significance to determine if infringement has taken place, 
thus recognizing the importance of economic value of databases to their makers. 
The E.U. and the U.S. Proposals extend exclusive rights similar to the WIPO 
Draft Database Treaty. Article 3 of the U.S. Proposal states: "the maker of a database 
eligible for protection under this Instrument shall have the right to do, authorize or 
prohibit acts of extraction, use or reuse of all or a substantial part of the contents of the 
databases.,,75 Article 7(1) of the E.u. Proposal grants the database makers exclusive 
rights "to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part, 
73 
Id. art. 2(vi). 
74 
Id. art. 2(v). 
75 
D.S. Proposal art. 3. 
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evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of their sui generis databases.,,76 Notably, 
the E.U. Proposal clearly distinguishes the database makers' exclusive rights from those 
.gh h 77 of the copyn taut ors. 
Both the E.U. and U.S. Proposals define the term "extraction" in a manner closely 
to the definition contained in the WIPO Draft Database Treaty. Article 7(2)(a) of the E.U. 
Proposal, employing the exact language used by the WIPO as cited above, defines 
"extraction" as "the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial part of the 
contents of a database to another medium by any means or in any form.,,78 Article 2.2 of 
the U.S. Proposal extends the temporal parameters with a mention of future development 
with its definition as "the permanent or temporary transfer to the same or anther medium, 
by any means now known or later developed, of all or a substantial part of the database 
contents.79 
Both competing proposals also define the term "utilization" in the same manner as 
the WIPO Draft Database Treaty. With prefix, Article 7(2)(b) of the E.U. Proposal 
defines "re-utilization" as an act "of making available to the public all or a substantial 
part of the contents of a database by the distribution of copies, by renting, by on-line or 
other forms of transmission.,,8o Using "use" and "reuse" rather than "re-utilization," 
Article 2.6 of the U.S. Proposal defines these terms as "the making available, by means 
now known or later developed, including by the distribution of copies, by renting, or by 
76 E.U. Proposal art. 7(1) and recital (42). "Whereas the special right to prevent unauthorized extraction 
and/or re-utilization relates to acts by the user which go beyond his legitimate rights and thereby harm the 
investment; whereas the right to prohibit extraction and/or re-utilization of all or a substantial part of the 
contents relates not only to the manufacture of a parasitical competing product but also to any user who, 
through his acts, causes significant detriment, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, to the investment." 
17 
78 U compare art. 7 with art. 5. 
79 U art. 7(2)(a). 
80 U.S. Proposal art. 2.2. 
E.U. Proposal art. 7(2)(b). 
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online or other fonns of transmission of all or substantial part of the contents of a 
database, or making available all or a substantial part of the database to members of the 
public at a place and at a time chosen by each member of the public, whether or not for 
direct or indirect commercial advantage or financial gain.,,81 
However, both the E.U. and the U.S. Proposals do not attempt to define 
"substantial part.,,82 While the E.U. Proposal assesses a degree of "substantiality" by 
reference to qualitative as well as quantitative factors, the U.S. Proposal merely provides 
for a right to prevent extraction, use, or reuse of substantial parts of the contents of a 
database. Both versions also allow the acts of extraction or re-utilization (use or reuse) of 
insubstantial parts on condition that the act must not be in conflict with the database 
makers' nonnal exploitation of the databases or adversely affects the actual or potential 
market for the databases.83 
Article 3 of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty affords the database makers the 
exclusive rights to control the access to facts and infonnation.84 Such exclusive rights are 
granted to them to authorize or prohibit any person from extraction and utilization of all 
or substantial parts of databases. Nevertheless, extracting insubstantial parts of databases 
may violate the owner's exclusive rights. If a taking of insubstantial parts proves to be 
repeated and systematic and in conflict with a nonnal exploitation of that database or 
81 
82 U.S. Proposal art. 2.6. 
PETER JASZI" supra note 41, at 4. "The bill does not define "substantial part," but its language points to 
an essentially circular understanding of this crucial term: If there would be measurable consumer demand 
for the data, then it would be unlawful to "extract, use, or reuse" it." GUY TRITTON, supra note 41, at 362. 
"Th e database right also has an express "substantiality" requirement in relation to infringement. As 
mentioned above, this is missing from the provisions concerning copyright protection for databases. Under 
the database right, such substantiality is assessed by reference to qualitative as well as quantitative factors. 
Therefore, the importance of what is taken or re-utilised can offset the fact that it may represent a relatively 
~Fl1 part of the maker's database." 
84 Compare E.U. Proposal art. 7(5) with U.S. Proposal art 5(a). 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 3. 
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degrading the value of that database, such act will constitute an infringement. In addition 
to downloading, browsing, searching or uploading of contents, anyone who merely 
searches for information would violate the owner's exclusive rights. This is because the 
computer device must temporarily copy and recompile the contents of databases in order 
to process search outcome. 
3. Exceptions 
There are some exceptions or limitations to the owner's exclusive rights. Article 
5(1) of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty provides: "Contracting Parties may regulate in 
their national legislation exceptions or limitations of rights in certain special cases that do 
not conflict with the normal exploitation of the database and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.,,85 The exceptions of sui generis 
databases are obscure. The provision allows Contracting Parties to regulate the 
exceptions to the sui generis databases in accordance with their legal traditions, on 
condition that such exceptions may not interfere with normal exploitation or interests of 
the owner of the database. No clear exceptions for teaching purposes or laboratory 
experiments are provided or required. 
The exceptions of sui generis databases may not be appropriate. Article 9(2) of 
the Berne Convention designs the fair use exceptions, also known as the 3-step test, in 
three major circumstances. Parties to the Berne Convention must permit the use of 
Works: (1) for a purpose of quoting and teaching; (2) on condition that such use is not in 
conflict with normal exploitation of author's works; and (3) that use does not 
unreasonably impair or prejudice the legitimate and/or economic interests of the 
----------------------85 
Id. art. 5(1). 
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authors.86 Inasmuch as the sui generis right is parallel to the copyright law, in that one is 
granted for factual or data contents and the other is granted for creative selection and 
arrangement of the contents, it raises the concern of whether it is appropriate to apply 
similar exceptions to both. 
The WIPO Draft Database Treaty explicitly mentions exceptions or limitations of 
governmental databases. Article 5(2) stipulates: "it shall be a matter for the national 
legislation of Contracting Parties to determine the protection that shall be granted to 
databases made by governmental entities or their agents or employees.,,87 However, the 
definition of governmental databases is not given. 
Both the E.U. and U.S. Proposals articulate the exceptions of sui generis 
databases in the same manner. Apart from the copyright fair use exceptions, Article 9 of 
the E.U. Proposal prescribes that, without an authorization of the database maker, a user 
may: (1) extract for private purposes of the contents of a non-electronic database; (2) 
extract for the purposes of illustration for teaching or scientific research, as long as the 
source is indicated and to the extent justified by the non-commercial purpose to be 
achieved; and (3) extract and/or re-utilize for the purposes of public security or an 
administrative or judicial procedure.88 In addition, Article 7(5) of the E.D. Database 
Directive indicates: "The repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-utilization of 
insubstantial parts of the contents of the database implying acts which conflict with a 
normal exploitation of that database or which unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the maker of the database shall not be permitted.,,89 It is obvious that the E.D. 
86 . 
87 Berne ConventIOn art. 9(2). 
88 WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 5(2). 
89 E.U. Proposal art. 9. 
[d. art 7(5). 
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proposal embraces both uses of substantial and insubstantial parts of databases. In tum, 
Article 5.1 of the U.S. Proposal simply states: "a lawful user of a database made 
commercially available or otherwise made available to the public may extract, use or 
reuse insubstantial parts of its contents for any purpose whatsoever.,,9o Article 5.2 of the 
U.S. Proposal also refers to a use of insubstantial parts as follows: "The repeated or 
systematic extraction, use or reuse of insubstantial parts of the contents of a database in a 
manner that cumulatively conflicts with the normal exploitation of the database or 
adversely affects the actual or potential market for the database shall not be permitted.,,91 
In the same language found in Article 5(1) of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty, Article 
5.3 of the U.S. Proposal stipulates: "Contracting Parties may, in their domestic 
legislation, provide for exceptions to or limitations on the rights provided in this 
Instrument so long as such limitations or exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the database and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the rightholder."n In addition, Article 5(2) of the WIPO Draft Database 
Treaty is similar to Article 5.4 of the U.S. Proposal as it states: "It shall be a matter for 
legislation in the Contracting Parties to determine the protection to be granted to 
databases made by a government entity or its agents or employees.,,93 
90 
91 U.S. Proposal art. 5(1). 
n ld. art. 5.2. 
93 Compare WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 5(1) with U.S. Proposal art. 5.3. 
Compare WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 5(2) with U.S. Proposal art. 5.4. 
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4. Duration 
Two alternative durations of protection of sui geneirs databases appear in the 
WlPO Draft Database Treaty. Alternative A follows the U.S. Proposal, which limits the 
duration of protection of sui generis databases to 25 years from the first of January in the 
year following the date of completion94 or the date when the database was first made 
available to the public.95 Alternative B follows the E.U. Proposal limiting duration to 15 
years from the first of January in the year following the date of completion96 or the date 
when the database was first made available to the pUblic.97 The adoption of both periods 
of duration provides clear evidence that the WIPO Draft Database Treaty has been 
heavily influenced by the two competing proposals of the E.U. and the U.S. The duration 
of protection should be determined primarily based on the nature of the subject matter 
and its economic significance to the database makers.98 Databases hold economic value 
for their owners, whose substantial investments in their production require a return, 
usually economic or monetary. However, different databases have different economic 
life-spans depending on types, demands of the market, and the marketability of the 
products. Dynamic databases are subj ect to constant updating, changing, and improving, 
thus, their duration of protection could be justifiably shorter. In the case of static 
databases, such as encyclopedic, historic, and cartographic databases, the longer duration 
of protection is appropriate. 
94 
95 WIPO Draft Databa.se Treaty art. 8(1) Alternative A. 
96 Id. art. 8(2) Alternatlve A. 
97 Id. art. 8(1) Alternative B. 
98 Id. art. 8(2) Alternative B. 
Id. Notes on Article 8, at 8.02. "The determination of the proper duration of any fonn of intellectual 
property is bound to depend on many factors, including the nature of the subject matter, the prevailing 
economic and technical circumstances, and the interests of right holders, users and society at large." 
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A substantial improvement of databases may create unlimited or perpetual 
duration of protection. Article 8(3) of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty reads: "Any 
substantial change to the database, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, including any 
substantial change resulting from the accumulation of successive additions, deletions, 
verifications, modifications in organization or presentation, or other alterations, which 
constitute a new substantial change shall qualify the database resulting from such 
investment for its own term ofprotection.,,99 If the database makers could established that 
there had been a substantial change in the contents as mentioned above, their databases 
would qualify for their own terms of protection. However, it is questionable whether 
slight but substantial improvement would result in unlimited duration of protection. 
While alternative durations of protection are proposed in the WIPO Draft 
Database Treaty, the E.D. and the D.S. Proposals advocate an unlimited duration of 
protection. Similar to the WIPO Draft Database Treaty, Article 10(3) of the E.D. 
Proposal and Article 6.3 of the U.S. Proposal stipulate that any substantial change, 
evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, to the contents, including any substantial change 
resulting from the accumulation of successive additions, deletions or alterations, which 
would result in a substantial new investment, would qualify the database resulting from 
th . C". • f· 100 at mvestment lor Its own term 0 protectIon. 
The unlimited duration of protection available under Article 8(3) of the WIPO 
Draft Database Treaty may produce unfair competition. The sui generis system is created 
to extend the property right to factual or data contents by means of giving an incentive to 
99 
Id. art. 8(3) 
100 • 
Compare E.U. Proposal art. 10(3) with U.S. Proposal art. 6.3. 
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the database industries. The unlimited duration of protection would lead to a monopoly if 
the database makers continue updating the substantial part of databases. 101 
5. Beneficiaries 
The makers of databases are eligible for protection. Article 6(1) of the WIPO 
Draft Database Treaty specifies: "Each Contracting Party shall protect according to the 
terms of this Treaty makers of databases who are nationals of a Contracting Party.,,102 
Article 6(2) extends the protection beyond nationals: "The provisions of paragraph (1) 
shall also apply to companies, firms and other legal entities formed in accordance with 
the laws of a Contracting Party or having their registered office, central administration or 
principal place of business within a Contracting Party; however, where such a company, 
firm or other legal entity has only its registered office in the territory of a Contracting 
Party, its operations must be genuinely linked on an on-going basis with the economy of 
a Contracting Party.,,103 The database makers, within the meaning of this provision, can 
be either natural or legal persons. The legal person must, as the national laws of 
Contracting Parties may apply, be registered companies, firms or other entities that have 
a premise in the Contracting Parties. 
The E.U. Proposal uses the exact wording of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty. 
Article 11 (1) of the E.U Proposal describes: "The right provided for in Article 7 shall 
apply to database whose makers or rightholders are nationals of a Member State or who 
101 PETER JASZI, supra note 41, at 2. "The effect term of protection of databases would be potentially 
perpetual, at least for dynamic compilations in electronic form." 
102 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 6(1). 
103 
[d. art. 6(2). 
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have their habitual residence in the territory of the Community.,,104 Further, Article 11(2) 
describes: "Paragraph 1 shall also apply to companies and firms formed in accordance 
with the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration 
or principal place of business within the Community; however, where such a company or 
firm has only its registered office in the territory of the Community, its operations must 
be genuinely linked on an ongoing basis with the economy of a Member State.,,105 On the 
other hand, the U.S. Proposal simply describes: "Databases whose makers are at the time 
of the making of the database either nationals of or habitual residents of a Contracting 
Party shall be protected under this Instrument.,,106 
6. National Treatment 
The WIPO Draft Database Treaty applies the principle of national treatment. 
Article 7 of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty requires that "the maker of a database 
enjoys the same protection of sui generis databases in Contracting Parties other than the 
Contracting Party of which he is a national,,107 In regard to Article 5 of the Berne 
Convention,108 member countries of the Convention must comply with the provision of 
national treatment affording equal treatment to national and foreign authors alike. The 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty reflects the Berne principle of national treatment to govern 
and extend protection beyond the territories of its Contracting Parties. 
The WIPO Draft Database Treaty demands conditions treated in connection with 
the Berne's principle of national treatment. Article 7(2) of the WIPO Draft Database 
104 
E.U. Proposal art. 11(1). 
105 
!d. art. 11(2). 
106 
107 U.S. Proposal art. 11.1. 
WIPO Draft Database Treat art. 7(1). 
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Compare Berne Convention art. 5 with WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 7. 
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Treaty states: "Protection of a database in the Contracting Party of which the maker of 
the database is a national shall be governed by nationallegislation."lo9 Article 7(3) states: 
"The enjoyment and the exercise of rights under this Treaty shall be independent of the 
existence of protection in the Contracting Party of which the maker of a database is a 
national. Apart from the provisions of this Treaty, the extent of protection, as well as the 
means and extent of redress, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the Contracting 
Party where protection is claimed."llo And Article 7(4) states: "Makers of databases who 
are not nationals of a Contracting Party but who have their habitual residence in a 
Contracting Party shall, for the purposes of this Treaty, be assimilated to nationals of that 
Contracting Party."lll Both national and foreign database makers will enjoy the same 
exclusive rights and protection in any Contracting Party's jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the 
foreign database makers may be satisfied with compensation in other Contracting Party 
where an infringement is claimed. The principle of national treatment guarantees equal 
protection but not redress. The courts in the other Contracting Parties consider 
compensation or reward in accordance with their different legal traditions, economics, 
and social conditions in their countries. 
The E.U. Proposal differs from the WIPO Draft Database Treaty. Article 11(3) of 
the E.U. Proposal imposes: "Agreements extending the right provided for in Article 7 to 
databases made in third countries and falling outside the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 
shall be concluded by the Council acting on a proposal from the Commission."ll2 The 
E.u. Commission requires a reciprocal treatment from the third-party countries whose 
109 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 7(2) 
110 
ld. art. 7(3) 
111 
ld. art. 7(4). 
112 
E.D. Proposal art. 11(3). 
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databases are being exhibited or exploited in the Union. The reciprocal treatment must be 
made as a special agreement between the E.U. and the third countries, binding the third 
countries to assure equivalence of the protection of sui generis databases. 
The U.S. Proposal, on the other hand, applies the Berne principle of national 
treatment directly to the protection of sui generis databases. On the same footing as the 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty, Article 11.2 of the U.S. Proposal specifies: "Rightholders 
shall enjoy, in respect of databases that qualify for protection under this Instrument. In 
Contracting Parties other than the country of the nationality or the habitual residence of 
the maker, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their 
nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Instrument." 1 13 
There are other similarities between the WIPO Draft Database Treaty and the U.S. 
Proposal. Article 11.3 of the U.S. Proposal specifies: "Protection in the country of the 
nationality or habitual residence of the maker shall be governed by domestic law.,,114 
Last, Article 11.4 specifies: "The enjoyment and the exercise of the rights hereunder shall 
not be subject to any formality; such enjoyment and exercise shall be independent of the 
existence of protection in the country of the database maker's nationality or habitual 
residence. Apart from the provisions of this Instrument, the extent of protection, as well 
as the means and extent of redress shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the 
Contracting Party where protection is claimed.,,115 Both the WIPO Draft Database Treaty 
and the U.S. Proposal ensure equal protection to foreign and national database makers. 
However, the principle of national treatment does not necessarily ensure the same 
standard of compensation or reward. 
113 
114 U.S. Proposal art. 11.2. 
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15 !d . art. 11.4. 
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The principle of national treatment differs from reciprocal treatment. The E.U. 
Commission demands reciprocal treatment from any third parties that wish to extend the 
protection of sui generis databases in the Member States of the E.U. These Member Sates 
are countries with advanced legal systems. Imposing high standard of protection is proper 
for them. In most of developing countries, legal systems are less advanced. If they wished 
to contract with the E.U., they would be treated unfairly. Not only do they need to 
upgrade their legal system to meet with the high standard of protection, but they also 
need to provide the same standard of compensation and reward as the developed 
countries. Applying the principle of national treatment imitating the U.S. Proposal is, 
therefore, appropriate. 
7. Application in Time 
The Contracting Parties must implement the treaty at the date of the entry into 
force of the treaty. Article 11 (1) of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty enforces: 
"Contracting Parties shall also grant protection pursuant to this Treaty in respect of 
databases that met the requirements of Article 1(1) at the date of the entry into force of 
this Treaty for each Contracting Party.,,]]6 Different Contracting Parties may enact the 
law for the protection of sui generis databases that represent substantial investments at 
different times. The protection will not interrupt, alter, or embrace any existing protection 
before the time of entry into force of this treaty. Article 11 (2) stipulates: "The protection 
provided for in paragraph (1) shall be without prejudice to any acts concluded or rights 
acquired before the entry into force of this Treaty in each Contracting Party."ll7 With one 
116 
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allowance, Article 11(3) states: "A Contracting Party may provide for conditions under 
which copies of databases which were lawfully made before the date of the entry into 
force of this Treaty for that Contracting Party may be distributed to the public, provided 




The U.S. Proposal enforces conditions similar to those found in the WIPO Draft 
Database Treaty. Article 9.1 of the U.S. Proposal imposes: "Databases eligible for 
protection under this Instrument that are in existence at the time this Instrument comes in 
force in respect of Contracting Parties shall be protected. The duration of such protection 
shall be determined under Article 6.,,119 Article 9.2 guarantees the existing protection as 
stated here: "The rights under this Instrument shall not prejudice any acts of exploitation 
performed prior to its effective date. It shall be a matter of domestic legislation to provide 
for protection of any rights of third parties acquired before the effective date of this 
Instrument.,,120 
However, the E.U. Proposal distinguishes the sui generis databases from 
copyrightable collections. Article 14(1) of the E.U. Proposal regards the protection of 
copyrightable databases, as stipulates, "Protection pursuant to this Directive as regards 
copyright shall also be available in respect of databases created prior to the date referred 
to Article 16 (1) which on that date fulfill the requirements laid down in this Directive as 
regards copyright protection of databases.,,121 Article 14(2) further declares: 
"Notwithstanding paragraph 1, where a database protected under copyright arrangements 
1I8 
1 
!d. art. 11(3). 
19 
120 U.S. Proposal art. 9.1. 
l
Id. art. 9.2. 
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in a Member State on the date of publication of this Directive does not fulfill the 
eligibility criteria for copyright protection laid down in Article 3 (1), this Directive shall 
not result in any curtailing in that Member State of the remaining term of protection 
afforded under those arrangements.,,122 To the same extent, the WIPO Draft Database 
Treaty prescribes in Article 14(3) for the sui generis databases: "Protection pursuant to 
the provisions of this Directive as regards the right provided for in Article 7 shall also be 
available in respect of databases the making of which was completed not more than 
fifteen years prior to the date referred to in Article 16 (1) and which on that date fulfill 
the requirements laid down in Article 7.,,123 Article 14(4) assures continuation of the 
existing protection: "The protection provided for in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall be without 
prejudice to any acts concluded and rights acquired before the date referred to in those 
paragraphs.,,124 
8. Technological Measures 
The WIPO Draft Database Treaty imposes legal measures to prevent local 
database industries. Article 10 of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty consists: "Contracting 
Parties must prohibit unlawful importation, manufacture or distribution of protection-
defeating devices, or the offer or performance of any service having the same effect, by 
any person knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that the device or service will 
be used for, or in the course of, the exercise of rights.,,125 This article safeguards the local 
database industries against harm due to any unlawful use of technological devices such as 
122 
123 Id. art. 14(2). 
124 ld. art. 14(3). 
125ld. art. 14(4). 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 10(1). 
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technological circumvention.126 Article 14 of the TRIPS Agreement adopts the principle 
of mutatis mutandis, a requirement for member countries to authorize or prohibit any 
unlawful act that can be different in national legal system from one country to another.127 
This raises a concern whether Article 10(2) of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty would 
apply the same principle of mutatis mutandis to determine appropriate and effective 
measures among Contracting Parties. In addition, Article 10(3) of the WIPO Draft 
Database Treaty defines the term "protection-defeating device" as "any device, product 
or component incorporated into a device or product, the primary purpose or primary 
effect of which is to circumvent any process, treatment, mechanism or system that 
prevents or inhibits any of the acts covered by this proposed treaty.,,128 It is 
understandable that the protection-defeating devices must be for a primary use but neither 
effectively circumvents nor specifically designed or adapted to circumvent. 
The U.S. Proposal contains technological measures consistent with the WIPO 
Draft Database Treaty, while the E.U. Proposal fails to address with this issue. In 
language very similar to that used in the WIPO Draft Database Treaty, Article 8 of the 
U.S. Proposal reads: "Contracting Parties shall make it unlawful to import, manufacture 
or distribute any device, product, or component incorporated into a device or product, or 
offer or perform any service, the primary purpose or effect of which is to avoid, by pass, 
remove, deactivate, or otherwise circumvent, without authority, any process, treatment, 
mechanism or system which prevents or inhibits the unauthorized exercise of any of the 
rights." 129 
126 Id. art. 10(2). 
127 TRIP 
128 S art. 14. 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 10(3). 
129 
U.S. Proposal art. 8. 
88 
9. Enforcement 
The enforcement clause of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty is not finalized. 
There are two alternatives set out in Article 13. Alternative A simply refers to a full detail 
of enforcement provisions attached in the Annex of the treaty.l30 Alternative B, on the 
other hand, refers to the enforcement procedures specified in Part III, Articles 41 to 61 of 
the TRIPS Agreement. 131 To assure availability of enforcement procedure in the national 
legal systems, Contracting Parties are required to undertake an effective action against 
any act of infringement and to provide remedies by means of mutatis mutandis. 
The E.U. Proposal mentions very little details regarding enforcement and remedy. 
Article 12 of the E.U. Proposal only cites: "Member States shall provide appropriate 
remedies in respect of infringement of the rights provided for in this Directive."l32 The 
U.S. Proposal, on the other hand, does not address the issues of enforcement and 
remedies. 
In summary, the WIPO Draft Database Treaty appears to be an amalgam of the 
E.D. and the U.S. Proposals. Each draft database treaty introduces the sui generis right, 
an unprecedented right "of its own kind" distinct from and additional to copyright, and 
gives exclusive owner right to the database makers who invest substantial contribution of 
capital, labor, or skill in gathering, coordination, selection, and arrangement of 
contents. 133 Such a right is a second layer of copyrightable collections by means of 
creating a strong new form of sui generis intellectual property protection over factual or 
data contents of databases. Its goal appears to be to promote the economic well-being of 
130 WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 13 Alternative A. 
131 . 
[d. art. 13 AlternatIve B. 
132 
E.D. Proposal art. 12. 
133 
Compare WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 1(1) with E.D. Proposal art. 7(1) and D.S. ProposaI1.1.3. 
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the database industries and make them parallel to an author's economic copyright. The 
definition of "sui generis" right is broadly defined and subject to fewer exceptions in 
favor of the database makers than provided by traditional copyright law. Other clear 
influences of the competing proposals are the duration of protection and the choice of 
international principles. Article 8 of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty contains 
alternatives durations of protection of 15 and 25 years, reflecting the E.U. and the U.S. 
Proposals respectively.134 Article 11 of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty enforces all 
member countries to adopt the principle of national treatment. This provision favors the 
U.S. Proposal more than the E.U. Proposal, which, in contrast, sets forth the concept of 
reciprocal treatment. 135 The new form of sui generis intellectual property protection has 
not been designed to promote the progress of science, or to support the useful arts to 
complete creativity cycles, or to promote the free flow of access to information for all in 
the global community. 136 
The potential effect of a sui generis database system should be noted. General 
criticisms center on the free flow of access to information that sui generis protection 
would inhibit with restrictions designed for the purpose of limiting and controlling the 
flow of information. Dissenting points of views hold that the sui generis system would 
impact adversely on crucial elements of freedom of speech as protected under the First 
Amendment doctrine of the U.S. Constitution. 137 With serious lobbying from proponents 
rn . 
Compare. WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 8 wzth E.U. Proposal art. 10 and u.s. Proposal 6. 
ill . 
Compare WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 11 wzth E.O. Proposal art. 11.3 and U.S. Proposal!1. 
136 Marci A. Hamilton, Database Protection and the Circuitous Route Around the United States, 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD 31 (2000). "While database 
legislation is, in general, viewpoint neutral, it is aimed at a particular type of content-facts and 
information. It is legislation that builds fences around building blocks necessary to create a market place of 
expression and ideas. It impacts on crucial elements of the market place of speech, including research, 
commentary, news reporting and creative works." 
137 
Id. at 31. 
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of both sides of the issue, the U.S. Congress has not currently accepted the idea that there 
is a compelling need for database protection. 138 Aside from the fact that the E. U. now has 
protection that does not provide for national treatment, there is a number of evidence 
proving that such legislation is crucial to the U.S. database industries and its socio-
economy. With the less advanced legal systems, developing and least developed 
countries advocating for the need to maintain a free flow of access to information, it is 
hoped that technological transfer will help national infrastructure, develop human 
resources, and heal their fragile economies. 
The most serious concern, however, relates to human rights under the auspices of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR,,)139 adopted by the United Nations 
and its successor, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
("ICESCR,,).140 Reaffirming fundamental human rights and freedom, of which the 
ultimate purpose is to bring peace and security and the understanding of differences 
among races, cultures, ways of life, and attitudes prescribed under the Charter of the 
United Nations, the UDHR promotes "the right to education" 141 for all peoples. The 
subsequent provision and the position of ICESCR, which primarily concern intellectual 
property laws, declare the right "to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
138 A number of draft legislations regarding the protection of sui generis databases have been proposed in 
Congress since 1996 as follows: Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act, H.R. 3531, 
104th Congo (1996). Former Rep. Carlos J. Moorhead of California introduced this bill on May 23, 1996. 
Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Congo (1998). Collections of Information 
Antipiracy Act. H.R. 354, 106th Congo (1999). Representative Howard Coble introduced this bill. 
Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act, H.R. 1858, 106th Congo (1999). Representative Bliley 
introduced this bill. Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th 
Congo (introduced Oct 8, 2003). 
139 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted December 10, 1948, G.A. Res 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd 
Sess., Pt. I, Resolutions, at 71, U.N. Doc. Al810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
140 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, concluded December 16, 1966, 
entered into force January 3, 1976,993 U.N.T.S. 3, 1966 U.N.J.Y.B. 170; 1977 U.K.T.S. 6, Cmmd. 6702 
[hereinafter ICESCR]. 
141 
UDHR art. 26.1. 
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applications,,,142 and the right of an individual "to benefit from the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
which he is the author.,,143 The proper balance of the interests between individual authors 
and the public sector is clearly recognized, and the flow and contents of facts, data, and 
information are acknowledged as a benefit for all in the global society. By granting the 
sui generis right to factual contents and recognizing the principle of reciprocity, the 
European database industries would possess the world's majority of database assets, 
incurring a cost to access such facts and information and opposing the human rights and 
freedoms of all in the global society. 
IV. Conclusion 
The sui generis system seems to fulfill the economic expectations of the database 
industries, but does not seem to benefit the larger global economy. It appears that the 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty was built on the provisions prescribed under the competing 
proposals submitted by the Member States of the European Union and the United States, 
by which they proposed to recognize a property right in the contents of facts, data, and 
infonnation contained in the databases. 144 The European Union and its Member States 
have claimed: "Since the entry into force of the Database Directive, the European CD-
ROM market and on-line markets have grown by leaps and bounds. A large number of 
new database products have been made available in Europe, many of which have been 
142 
143 Id. art. 27(1). ICESCR art. 15(1)(b). 
144 !d. art. 27(2). ICESCR art. 15(1)( c). 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty Preamble Clause. 
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produced by small and medium-sized enterprises.,,145 The Database Directive is a piece 
of legislation for regional benefits; the European Union has failed to set forth a 
convincing argument that the protection of sui generis databases is an apt tool to foster 
economic and social infrastructure in developing countries and the global economy as a 
whole. Instead, the privatization of the contents of facts and data results in an increasing 
cost to public sectors such as science, research, and education to gain access to the same 
facts and data that once were available to them without cost. The free and open access to 
information is important. Copyright law already addresses the free flow of access to 
information as central to society's public information policies affecting what we can read, 
view, hear, use, or learn. The WIPO Draft Database Treaty recognizes that an instrument 
concerned primarily with the economic rights of database makers would not make sense 
to adopt as an international instrument to promote rights and freedoms and economic and 
social progress for all citizens of the global society. 
145 Contrast The Legal Protection of Non-Creative Databases, WIPO Doc. WIPOIECICONFI99/SPK/22-A 
(September 1999), at 4. "First Court cases in several EC Member States have shown that the sui generis 
regime works without difficulties or undesirable side effects in areas such as telephone directories, 
compilations of legal texts, or electronic dictionaries. Since the entry into force of the Database Directive, 
the European CD-ROM market and on-line markets have grown at enormous rates. A large number of new 
database products have been made available in Europe, many of which have been produced by small and 
medium-sized enterprises." The Legal Protection of Databases, WIPO Doc. SCCR/8/8 (November 4, 
2002), at 3. "Firstly, the sui generis protection of databases had proven to fulfill the economic expectations. 
Since the entry into force of the Database Directive, the European CD-ROM market and on-line markets 
have grown at enormous rates. A large number of new database products have been made available in 
Europe, many of which have been produced by small and medium-sized enterprises. Many of these 
databases are only made available in the European Community, as sui generis protection provides database 
makers with a safe legal environment for the marketing of their products; they are reluctant to market them 
without this legal security. Secondly, the application of practice of the sui generis right has demonstrated 
~at the protection is operational in the markets, that the Courts have already shown their ability to address 
ISSues arising under the Directive (such as the interpretation of "substantial investment," "substantial part of 
the contents," or "substantial new investment"), and that the protection does not interfere with research or 
with the exchange of information." 
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Chapter III 
Economic Justification for Sui Generis Databases 
I. Introduction 
The economic justification for sui generis databases needs to be reexamined. 
Unrestricted import and export of goods and services between nations is part of an ideal 
international trade policy that is subject to the fundamental economic theories of 
"Demand-Supply" and "Maximization" (comparative advantage). Against the prevailing 
wisdom that free-flowing commerce would threaten domestic producers, 18th century 
political economist and philosopher Adam Smith believed that, based upon comparative 
advantage theory, nations should export what they can produce most efficiently and 
inexpensively and import "what it will cost them more to make than to buy."l In 
1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, BOOK IV, SECTION II, 12 (1776). "If a foreign country can 
SUpply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of 
the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage." Steven Suranovic, 
The Theory of Comparative Advantage - Overview, at http://internationalecon.com/vl.0/ch40/40cOOO.html 
(last visited September 20, 2005). "The theory of comparative advantage is perhaps the most important 
~oncept in international trade theory. It is also one of the most commonly misunderstood principles. There 
IS a popular story told amongst economists that once when an economics skeptic asked Paul Samuelson (a 
Nobel laureate in economics) to provide a meaningful and non-trivial result from the economics discipline, 
Samuelson quickly responded with, "comparative advantage." The sources of the misunderstandings are 
easy to identify. First, the principle of comparative advantage is clearly counter-intuitive. Many results 
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opposition to the concept of free trade, protectionism continues to be promoted in the 
interest of defending domestic industries from foreign competition. 
The European invention of the sui generis system promotes unfair competition. 
Under the European Database Directive's regime, the economic interest of the European 
database makers has been satisfied as the protection of factual and data contents is 
granted to them.2 Not only the duration of protection that creates an unlimited term of 
protection, but also the requirement of reciprocal treatment combine to create a monopoly 
for the European database industries/ promoting the interest of defending its local 
industries from foreign competition. Such a protectionist regime produces a number of 
negative effects, among which are restricting "free competition" and turning one 
particular region's free trade into another country's economic exploitation; this is 
especially true in developing countries with fragile economies and limited resources. The 
system of the free flow of trade, which is championed by Adam Smith's theory of the 
"invisible hand," the self-interested actions of both consumers and producers to promote 
an optimal economic and social outcome, should be maintained.4 Regulating the sui 
from the formal model are contrary to simple logic. Secondly, the theory is easy to confuse with another 
notion about advantageous trade, known in trade theory as the theory of absolute advantage. The logic 
behind absolute advantage is quite intuitive. This confusion between these two concepts leads many people 
to think that they understand comparative advantage when in fact, what they understand, is absolute 
advantage. Finally, the theory of comparative advantage is all too often presented only in its mathematical 
form. Using numerical examples or diagrammatic representations are extremely useful in demonstrating the 
basic results and the deeper implications of the theory. However, it is also easy to see the results 
mathematically, without ever understanding the basic intuition of the theory." 
2 The Legal Protection of Databases (submitted by the European Community and its Member States), 
WIPO Doc. SCCR/8/8 (November 4. 2002), at 3. "The sui generis protection of databases has proven to 
fulfill the economic expectations. Since the entry into force of the Database Directive, the European CD-
ROM and online markets have grown at enormous rates. A large number of new database products have 
been made available in Europe, many of which have been produced by small and medium-sized 
enterprises. " 
3 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection 
of Databases, OJ. L 77/20 [hereinafter Database Directive] arts. 10(3) and 11(3). 
4 
CHRIS ROHMANN, A WORLD OF IDEAS; A DICTIONARY OF IMPORTANT THEORIES, CONCEPTS, BELIEFS AND 
THINKERS 247 (1999). "In a free market, prices, quantities, and production methods are governed by the 
forces of Supply and Demand. When the price of a good is stable because the supply of it matches the 
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generis right is an irresponsible action of the European Union, an attempt to steal 
knowledge wealth from other countries. 
This Chapter explores important economic mechanisms and competition law that 
have been used to promote the competitiveness of the database industries. Section II 
explains fundamental economic theories that lead to an understanding of the concept of 
an efficient and perfect competition within the database industries. Section III analyzes 
judicial decisions ofthe two economic parties, the European Union and the United States 
of America, that apply competition law to create a fair reproduction and dissemination of 
factual contents and to prevent unfair competition derived from an attempt to dominate 
the free flow of contents in the market. Section IV examines a concept of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction that the courts in the E.U and the U.S. have utilized to assert extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over activities that are constituted outside their borders. Section V addresses 
the concept of economic invisible hands and the competition laws that are sufficient to 
promote market efficiency and a competitive advantage for the worldwide database 
industry. 
demand for it, the market for that good is said to be in equilibrium. The invisible hand is not infallible, 
however; unemployment, inflation, and the adverse unintended consequences of economic activity (know 
to economists as "negative externalities") are examples of market failure. In these situations, government 
often steps in, creating subsidies, regulations, public-sector industries, taxes, and other mechanisms to 
Correct or avoid the malfunction. Government intervention in free market economies also typically includes 
antitrust laws, tax incentives to encourage certain kinds of investment, and interest-rate manipulation." 
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II. Relation of Fundamental Economic Mechanism, Competition, and the 
Protection of Sui Generis Databases 
Whatever its choice of economic systems and national policies, a government 
adopts basic economic principles to promote the competitiveness of its markets, and uses 
legal measures to support market activities.5 Generally, there are two fundamental 
economic theories that the government takes in consideration. One is "Demand-Supply," 
which explains the concept of price motivation between producers and consumers in the 
market and the other is "Profit Maximization," which explains the competition between 
players based on the concept of price motivation. 
A. Demand-Supply 
Together, Demand and Supply motivate market activities. The theory of Demand-
Supply is based on the relationship between suppliers and consumers in the market. 
"Supply" (ceteris paribus) is an ability and willingness to sell specific quantities of goods 
at alternative prices in a given time period. 6 "Demand" (ceteris paribus), in contrast, is 
an ability and willingness to buy specific quantities of goods at alternative prices in a 
given time period. 7 Both Demand and Supply magnify each other, rendering market 
behavior. If there is high demand by consumers for a specific product in the market, the 
increase in demand will cause the price of the product to be increased as well. Once the 
demand is greater than the supply, prices will rise and that price motivation may tempt 
5 
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 2 (1962). "Government is necessary to preserve 
freedom, .. .Its major function must be to protect our freedom both from the enemies outside our gates and 
from our fellow citizens: to preserve law and order, to enforce private contracts, to foster competitive 
markets" 6 . 
7 BRAD R. SCHILLER, THE ECONOMY TODAY (8th ed. 2000). 
!d. 
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new suppliers to produce that specific product and move into a market already dominated 
by a few suppliers. In contrast, if suppliers over-produce a specific product, the supply 
becomes greater than the demand. Then prices will drop and become more competitive 
and consumers will benefit from the competition between the suppliers offering that 
product. 
B. Profit Maximization and Maximizing Behavior 
Profit Maximization explains the natural market behavior that leads to 
competition. In a perfect market environment, the Profit Maximization is the most 
profitable rate of output which is indicated by the intersection of marginal revenue and 
marginal cost or where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. 8 This means a firm 
maximizes profit when it could sell a single item of a specific product and gain the profit 
at the cost of producing it. Consequently, the maximized profit, which becomes profit 
incentive, stimulates competition in the market. Any firm would want to enter into a 
market that has already been dominated by the original player. The economists describe 
this kind of behavior as a "Maximizing Behavior.,,9 
Maximizing Behavior applies to all market participants. Consumers come with a 
limited amount of income to spend. lO They wish to buy the most desirable goods and 
services that their limited budgets will permit. However, they cannot afford everything 
they want, so they must make choices about how to spend their scarce dollars. Their goal 
is to maximize the utility (satisfaction) they get from their available incomes. Businesses 
8 




come to the marketplace with a quest to maximize profits. I I They try to use resources 
efficiently and lower the cost of production, or even to have legal protection reduced or 
increased in order to maximize the profit. The public sector also has a maximizing goal 
called "welfare maximization.,,12 Government has to use available resources to serve and 
maximize the public needs. Thus, the resources available for this purpose are finite. 
Hence local, state, and federal governments must use scare resources carefully, striving to 
maximize the general welfare of society. 
c. An Application of Economic Theories to Sui Generis Databases 
The above-mentioned economic theories can be directly applied to market 
activities of the database industries. In a perfect market environment, the theories of 
Demand-Supply and Maximizing Behavior act together to explain market behavior in 
relation to price mechanism. If the prices of database goods and services are not too high, 
the demand of consumers will increase. The increasing demand, consequently, motivates 
the database compilers or makers to produce more products or services to supply the 
market. Price mechanism will motivate subsequent compilers to enter into the market that 
already has been captured by the original players. This is because the subsequent 
database makers foresee how they can maximize the profit at the cost of producing one 
additional unit. Some database makers even enter further into their "market opportunity" 
by developing better and cheaper databases to supply the market. In this sense, the 
competition flourishes. Vice versa, if the prices increase, the demand of consumers will 





Every relationship in the market is determined by the price mechanism. The 
databases, ranging from hard products (CD-ROM or compilations) to soft products 
(online database services), will be consumed if the costs are not too high for the 
consumer to afford. At this point, the market price of databases will not rise above or 
equal the marginal price. This is because no firm may charge more than another; any 
attempt by a single firm to raise a price would result in a loss of sales as buyers opt for a 
lower priced product. On the other hand, if the market price drops below a producer's 
marginal cost, the producer will not gain enough revenue from the sale of a unit to cover 
his expenses in producing an item. Consequently, he will ultimately be forced to drop out 
of the competition in the market. 
Any subsequent database maker will be tempted to enter into the market that is 
already dominated by the original databases makers if there is an equal market 
opportunity. They may use different business strategies to attract consumers, including 
product improvement and development. However, competition would flourish only if the 
underlying data is free to the subsequent compilers so they are not forced to start from 
scratch by doing a survey and rediscovering the same data. Legal measures, if any, 
should be provided to subsidize competition, but not to eliminate the subsequent 
compliers from the market or to allow the original database makers to dictate supply and 
price. 
According to D' Amato and Long, the copyright protection constitutes a 
temporary monopoly over reproduction and dissemination of expressive contents.13 They 
13 
ANTHONY D' AMATO & DORIS ESTELLE LONG, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY; 
UNDERLYING THEORIES 54 (1996). "In a desire to reward the author, and hence encourage production of 
new works, copyright essentially grants the author a monopoly over the reproduction and dissemination of 
his creative expression for a limited period of time. Thus, copyright is also a tax to society, because the 
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explained that an author of creative works generally obtains exclusive rights which would 
create a temporary monopoly by way of a lengthy duration of protection, the author's life 
plus fifty years. 14 Through a licensing scheme, the consumers pay more than they should 
for licensing products. IS The subsequent compilers will be reluctant to incur the costs by 
starting from scratch and entering a market or absorbing monopolistic prices of 
copyrighted items.16 Although they did not mention any applicable economic theory in 
connection with the factual contents, they appear to support the idea that copyright law 
maintains a proper balance, providing an incentive to the authors and promoting the 
public free flow of access to information, by stating: "The limit is important because the 
purpose of copyright is not solely to reward authors, but rather to induce production at the 
minimum possible cost to society. The law, by limiting the ownership of data, thus, 
favors its free movement and therefore contributes to the general progress of society.,,17 
They emphasized that a government's granting of protection of any kind should neither 
limit the public access to information nor avail any private entity an absolute monopoly 
window in information goods and services. 
author may set price he chooses for the work, though the work faces potential substitution if the price is too 
high and buyers opt instead for other, similar works." BRAD R. SCHILLER, supra note 6, at 496. "A 
"monopoly" situation is when a firm produces the entire market supplies of a particular good and 
service ... Although monopolies simplify the geometry, they complicate the arithmetic of profit 
maximization. In theory, this special adaptation of the profit-maximizing rule does not work for a 
monopolist. The demand curve facing a monopolist is downward-sloping. Because of this, marginal 
revenue is not equal to price for a monopolist. On the contrary, marginal revenue is always less than price 
in a monopoly, which makes it just a bit more difficult to fmd the profit-maximizing rate of output." 
14 ANTHONY D'AMATO & DORlS ESTELLE LONG, supra note 13, at 54. "In order to protect the copyright 
holder while mitigating the burden of his monopoly on his competitors and customers, the protection is 
limited to creative expression for a specific period of time." 
15 Id. "Competition is prohibited from copying expressions without the author's consent. To produce new 
Works, competitors must pay to license, or they must start from scratch." 
16 Id. 
17 
!d. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REv. 989, 
1014 (1997). "Copyright protection does not extend to the ideas, facts, or functional elements of a work, 
but only to the author's original expression of those ideas or elements. Thus, a copyright owner in a 
database of facts cannot prevent a user from copying the facts themselves from the database. Only the 
creative effort (if any) that has gone into the selection or organization of material is entitled to protection." 
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In contrast, the European Union's creation, the sui generis protection of its own 
kind, constitutes a monopoly by means of its perpetual duration of protection. In 
reference to the Database Directive, it specifies two-tiered protection, one attached to the 
creative selection and arrangement of the contents of databases and the other to the 
factual or data contents. I8 The sui generis system provides the database makers an 
ownership right to prevent the unauthorized extraction and/or reutilization of both 
creative and factual contents of databases for commercial purposes and unlimited 
duration of protection if the database makers show that there is substantial change in the 
databases. I9 This is convincing evidence that the regime of sui generis databases is 
unjustifiable. 
D. Justifiable Economic Concept of Competition 
Competition, in an economic context, can be referred to as the actions of two or 
more rivals in pursuit of the same objective.2o In the context of markets, the specific 
objective is either selling goods to buyers or alternatively buying goods from sellers.21 In 
a system of perfect competition, there would be a number of sellers, a number of buyers, 
and perfect market information available to all.22 The sellers, competing among 
18 Database Directive arts. 3 and 7. 
19 
Id. art. 10(3). 
20 
AREEDA KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 5 (5th ed. 1997). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 6. "A market economy will be perfectly competitive if the following conditions hold: 
(1) Sellers and buyers are so numerous that no one's action can have a perception impact on the 
market price, and there is no collusion among buyers and sellers. 
(2) Consumers register their subjective preferences among various goods and services through market 
transactions at fully known market prices. 
(3) All relevant prices are known to each producer, who also knows of all input combinations 
technically capable of producing any specify combination of outputs and who makes input-output 
decisions solely to maximize profits. 
(4) Every producer has equal access to all input markets and there are no artificial barriers to the 
production of any product." 
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themselves for business, would be induced to make and provide what their customers 
want. To do so they would aspire to be inventive and progressive and to minimize costs. 
The pressures of competition would keep prices near costs. 
However, the process of competition may result III one firm dominating the 
market. Competition between firms may produce a "winner" which dominates the 
market, or a "national" monopoly may exist on the market.23 A firm with sustained 
monopoly power would have an incentive to act inefficiently, which could involve letting 
costs rise; to use their power to exploit consumers; and to strike down competitors to 
preserve its monopoly in the market. Such activities constitute an economic inefficiency 
in the market and restrain competition. In these situations, it may be necessary for a 
governmental body to take certain measures to restrain the dominating firms' behavior. 
Competition law, therefore, exists to protect the process of competition in a free 
market economy.24 Competition law is legal measures that the government adopts in 
accordance with the form of economic organization which brings the greatest benefits to 
society?5 To foster diversity and pluralism, competition law seeks to promote effective 
and undistorted competition in the market. The basis of free competition between firms is 
believed to deliver efficiency, low prices, and innovation. Competition and competition 
law that serves the market economy tend to keep markets free and open, thereby 
23 CHRIS ROHMANN, supra note 4, at 71. "The economic theory of competition spans a continuum, from 
perfect competition, in which many sellers offer the same product under the same circumstances, to 
monopoly, in which a product is available from only one source, which therefore has no competition. Both 
of these model circumstances are rare; more common are atomistic and monopolistic competition and 
Oligopoly." 
24 
ELEANOR M. Fox, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 801 
(2002). "Many analysts assume that a system of free enterprise with competition law exists only to obtain a 
more efficient allocation of resources or only to prevent price rises to consumers and that competition law 
has exactly and only this goal. Of course, as we have seen, that is not the case. Competition law usually has 
other goals as well. In the European Union, these goals include market integration, openness, control of 
dOminance, fairness, and competitiveness (the growth of efficient, dynamic and responsive firms for the 
~;ke of the European economic strength in world markets)." 
ALISON JONES AND BRENDA SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 3 (2001). 
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providing opportunities for entrepreneurs and their small- and medium-sized 
. 26 
enterpnses. 
In perfect competition, the welfare of consumers should be maximized. Under this 
perfect competitive environment, the consumers determine the amount of economic 
resources available, which maximizes the efficiency of the market. The cost of the 
production of goods and services will be as low as possible because the undertakings 
need to remain competitive. The prices remain low as a function of the mechanics of 
supply and demand. 
III. Applicability of Competition Law to Promote Economic Efficiency of Sui 
Generis Databases 
Inasmuch as perfect competition is an ideal set forth by a theory, reality is often 
different. The reality is that monopolies do occur. Whereas the WIPO Draft Database 
Treaty, like other intellectual property law, tends to create a monopoly window for the 
database makers, giving them an ability to control prices and production, competition law 
tends to promote the market efficiency and competition in the databases industries. There 
is existing evidence of how the courts in the E.U. and the U.S. apply competition law to 
support competition in the database industries. 
26 Andres Guadamuz Gonzales, The Impact of Globalization on Competition Law, 6-7 (Enero del 2002), at 
http://www.democraciadigital.org/etc/arts/0201global.html. "It would appear that the rationale behind 
competition law is very complex. It exists to protect the consumer, it also protects smaller enterprises from 
preying practices of powerful undertakings, it protects the economy, and it is also beneficial for the 
"common good" of society. Whatever reason, it can be argued that the goal of competition policy is to find 
a balance with a market which no undertaking is allowed to become too dominant." 
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A. A Position ofE.U. Competition Law 
Member States of the European Union utilized competition law to enhance 
economIC efficiency and social development in its internal market. Every year the 
Competition Directorate publishes a report27 that reexammes the objectives of 
Community competition policy to be in compliance with Articles 81 (ex 85) and 82( ex 
86) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community of 1957 (E.C. Treaty)?8 In short, 
Article 81 (1) declares that agreements that distort competition are incompatible with the 
common market;29 Article 81(2) declares such agreements void;3o and Article 81(3) 
allows exemption for such agreements or practices that are economically progressive and 
27 ELEANOR M. Fox, supra note 24, 784-787. Referring to the XXXth Report on Competition Policy 
(2000), paragraph 1 states: "Competition Policy is one of the pillars of the European Commission's action 
in the economic field. This action is founded on the principle, enshrined in the Treaty, of "an open market 
economy with free competition." It acknowledges the fundamental role of the market and of competition in 
guaranteeing consumer welfare, in encouraging the optimum allocation of resources and in granting 
economic agents the appropriate incentives to pursue productive efficiency, quality, and innovation." 
Treaty Establishing European Community, adopted 1957 [hereinafter E.C. Treaty] arts. 81(ex 85) and 
82(ex 86);" the XXIXth Report on Competition Policy (1999), paragraph 2 states: "The First objective of 
competition policy is the maintenance of competitive markets. Competition policy serves as an instrument 
to encourage industrial efficiency, the optimal allocation of resources, technical progress and the flexibility 
to adjust to a changing environment;" and the XXVIth Report on Competition Policy (1996), paragraph 2 
states: 'Competition policy is both a Commission policy in its own right and an integral part of a large 
number of European Union policies and with them seeks to achieve the Community objectives set out in 
Article 2 of the Treaty, including the promotion of harmonization and balanced development of economic 
activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth which respects the environment, a high level of 
employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic 
and social cohesion." 
28 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, 0.1. (C 340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter 
Ee Treaty]. 
29 ld. art. 81(1) (ex article 85(1). "The Following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common 
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions, by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distribution of competition within the common market, and in particular those 
Which: 
(a) direct or indirect fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with 
30 the subject of such contracts." 







benefit consumers.31 Article 82 prohibits abuse of a dominant position.32 In addition, the 
European Parliament and its Commission are bound to promote balance and sustain 
economic and social progress in the Community in other areas as well: merger control,33 
liberalization and state intervention,34 and state aid.35 
In Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission (1995) (Magil/),36 the European Court of 
Justice ("ECl") held that a refusal to license copyright in factual contents infringed 
Article 82 of the E.C. Treaty. The EC] upheld the Commission's decision in Magill TV 
Guide v. Independent Television Publications Ltd. (ITP), British Broadcasting 
Cooperation (BBC) and Radio Telefis Eireann Authority (RTE) (1988).37 The 
Commission of the European Communities ("Commission") held that the policies and 
practices of ITP, BBC and RTE, respectively, in relation to their individual advance 
31 Id. art. 81(3). "The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; 
-any decision or category of decision by associations of undertakings; 
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or promoting technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial 
part of the products in question." 
32 Id. art. 82 (ex article 86). "Any abuse one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in 
so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse, in particular, consist in: 
(a) direct or indirect imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contracts." 
33 Application of Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings. 
34 
EC Treaty arts. 37 and 90. 
35 
Id. arts. 90, 92-94. 
36 Court of Justice C-241-241191 P, RTE & ITP v. EC Commission [1995] ECR 1-743, [1995] 6 CMLR 
718. 
37 COmmission Decision 891205/EEC, relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty 
(1V/31.851- Magill TV Guide/lTP, BBC and RTE), 1988 OJ. (L 78) 21.3.89, 43; [1989] 4 CMLR 755. 
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weekly program listings, constituted infringements of Article 82.38 Each broadcasting 
organization published weekly listings of its programs in Ireland and North Ireland, gave 
newspapers its schedule free on a daily basis (according to strictly enforced licensing 
conditions),39 and claimed copyright protection over its program listings. Therefore, RTE 
had statutory monopoly over television broadcasting in Ireland,4o whereas BBC and ITP 
had a statutory duopoly in the U.K. (including Northern Ireland). 41 At that time, no 
composite TV guide existed. An Irish publisher, Magill, started to publish a 
comprehensive weekly TV guide giving details of all programs available to viewers in 
Ireland and Northern Ireland. It sought licenses from RTE, BBC and ITP but the licenses 
were denied.42 Magill complained to the Commission that the television companies, by 
refusing to give out reliable advance listings information and protecting their listing by 
enforcing their copyright, were infringing Article 82. 
ill the finding, the relevant product market43 was identified in VIew of the 
potential demand for weekly TV guides. The products to be taken into account were the 
advance weekly listings ofITP and BBC regional program services and those ofRTE and 
38 Id. art. 1. 
39 
Id. para. 15. 
40 
/d. para. 2. 
41 
Id. paras. 3-4. 
42 
Id. para. 5. 
43 Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market, 1997 OJ. C 372/5 II. "A relevant product 
market comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable 
by the consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use ... The 
relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the 
supply and demand of products or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently 
homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighboring areas because the conditions of 
competition are appreciably different in those areas ... The relevant market within which to assess a given 
competition issue is therefore established by the combination of the product and geographic markets. The 
~ommission interprets the defmitions at paragraph 7 and 8 (which reflects the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice and the Court of First Instance as well as its own decisional practice) according to the orientations 
defmed in this Notice." 
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also the TV guides in which these listings were published.44 For a publisher wishing to 
produce a weekly TV guide for the geographic area, these listings constituted the 
essential raw materials for any such guide.45 The individual listings were not 
interchangeable with one another but instead were complementary to one another, as they 
concerned different programs.46 Accordingly, the consumers experienced this difficulty 
and demanded that this information be contained in a single periodical, that IS, a 
h · 'd 47 compre enSlVe gm e. 
On the other hand, the relevant geographic market was determined by the 
common characteristic of where the weekly listings could be received and where TV 
guides containing these listings were distributed.48 The RTE program service was 
received in most, ifnot all, of Ireland and Northern Ireland.49 The BBC and ITP program 
services, or at least regional versions of these services, were also received in this area. 50 
Any comprehensive weekly TV guide, therefore, would contain at least the weekly 
listings for these regional services. Consequently, the relevant geographic market was 
most of Ireland and Northern Ireland, which constituted a substantial part of the common 
market for the purpose of Article 82. 
The Commission provided an analysis of existence of dominant position. First, 
the existence of a dominant position was found in accordance with the nature of subject 
matter in this case.51 The broadcasting organizations' listings were entitled to national 
copyright protection of the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland, which was contrary 
44 









Id. paras. 8-9. 
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to the concept of copyright protection elsewhere in the Community. 52 This case appeared 
to be a battle between intellectual property rights and competition law. Insofar as the 
dominant position is concerned, it is to be remembered at the outset that mere ownership 
of an intellectual property right cannot confer a monopoly position.53 Since the 
broadcasting organizations legitimately obtained copyright protection on their listings, 
they had a monopoly over their reproduction and distribution.54 Any third parties who 
wished to produce reliable listings for pUblication in their own TV guide must obtain 
licenses from the broadcasting organizations, resulting in the ability of the license-
holding organizations to control competition from third parties in the markets. 55 The 
broadcasting organizations, thus, were in a position to prevent effective competition in 
the market of weekly television magazines and, therefore, occupied a dominant position. 
Second, the existence of abuse of Article 82 was found in relation to the 
broadcasting organizations' actual policies and practices. 56 ITP, BBC, and RTE had 
policies to supply publishers with their advance weekly listings but to limit, by means of 
the terms of licenses granted, the reproduction of these listings to one or, at most, two 
days' listings at a time. Another option was to refuse to license altogether. 57 The 
Commission took a view that these policies and practices were unduly restrictive to the 
competition by preventing the appearance of a new product for which there was a 
potential consumer demand. 58 Instead, their conduct reserved to themselves the secondary 











denied access to the basic infonnation that was the raw material indispensable for the 
compilation of such guides. 59 In addition, the Commission asserted that such abuse also 
had effect on trade between Member States because a comprehensive TV guide 
containing the advance weekly listings oflTP, BBC and RTE would clearly be marketed 
in both Ireland and Northern Ireland, which would include cross-border trade in such 
guides.60 In conclusion, the Commission considered that the practices and policies of 
broadcasting organizations were prohibited under Article 82 because, in fact, they used 
copyright as an instrument of abuse, and in a manner that fell outside the scope of the 
specific subject-matter of that intellectual property right, and by acting in a dominant 
position to prevent the introduction of a new product, the weekly TV guide, to the 
market.6l The Commission's decision was also upheld by the Court of First Instance.62 
Only RTE and ITP appealed to the ECJ.63 The ECJ confinned the finding of 
abuse but its judgment was strikingly narrow.64 It concentrated on the specific scenario in 
issue and eschewed extended discussion about the nature of intellectual property rights 
and their relationship to the rules of competition. 65 The ECJ stated: 
59 Id. 
60 
Id. para. 24. 
61 
"[T]he appellants-who were, by force of circumstances, the only 
sources of the basic information on programme scheduling which is the 
indispensable raw material for compiling a weekly television guide-
gave viewers wising to obtain information on the choice of programmes 
for the week ahead "no choice" but to buy the weekly guides for each 
Id. art 1 
62 Court' of First Instance T-69/70/89, 76/89, RTE, ITP, BBC v. EC Commission [1991] ECR H-485, 
[1991] 4 CMLR 586 
63 . 
64 C-241/91P and C-242/91P, [1995] ECR 1-743, supra note 36. 
65 Id. paras. 46-58. 
Id. para. 46. 
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station and draw from each of them the information they needed to make 
. ,,66 compansons. 
In conclusion, the ECJ held that the refusal to supply information that was the raw 
material necessary for the weekly TV listings constituted an abuse under Article 82(b) of 
the E.C. Treaty by means of preventing the appearance of a new product that the 
appellants did not offer but for which there was a potential consumer demand.67 
The Commission had been concerned that dominant undertakings should not 
hinder competition from producing products and services. The decision in the Magill case 
had proved that a refusal to license intellectual property rights under Article 82 of the 
E.C. Treaty would affect the competition of the database industry. In pursuant to the 
Database Directive, recital 47 mentioned: 
"Whereas, in the interests of competition between suppliers of 
information products and services, protection by the sui generis right 
must not be afforded in such a way as to facilitate abuses of a dominant 
position, in particular as regards the creation and distribution of new 
products and services which have an intellectual, documentary, technical, 
economic or commercial added value; whereas, therefore, the provisions 
of this Directive are without prejudice to the application of Community 
or national competition rules.,,68 
It raises an important question of how far the sui generis right under the Database 
Directive regime could promote free competition. Inasmuch as it constitutes a property 
right in the factual contents, the concept of protection directly opposes the copyright 
rationale of the public free flow of access to information. Moreover, it violates 
66 
67/d· para. 53. 
68 [d. para. 54. 
Database Directive recital 47. 
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international treaties to which Member States are signatories, especially the Berne 
Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.69 The action of institutions applying and enforcing the Community law must 
respect the general principles of law, in particular, the principles of proportionality, 
legitimate expectations, and fundamental rights.70 To this point, it is important that when 
administering Community law, the Commission must ensure that such law is in 
compliance with the principles of human rights, rules of natural justice, and "international 
comity" (living peacefully with other nations in mutual respect and accommodating their 
interests, the rules of politeness, convenience and goodwill observed by States in their 
mutual intercourse without being legally bound by them).71 
B. The Position of U.S. Antitrust Law 
The first country in which antirust law took a firm legislative foothold was the 
United States. Since 1890, the U.S. courts applied the Sherman Act to prohibit the 
existence of monopolies, conspiracies between companies, and lowering prices to 
eliminate smaller competitors.72 Insofar as it concerned healthy U.S. economy, the 
Sherman Act was very effective in creating a system of punishment by providing private 
individuals a way to recover "treble damages" for beaches of the antitrust law.73 In 
69 ALISON JONES AND BRENDA SUFRIN, supra note 25, at 66-67. "The ECJ has developed and introduced a 
body of unwritten law, the general principle of law, as part of Community law. These are rules, based on 
national laws of Member States and international treaties, especially the European Convention of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in accordance with which Community law is interpreted. The principles 
are important when determining the boundaries of proper and lawful action of the Community and national 




7 lSU.S.c. §§ 1-7. 
3 Id. AREEDA KAPLOW, supra note 20, at 106-107. "Although antitrust laws are of general application, 
Covering all industries and virtually all economic activity, several "exemptions" have arisen over the years. 
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pursuant to the compilations of facts and infonnation, it appeared that the U.S. courts had 
applied the doctrine of "misappropriation" to promote competition of the database 
industry in addition to the doctrine of "sweat of the brow." 
In International News Service v. Associated Press case (INS v. AP) (1918),74 the 
U.S. Supreme Court applied the doctrine of misappropriation to compilations of facts or 
data in news. According to the underlying fact, during the First World War, the INS and 
AP were competitors engaging in the same business conduct, news services.75 Both 
gathered and published news about wars from abroad secured from foreign 
governments.76 However, AP was barred from sources in some countries and began to 
pirate its competitor's news from INS's bulletin boards.77 INS filed the suit, alleging that 
AP had misappropriated its news and sought for an injunction against its rival agency. 
The District Court granted the summary judgment in favor of AP and withheld the 
injunction.78 In appeal, the Appeal Court reversed the decision, issued the injunction, and 
restrained AP from taking or gainfully using any of INS's news by means of the 
commercial value attached to the news.79 The Supreme Court affinned reasoning that 
INS still had commercial interest in the news it gathered. 
Pursuant to the doctrine of misappropriation, Justice Pitney delivered the leading 
opinion directed to the owner's commercial or economic interest in the commercial data 
We use the quoted term loosely to cover quite different limitations on the reach of the antitrust laws. There 
are literal exemptions by which statutes expressly allow certain conduct-for example, by agriculture 
cooperatives or by labor unions-that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws ... In addition, the courts 
have assumed that Congress meant to respect principles of federalism by leaving "state action" outside the 
antitrust regime. Finally, the federal antitrust laws apply only where interstate and foreign commerce are 
~volved, although applying U.S. law to foreign activity creates special difficulty." 
7: International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 63 L. Ed. 211, 39 S. Ct. 68 (1918). 







or information. The Court pointed out that gathered information about events of public 
interest was not "susceptible of ownership or dominion in the absolute sense.,,80 The 
gatherers had no right against the public at large and should not make any use of 
information because news was "common property.,,81 Nevertheless, the gathers could 
obtain a right to restrain use of such news if there was a commercial rival between the 
complainant and the defendant. In this sense, the news must be regarded as "quasi-
property,,82 that had all attributes necessary to determine a misappropriation. INS, then, 
could prohibit its competitors from using it "until its commercial value as news has 
passed away.,,83 The Court found that AP's conduct was an endeavor to reap where it had 
not sown and amounted to an unauthorized interference to INS's legitimate business at 
the point where its profit was to be reaped.84 AP should be prohibited from taking news 
from the INS bulletin board. Otherwise, no news service could stay in business. 
The Court laid down elements central to INS's claim as follows: (1) the plaintiff 
generated or collected information at some cost or expense,85 (2) the value of information 
was highly time-sensitive,86 (3) defendant's use of information constituted free-riding on 
the plaintiffs costly efforts to generate or collect it,87 (4) the defendant's use of 
information was in direct competition with a product or service offered by the plaintiff,88 
and (5) the ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff would so 
reduce the incentive to produce the product or service that its existence or quality would 
80 !d. at 236. 
81 
Id. at 235. 
82 
Id. at 236. 
83 




!d. at 231 
87 . 
Id. at 239-240. 
88 
!d. at 240. 
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be substantially threatened.89 INS's conduct would render AP's pUblication profitless or 
so little profitable as in effect to cut off the service by rendering the cost prohibitive in 
comparison with the return. 
Further, the Court reasoned that the INS case was about the protection of property 
rights in time-sensitive information so that the information could be made available to the 
public by profit-seeking entrepreneurs. If services like AP were not assured of property 
rights in the news they pay to collect, they would cease to collect it. The ability of 
competitors to appropriate their product at only nominal cost and thereby to disseminate a 
competing product at a lower price would destroy the incentive to collect news in the first 
place. 
It appeared that the Court recognized a property right in such facts and 
information. However, the Court did not mention that the gathered news was 
copyrightable, it only referred to the gathered facts and information as "quasi property." 
Though the news was realized as "common property" belonging to the public, the Court 
applied the doctrine of misappropriation, reasoning that the gatherer still had a 
commercial interest in the contents and prevented INS from getting a free ride. The 
Court's decision responded to economic significance and interest of the gatherer in 
gathered facts and information. 
In the recent development, the U.S. court appears to be more sophisticated and 
provides more satisfactory analysis of the doctrine of misappropriation in relation to the 
databases. In National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc. (NBA v. Motorola) 
89 
!d. at 241. 
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(1997),90 the Second Circuit Court held that Motorola did not free-ride on NBA's product 
since it expended its own resources to collect purely factual infonnation. Motorola 
manufactured and marketed SportsTrax paging device while Sports Team Analysis and 
Tracking Systems ("STATS") supplied the game infonnation that was transmitted to the 
pagers such as the teams that were playing, score changes, and the time remaining in the 
quarter. 91 NBA filed in the Southern District of New York on the grounds of 
misappropriation and sought an injunction to bar the sale of a handheld pager that 
displayed updated scores and statistical infonnation of National Basketball Association 
games.92 The District Court found that Motorola and STATS were liable for 
misappropriation.93 The Second Circuit Court reversed the decision. 
In its finding, the Second Circuit Court outlined elements of the doctrine of 
misappropriation as follows: (1) the subject matter must result from plaintiffs own 
contribution, expenses, and labor in generating or collecting infonnation; (2) the 
infonnation was time sensitive, (3) the defendant's use of the infonnation must constitute 
free-riding status; (4) the defendant's use of the infonnation was in competition with a 
product or service offered by the plaintiff or likely to be offered by the plaintiff, and (5) 
the ability of other parties to free ride on the efforts of the plaintiff would so reduce the 
incentive to produce the product or service that the existence or equality of the product 
would be substantially threatened.94 The Second Circuit Court found that Motorola had 
not engage in unlawful misappropriation because the infonnation transmitted to 
90 
91 National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F. 3d 841 (2nd Cir. 1997). 




Id. at 845. 
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SportsTrax was not precisely contemporaneous, but was, in fact, time sensitive.95 
Besides, the NBA failed to show any competitive effect from SportsTrax on the 
following grounds: first, the product was generating the information by playing the 
games; second, the product was transmitting live, full descriptions of those games; and 
third, the product was collecting and retransmitting strictly factual information about the 
games.96 The Court also found that the NBA' s primary product-producing basketball 
games with live attendance and licensing copyrighted broadcasts of those games-was 
not infringed upon nor did it involve a free-ride, inasmuch as Motorola markets 
SportsTrax as being designed for those times when a person could not be at the arena, 
watch the game on TV or listen to it on the radio. 97 In addition, the Court asserted that 
transmitting contents of live events such as baseball games were not copyrightable and, 
therefore, survived the Copyright Act's preemptive effect.98 U.S. Congress only extends 
copyright to author's creative expressions, not facts or information. 
Evidently, the U.S. courts extend antitrust law to constitute a property right in the 
factual contents and to promote market efficiency in the database industry. The decisions 
in both cases indicate an intention to recognize economic significance of the databases 
and resolve the problem of free-riding. However, the decision in the NBA case is based 
on the fact that there are different relevant markets. Under the NBA scenario, the market 
would be competitive since the underlie information remains free for all to access. On the 
other hand, the Court in the INS case utilizes antitrust law to prevent free-riding of the 
gathered facts and to secure the investment of the gatherer. Under the INS scenario, only 
95 
[d. at 853 96 . 
[d. at 854. 
97 !d. 
98 
[d. at 846. 
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a handful of database compilers would remain in the market as they would obtain 
exclusive owner rights over the factual contents of databases. The subsequent compilers 
would not have an incentive to start collecting the same data from scratch and enter into a 
market already dominated by the original players. Consumers would have limited 
alternatives of product selections. The market would not be freely competitive as the 
authority's grant would create a temporarily monopoly status to the database industries. 
Last, both cases refer to compiled facts that copyright law does not afford protection 
unless there is minimal creativity in the selection and arrangement of the contents. The 
INS case refers to this type of work as a quasi property based on labor justification 
corresponding to the doctrine of sweat of the brow, whereas the NBA case mentions that 
compiled facts are not copyrightable corresponding to the true copyright regime that the 
U.S. ratified in the Berne Convention. 
The European approach, on the other hand, seems to be more effective than the 
U.S. approach. The Court's decision in the Magill case represents an idea to promote the 
pUblic free flow of access to information, flourishing market competition inasmuch as the 
European courts consider a refusal to license as an abuse of dominant position. It seems 
that the European courts eliminate temporary monopoly that copyright law allows 
through a licensing scheme, but fail to state that the factual contents are not 
copyrightable. Unlike the U.S. courts that suggest that the economic significance of the 
contents to the gatherers is of prime importance, the European courts merely suggest that 
a refusal to license would impede the free movement of goods and services in the 
Community. 
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There are a number of other differences between E.D. and U.S. competition laws 
that need to be addressed. First, the characteristic of the U.S. antitrust law is national, 
while the E.D. competition law is regional. Second, the Magill case presents a 
governmental authority to examine an existence of abuse of dominant position, but the 
U.S. court decisions present infringed parties who brought the claim before the courts on 
a ground of free-riding. 99 Last, the D.S. courts need not be concerned with distinct 
copyright law, whereas the European courts must consider the effect of the distinct 
copyright laws of the Member States and are challenged to solve problems in the national 
system in a way that would promote economic and social development in the Community 
as a whole. lOo One similarity they share, however, is that both the U.S. courts and the 
European courts efficiently utilize competition law to promote competition in the 
database industries and maximize the public need of free access to information. 
99 Martha Neil, Old Continent, New Deal, ABA J. (September, 2004) at 50, 54. "A 'philosophical gulf' 
exists between American and European Union antitrust regulators. The U.S. Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission routinely focus on potential harm to consumers. EU regulators, on the other 
hand, are concerned primarily about adverse effects will have on competitors." 
looALISON JONES AND BRENDA SUFRIN, supra note 25, at 558. "Common law notion of copyright 
emphasize the right of author to prevent others exploiting his work for commercial gain whereas the civil 
law emphasizes the right of the creator of a work to be recognized as such and to be normally entitled to 
protect its integrity. U.K. copyright law, for instance, covers performers' rights and similar rights but in 
most E.U. countries there is a distinction drawn between "author's right" and "neighboring rights" (those 
aCcorded to sound recordings, broadcastings, and performers). Under the U.K. law works created by the 
"sweat of the brow", such as compilations of information, are accorded copyright protection, whereas civil 
law systems require a greater degree of creativity." 
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IV. Extraterritoriality Aspect of Sui Generis Protection 
Within the context of competition law, the issue of extraterritoriality has become 
increasingly important as what is called the "globalization"lOl of the world economy 
advances. As competition takes place on a global dimension, it becomes more and more 
difficult to isolate the effects of transactions. For an authority to be able to assert 
substantive jurisdiction in antitrust matters,102 the jurisdiction must be one of two types 
afforded by international law. On the one hand, there is what is variously called 
prescriptive, legislative, or subject-matter jurisdiction, which is the right of States to 
make their laws applicable to persons, territory, or situation. 103 On the other hand, there is 
enforcement jurisdiction, which is the capability to take executive action to enforce 
compliance with those laws. 104 Thus, competition law primarily concerns how a state 
101 CHARLES W. HILL, INTERNATIONAL BUSlNESS: COMPETlNG IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 5-14 (2nd ed. 
1997). "The general understanding of the meaning of globalization is that it is a process in which the world 
is moving from a system of national economies into a trade regime where barriers of different types are 
disappearing to create one global marketplace. It is believed that this process of globalization is being 
driven by the fall of trade and investment barriers, the rapid technological advance in transportation and 
telecommunications, and the increase in direct investment of companies into third markets." CHRIS 
ROHMANN, supra note 4, at 199. "Although the contemporary political and policy know as globalism 
shares a supranational, nonisolationist outlook with other conceptions of internationalism, it differs from 
most of them in its emphasis on international power and influence rather than cooperation. The term refers 
Primarily to the u.s. policy of global engagement aimed at expanding its political influence and economic 
markets, but it was also applied to the Soviet Union's efforts to extend its own sphere of influence during 
the Cold War. "Globalism" is also applied to the view that some problems, such as ozone depletion and 
global warming, cannot be effectively dealt with on a local or regional scale but must be attacked globally." 
102 AUSON JONES AND BRENDA SUFRIN, supra note 25, at 1049. "On general principles, substantive 
jurisdiction in anti-trust matters should only be taken on the basis of either (a) the territorial principle, or (b) 
the nationality principle ... The territorial principle justifies proceedings against foreigners and foreign 
companies only in respect of conduct which consists in whole or in part of some activity by them in the 
territory of the State claiming jurisdiction .... The nationality principle justifies proceedings against 
nationals of the State claiming jurisdiction in respect of their activities abroad only provided that this does 
not involve interference with the legitimate affairs of other States or cause such nationals to act in a manner 
~~ich is contrary to the laws of the State in which the activities in question are conducted." 
Id. at 1039. 
104 Id. 
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would presume its rights to take jurisdiction in respect to conduct that has affected its 
. 105 own temtory. 
By taking into account the whole panorama of competition law in respect to 
international law, the E.U has, by far, the most developed regime of international 
protection for competition and it sets an example that should be followed. l06 On the other 
hand, though the United States is the first country in which competition law set a firm 
legislative foothold in the national legal system, as Judge Wood commented, the strong 
u.s. antitrust law appears to put U.S. firms at a disadvantage in the competitive battle 
with their foreign rivals. 107 Thus, both systems share some common characteristics in 
regard to the extraterritorial jurisdiction. The US. and the European courts adopt the 
principle of the effect doctrine to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction by conditions that (1) 
there are agreement( s) or concerted practice( s) that create a direct and immediate 
restriction of competition; (2) the effect of the conduct must be reasonably foreseeable; 
and (3) that the effect produced on the territory must be substantial. l08 Though they lack 
sufficient evidence of the court's decision in relation to the databases subject-matter, the 
existing court decisions that present an extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction should be 
105 Id. 
106 A. Paul Victor, Diane Wood, Tom Campbell, Timothy J. Muris, and Thomas M. Jorde, Commentary: 
Antitrust and International Competitiveness in the 1990s, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 591 (1989) at 4. "The 
competition rules of the European Economic Community, set forth in Articles 95 and 86 of the treaty of 
Rome and implemented by the European Commission, are comprehensive and strong." 
107 Id. at 2-3. "The message seems inescapable: the United States, or more particularly U.S. firms, have not 
been winning the competitive battle with their Pacific Rim, European, or other foreign rivals ... Both 
existence of strong (at least on paper) antitrust law and specific aspects of those laws have often been said 
to put U.S. firms at a disadvantage." 
108 AREEDA KAPLOW, supra note 20, at 145. "Congress responded in 1982 with the Export Trading 
Company Act, which leaves little doubt that the concern of the antitrust laws is with U.S. consumers and 
exporters, not foreign consumers or producers. The Act contains a new §7 making the Sherman Act 
inapplicable to "conduct involving ... commerce (other than import trade ... ) with foreign nations-unless 
SUch conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on (1) domestic or import trade or 
(2) "on export ... commerce ... ofa person ... in the United States." 
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sufficient to prove an efficiency of the effect doctrine applicable to the sui generis 
databases in the global dimension. 
A. Extraterritoriality in an Aspect of E.U. Competition Law 
Restrictions on competition and abusive conduct which effect trade between 
Member States may originate outside the Community. Foreign firms established outside 
the Community may, for example, fix prices in the Community or divide the common 
market between them. To presume rights to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, the ECJ 
must examine whether such behavior is anti-competitive and has an effect that impedes 
the free movement of goods and services in the Community. Examples of how the ECJ 
applies the principle of effect doctrine to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction are 
demonstrated below. 
In Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. ("ICI") v. Commission (Dyestuffs) (1972),109 
the ECJ upheld the Commission's decision that behavior constituted a converted practice 
that was prohibited by Article 81(1) of the E.C. Treaty, holding that the Commission did 
have jurisdiction over the British company.IIO The Commission brought proceedings 
alleging that enterprises in six Member States and ICI, a company incorporated and 
having its headquarters in the U.K., which was not at that time a member of the 
Community, had infringed Article 81(1) by means of engaging in fixing prices of 
dyestuffs and the dye markets. III The ECJ reasoned that: first, such behavior had direct 
and substantial effects in the Community markets as stated: 




"Although parallel behavior may not by itself be identified with a 
concerted practice, it may however amount to strong evidence of such a 
practice if it leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond 
to the normal conditions of the market, having regard to the nature of the 
products, the size and number of the undertakings, and the volume of the 
said market.,,1l2 
Second, such behavior had reasonably foreseeable effects in the Community market as 
stated: 
"Although every producer is free to change his pnces, taking into 
account in so doing the present or foreseeable conduct of his competitors, 
nevertheless it is contrary to the rules of competition contained in the 
Treaty for a producer to cooperate with his competitors, in any way 
whatsoever, in order to determine a coordinated course of action in 
relation to a price increase and to ensure its success by prior elimination 
of all uncertainty as to each other's conduct regarding the essential 
elements of that action, such as the amount, subject-matter, date and 
place 0 f the increases." 113 
Further, the U.K. government adopted the approach that the ECJ had no 
jurisdiction and that the Commission could not exercise jurisdiction against a foreigner 
Who or a foreign company which had committed no act within the Community. The ECJ 
held that although the subsidiaries within the Community had separate legal personalities, 
it could not outweigh the unity of their conduct on the market for the purposes of 
1I2 
!d. para. 66. 
113 
[d. para. I 18. 
123 
applying the rules of competition.114 The reality was that the ICI undertaking which had 
brought the concerted practice into legal question took place within the common 
market. 115 The issue of lacking jurisdiction raised by the applicants, therefore, was 
declared to be unfounded.116 The subsidiaries were merely carrying out the parent's 
order, so that they appeared as "mere extensions oflCI in the Common Market.,,117 
In A Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. Commission (Woodpulp) (1993),118 the ECJ 
addressed the existence of the effect doctrine in relation to the principles of international 
law. The Commission investigated alleged price-fixing in the wood pulp industry. It 
found that a cartel existed, and held that forty-one producers and two trade associations 
(Finncell and KEA) had engaged in concerted practices contrary to Article 81(1). All 
producers and trade associations had their registered offices outside the Community, but 
most, if not all, of the producers had branches, subsidiaries, agencies or other 
establishments within the Community. The Commission adopted the effect doctrine and 
extended the territorial scope of Article 81 to undertakings whose registered offices were 
situated outside the Community because the agreements to fix prices had affected trade 
between Member States and restricted competition in the Common Market. 119 
Many of the addressees appealed on two grounds that: (1) the Commission had no 
jurisdiction to apply its competition law to the addressees, and (2) they had not 
participated in concerted practices. The ECJ asserted that although the main sources of 
supply of wood pulp were outside the Community, in Canada, the United States, Sweden, 
114 
Id. para. 140. 
115 
Id. para. 14l. 
116 
Id. para. 142. 
117 !d. 
118 




and Finland, the producers established in those countries sold directly to purchasers 
established in the Community and engaged in practices for the purpose of winning orders 
from those countries; this constituted competition within the Common Market. 120 It 
followed that the producers acted in concert on the prices to be charged to their customers 
in the Community and created effect by selling at prices which were actually coordinated, 
there were taking part in concentration which had the object and effect of restricting 
competition within the common market within the meaning of Article 81(1).121 
Therefore, the Commission had not infringed Article 81 by applying the competition 
rules to the individual undertakings. 
In addition, the applicants submitted that the Commission's decision was 
incompatible with public international law on the grounds that the use of the competition 
rules in this case was based exclusively on the economic repercussion within the common 
market. The ECJ noted that an infringement of Article 81 consisted of conduct made up 
of two elements, the formation of the agreement, decision, and concerted practices; and 
the "implementation.,,122 It found the producers implemented their pricing agreement 
within the common market. The Community'S jurisdiction to apply its competition rules 
to such conduct was covered by the territoriality principle as universally recognized in 
public international law. 123 
Further, the applicants argued on issues of the infringement of the principles of 
non-interference and international comity. The ECJ asserted that there was no need to 
enquire into the existence of such a rule in international law since it was sufficient to 
120 
Id. para. 12. 
121 
Id, para. 13. 
122 
Id. para. 16. 
123 J,d , para. 18. 
125 
'" 
observe that the conditions for its application were, in any event, not satisfied.
124 
The 
u.s. antitrust law did not require export cartels to be entered into, but merely tolerated 
them.125 In addition, the United States authorities had not raised any objection regarding 
any conflict of jurisdiction when consulted by the Commission pursuant to the OECD 
Council Recommendation of 25 October 1979 concerning Co-operation between Member 
Countries on Restrictive Business Practices affecting International Trade.
126 
Accordingly, 
the ECJ rejected the argument relating to the disregard of international comity raised by 
1· 127 the app lcants. 
It appears that the ECJ avoided mentioning the effect doctrine. Instead, the ECJ 
used the term "implementation" which meant to cover "direct sales" to Community 
purchasers and does not depend on the sellers establishing some form of marketing 
organization within the Community.128 The extraterritorial jurisdiction is taken simply 
because of sales into the Community giving an impression that the "implementation" is 
similar to the effect doctrine. 
124 
Id. para. 20. 
12S Id. 
126 
Id. para. 21. 
127 
!d. para. 23. 
128 ALISON JONES AND BRENDA SUFRlN, supra note 25, at 1055. "Significantly, this judgment avoided 
talking about' effects'. Given the terms in which the Commission decision, the arguments before the Court, 
and the Advocate General's opinion had been concluded, this avoidance of specific reference to the effects 
doctrine must have been deliberated. Instead, the Court talked about 'implementation'." 
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B. Extraterritoriality in an Aspect of U.S. Antirust Law 
The U.S. courts confirmed that there is some extraterritorial jurisdiction under the 
Shennan Act. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (Alcoa) (1945),!29 the Court 
laid down the principle of the effect doctrine to determine agreements concluded outside 
the U.S. This case concerned a Canadian corporation which violated Section 1 of the 
Shennan Act in its agreement with European aluminum producers to stay out of the 
United States market. Judge Learned Hand stated that a "state may impose liabilities, 
even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has 
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends,,130 at least where those 
effects were intended. The Second Circuit Court held that the Sherman Act applied to a 
Canadian company which had participated in a cartel intended to affect U.S. importation 
inasmuch as there was direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on the U.S. 
commerce.!3! However, there is no clear narration of how far the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act could extend to international commerce.132 The effect 
test in this case was incomplete because it failed to consider the other nation's interests. 
In Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America (1976),133 the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals recognized the effect doctrine by imposing additional consideration of 
balancing interests in regard to the notion of "international comity.,,!34 This case 
concerned an action by a U.S. company alleging that the defendants in Honduras had 
conspired to exclude it from the Honduran lumber market, from where it planned to 
129 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
130 
Id. at 443. 
131 Id .. 
132 AREEDA KAPLOW, supra note 20, at 146. "The Sherman Act is presumably not intended to run the 
conunercial world, yet to say that only significant effects on United States foreign commerce are covered 
does not identify the threshold of significance." 
133 Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
134 
Id. at 615. 
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export to the U.S. The Court laid down a tripartite analysis: first, the federal courts may 
legitimately exercise subject-matter jurisdiction under those statutes; second, a greater 
showing of burden or restraint may be necessary to demonstrate that the effect was 
sufficiently large to present cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and therefore a civil 
violation of the antitrust law; and third, there was the additional question, which was 
unique to the international setting, of whether the interest of and links to the United 
States, including the magnitUde of the effect on American commerce, were sufficiently 
strong, vis-a-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion on extraterritorial 
authority135 as stated: 
"The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign 
law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations 
or principal places of business or corporations, the extent to which 
enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the 
relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with 
those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or 
affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the 
relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the 
United States as compared with conduct abroad.,,136 
It appears that the Court did not deny jurisdiction but merely suggested that it 
should not be exercised where the interests of the U.S. in asserting jurisdiction were 
outweighed by the interests of international comity. The Court concluded that subject 
matter jurisdiction was established upon a showing of some actual or intended effect. 
Additional effects might be necessary to establish the violation. Even then, the Court 
135 
!d. at 613. 
136 
Id. at 615. 
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insisted, it may refrain from asserting "extraterritorial authority" unless the magnitude of 
effects in United States commerce was sufficiently strong in light of: (1) the several 
parties' nationality, allegiance, or principle locations; (2) the relative importance of 
domestic and foreign conduct in the alleged violation; (3) the relative effects on the 
several countries involved; (4) the clarity of foreseeability of a purpose to affect or harm 
U.S. commerce; (5) foreign law or policy and degree of conflict with our policy or law; 
and (6) compliance problemsY7 
In comparison, both the US. courts and the E.U courts share some common 
characteristics. Both the U.S. and E.U. courts demonstrated their interests to assert 
extraterritorial jurisdiction because there is an economic effect to commerce within 
borders. Second, the principle used in consideration was that such activity must constitute 
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on their commerce. Thus, it can be 
observed that the both the US. and the E.U courts have addressed the notion of 
"international comity" by means of living peacefully with other nations in mutual respect 
and accommodating their interests, the rules of politeness, convenience, and goodwill. In 
reference to the applicability of the effect doctrine to the sui generis databases, although 
there was no evidence of the courts' decision in this matter, both the E.U and the U.S. 
courts satisfactorily demonstrated that the effect doctrine could provide a sufficient 
mechanism for the courts to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. Other countries or regions, 
despite sometimes touching upon intellectual property right questions in their competition 
policy legislation, have limited experience in this area. There are a number of bilateral 
and multilateral co-operative bodies that have undertaken the creation of international 
137 T' unberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 749 F 2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 
(1985). 
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competition law, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
("DECD") and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
("UNCT AD"). These bodies aim at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
member countries' enforcement of their competition laws against such cartels as 
d· d b 138 IScusse a ove. 
IV. Conclusion 
The economic mechanisms and competition law already in place prove to be 
sufficient to promote competition of the database industries. However, the WIPO Draft 
Database Treaty tends to constitute a monopoly in the database industries.139 In contrast, 
the courts in the U.S. and the E.D. have tended to apply competition law to promote 
138 ALISON JONES AND BRENDA SUFRIN, supra note 25, at 1067-1073. Andres Guadamuz Gonzales, supra 
note 24, at 12. "The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which is made up 
by the 25 most developed nations, has issued several recommendations on the issue of competition policy. 
Many other international organizations have issued recommendations on the issue of trade, globalization 
and competition, such as the United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices, and the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and development (UNCTAD)." Competition Policy and the Exercise of 
Intellectual Property Rights, U.N. Economic and Social Council, Forth United Nations Conference to 
Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of 
Restrictive Business Practices, Reported by the UNCTAD Secretariat, Item 6 (b) of the provisional agenda, 
at 19, U.N. Doc. TDIRBP/CONF.5/6 (2000). "The competition policy rules applied to IPRs in developed 
countries or regions nowadays are broadly similar, despite some variation in the scope of exemptions 
granted in this area. These rules are based upon the premise that competition policy and the IPRs system 
are complementary, because IPRs promote innovation and its dissemination and commercialization, which 
enhances dynamic efficiency and welfare, outweighing any static allocative efficiency losses adversely 
affecting prices and quantities of products ... There is therefore a need for effects to promote mutual 
understanding and confidence-building in this area. In this respect, it has been suggested that the 
deliberations of the WTO Working Group on this subject provide and analytical basis for further work on 
fostering common approaches to competition enforcement policies in this area among WTO member 
countries and that, taking into account these deliberations as well as related economic literature and 
national enforcement policies, future work in this are might cover the following issues: comparative 
approaches to the treatment of licensing arrangements; the role of IP in networks industries; the emergence 
of new strategies for the exercise of market power through the acquisition of IPRs and the use of patent 
infringement suits to deter the entry of competitors; the concept of "innovation markets"; and the 
implications of the territorial divisibility of IPRs and the case for applying the doctrine of exhausting of 
IPRs in international trade." 
139 Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Databases to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (December 1996) 
[hereinafter WIPO Draft Database Treaty]. 
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competition III the database industries rather than to support monopoly. To assert 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the courts have applied the effect doctrine to an activity that 
created direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect to the free movement of 
goods and services in the territories and addressed the importance of the consideration of 
international comity and other principles of international law. Further, it appears that the 
governmental bodies of the U.S. and the E.U. understand the economic mechanisms of 
Demand-Supply and Maximizing Behavior and utilize competition law to support them. 
The public benefits are maximized inasmuch as there is a free flow of access to factual 
contents and information and competition flourishes. 
An important question remains regarding the implementation of systems. Could 
economic mechanisms and systems similar to those in developed countries work in 
developing and least developed countries? In order to sustain national economic and 
social infrastructure, in particular human resource development, developing countries 
need a free flow of access to information. De Soto explains that the increasingly 
integrated global economic system has produced important efficiency gains, but the new 
system's market dynamic is still not fully understood. Citizen in developing countries 
cannot understand how to convert their property into capital, and lawyers and legislatures 
are busy studying the legal-economic system in developed countries instead of trying to 
more deeply understand their fundamental national interests. 140 His statement reveals that 
no matter how far the global economic system has been integrated and the foreign 
advanced technology has been transferred and available to them, the citizens in 
developing countries could never apply the same logic of legal and economic standards, 
140 
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS 
EVERYWHERE ELSE 153-206 (2000). 
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such as how to convert their intellectual assets into a balance sheet. 141 Amidst the 
privatization boom, together with the need to maximize profit, that are having a growing 
impact on the concept of new mechanisms for controlling the use and dissemination of 
undeveloped compilations and collections of infonnation in the Third World countries, 
their knowledge wealth has flowed freely from generation to generation. In addition, 
Goldstein comments that, in regard to an enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
taking U.S. standards as the basis for analysis tends to highlight a large number of 
enforcement inadequacies that exist in developing countries.142 Problems often mentioned 
include: the slowness of the enforcement process; discrimination against foreigners; 
biased court decisions; inadequate civil and criminal remedies; and corruption.143 The 
enforcement component of a "mature" intellectual property rights system is not always 
easily emulated in developing countries. If databases were recognized as "a vital element 
in the development of a global infonnation infrastructure and an essential tool for 
promoting economic, cultural and technological advancement,,,144 the concept of the 
public free flow of access to infonnation should be realized for the purpose of human 
resource development and the vital global economy. 
141 Id. 
142 
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW; CASES AND MATERIALS 67 (2001). 
"Developing countries have significantly changed attitudes toward foreign investments and technology 
transfer in the 1980s. The foreign debt crisis, decreasing private capital flows to developing countries, 
negative experiences with the regulatory approach, outward-oriented development strategies, and the 
ongoing "technological revolution" are some of the possible explanations for the more liberal posture 
adopted by many developing countries on intellectual property. Yet for a developing country the economic 
implications of the trade-off between static and dynamic aspects of the production and allocation of 
knowledge remain open to debate.) 
143 I d. 
144 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty, Preamble Clause. 
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Chapter IV 
The Public Interest and Sui Generis Databases 
I. Introduction 
The WIPO Draft Database Treaty considered at the forum of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization does not serve the public interest because it introduces 
imbalance into the concept of the free flow of access to infonnation. Its objective is to 
create a new fonn of intellectual property in sui generis databases by means of granting 
intellectual property protection to the database makers in recognition of the investment 
they have made in compiling those databases. 1 Such a regime, if enacted as a treaty, 
would greatly hann major public institutions such as science and education by subjecting 
them to new and increasing costs and restrictions to access compiled facts and 
infonnation that previously held public domain status and, thus, were freely available. 
I 
Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Databases to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. CRNRlDC/6 (December 1996) 
[hereinafter WIPO Draft Database Treaty], Preamble. 
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The public interest is a priority of highest order, and policy makers are elected or 
appointed to protect it. The concept of public interest derives from the concept of a 
"social contract,,2 between people and their government. It is the people's will that 
empowers a "state" to protect its people from tyranny and to oppose any abuse of power 
against them. Government is charged to uphold the tenets of the social contract and to be 
responsible for its people by legislating and enforcing laws that guarantee the social 
welfare of its citizens (education, health care, and retirement programs), their security 
(economic safety net), and their freedom (free speech and free association). Therefore, 
extending ownership rights and privileges to database makers of compiled facts and 
information would undermine the concept of the social contract that obligates every 
government to the will and protection of its people. 
Ultimately, the sui generis system violates human rights. In a declaration of its 
major purposes, Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations includes the following: 
1. To maintain international peace and security ... ; 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations ... ; 
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedom for all ... 3 
2 
CHRIS ROHMANN, A WORLD OF IDEAS; A DICTIONARY OF IMPORTANT THEORIES, CONCEPTS, BELIEFS AND 
THINKERS 365 (1999). "The theory of government holding that society is created by the common will of 
individuals, who see greater advantage in association than in isolation, and that legitimate political 
authority therefore rests on the consent of the governed. The concept goes back at least to medieval 
scholastics such as William of Ockham, who argued that the state's power derives from the people's will, 
but it rests primarily on ideas developed in Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan (1651), John Locke's Two Treaties 
on Government (1690), and Jean Jacques Rousseau's Social Contract (1762)." 
3 Charter of the United Nations, concluded June 26, 1945, entered into force October 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. 
XVI, 1976 YB.U.N. 1043; 1945 Can. T.S. 7; 1945 S.A.T.S. 6; 1946 U.K.T.S. 67, Comd. 7015 B.F.S.P. 
805; U.S.T.S. 993, 59 Stat. 1031 [hereinafter U.N. Charter] art. 1. 
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Internationalism is derived from and based on class conSCIOusness and common 
humanity. Without basic protections, the global community, particularly developing 
countries who depend upon the free flow of access to facts and information for their 
national infrastructure, would be more vulnerable to threats and inequality, and thus in 
jeopardy of compromising the freedom of its citizens.4 
This chapter investigates the idea of public interest based upon the concept of the 
free flow of access to information. Section II examines exception and limitation clauses 
of copyright law that have been adequately set to promote the public policy of access to 
facts and information. Section III investigates the violation of human rights, the right "to 
education,"S and the right "to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications,,6 as they concern sui generis protection. Section V addresses the issue of 
global public policy and the potential of adoption of a treaty for the protection of sui 
generis databases. 
4 CHRIS ROHMANN, supra note 2, at 199. "The second major formulation of internationalism, also known as 
cosmopolitanism, derives form the attitudes embodied by enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire and 
particularly from the writings of Immanual Kant, especially Toward Perpetual Peace (1975). Kant 
proposed the possibility of a global community based on the humanity, freedom, and equality of its 
members. In the essay "Ideas for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," he said that the most 
important and difficulty task for humankind is the attainment of a universally just civil society based on 
equality and respect, in which all people would be treated as ends in themselves rather than means to 
others' ends." 
5 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted December 10, 1948, G.A. Res 217A, UN. GAOR, 3rd 
Sess., Pt. I, Resolutions, at 71, UN. Doc. Al810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR] art. 26(1). International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, concluded December 16, 1966, entered into force 
January 3, 1976, 993 UN.T.S. 3, 1966 UN.J.Y.B. 170; 1977 UK.T.S. 6, Comd. 6702 [hereinafter 
ICESCR] art. 13(1). 
6UDHR art. 27(1). ICESCR art. 15(1)(b). 
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II. Copyright Fair Use in regard to Sui Generis Databases 
A. The Concept of Proper Balance in International Copyright 
Instruments 
The legal framework for the protection of sui geneirs databases, which gives the 
private sector property rights in the contents of facts, data, and information, opposes 
established public policy in major public sector arenas, as discussed earlier. From the 
time of its establishment in 1886, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Work ("Berne Convention") has recognized that "limits to absolute protection are 
rightly set by the public interest.,,7 The proper balance between the interest of authors and 
public sectors is set in the Berne's provisions regarding limitations and exceptions and 
duration of protection. Thus, member states are granted latitude to limit the rights of 
authors in certain circumstances by which limitations and exceptions of authors' works 
may be adopted under national laws. Article 10 of the Berne Convention states: 
"(1) It shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which has 
already been lawfully made available to the public, provided that their 
making is compatible with fair practice, and their extent does not exceed 
that justified by the purpose, including quotations from newspaper 
articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries. 
(2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union, and 
for special agreements existing or to be concluded between them, to 
permit the utilisation, to the extent justified by the purpose, of literary or 
artistic works by way of illustration in publications, broadcasts or sound 
7 
Sam Ricketson, WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Digital Environment, WIPO Doc. SCCRJ9/7 (April 5, 2003), at 3. 
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or visual recordings for teaching, provided such utilisation is compatible 
with fair practice. 
(3) Where use is made of works in accordance with the proceeding 
paragraphs of this Article, mention shall be made of the source, and of 
the name of the author ifit appear thereon.,,8 
The position of the Berne Convention is clear on the subject of protected works 
and public interest when it declares that absolute copyright protection should not exist in 
a protected work because of the importance of the need for ready availability of such 
works from the point of view of the general public. The Berne Convention provides for 
fair use exceptions if such quotations are made for purposes such as criticisms, comment, 
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. In reference to the fair use exceptions 
to broadcasting and current events, Article 10bis permits the reproduction by the press, 
through print or by wire, of articles published in newspapers or periodicals as long as the 
purpose is to make such works available to the pUblic.9 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is fair use, 
Article 9(2) ofthe Berne Convention specifies factors to be considered, called the "three-
step" test to an author's work. The conditions are set forth as follows: First, the criteria 
permit exceptions only in certain special cases; second, the exceptions may never conflict 
with normal exploitation of the works; and third, the exceptions may not unreasonably 
impair or prejudice the legitimate interests, including economic interests of the author.10 
8 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September 9, 1886 (Paris Act of July 
1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention] art. 10. 
9 [d. art. lObis(l) and (2). 
10 [d. art. 9(2). Rogers v. Koons, 960 F. 2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992). The Second 
Circuit Court rejected a fair use parody defense by the artist Jeff Koons, holding that he intentionally 
created a sculpture called "string of puppies" based on a copyrighted photograph entitled "Puppies" made 
by a professional photographer. The court found that Koons's purpose in using the copyrighted photograph 
Was commercial; he had made four sculptures, three of which has been sold for a total of $367,000. The 
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In addition, due to the nature of facts of some work such as court decisions, 11 political 
speeches,12 lectures and addresses,13 the Berne Convention permits a high degree of 
flexibility to fair use exceptions, enabling member countries to give effect to their 
differing views of public interests-at one extreme, they are free to leave such contents 
entirely in the public domain; at the other, they may accord them complete protection as 
literary or artistic works; or they may grant qualified protection, subject to generous 
rights of use on the part of the public. 14 
However, the Berne fair use exceptions do not apply to the collections and 
compilations of facts and information insofar as they are not assimilated into creative 
collections under Article 2(5) of the Berne Convention. Article 2(5) appears only to 
require protection of collections of literary and artistic works "which, by reason of the 
selection and arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual creations.,,15 It does 
not refer to collections and compilations of data or other material which are not literary or 
artistic works. The collections and compilations of these kinds of works, therefore, fall 
outside the scope of Article 2(5). The Berne Convention intends to leave the underlying 
facts available to the public, taking into account the serious need of the scientific research 
and educational communities to the free flow of access to information and of developing 
countries that need this available access for purposes of national infrastructure. Article 
2(8) of the Berne Convention also confirms the free flow of underlying facts as stated: 
artist's claim of parody escaped the court; it found that his motive was a bad-faith desire to make money 
based on another's copyrighted work and that none of the other factors relevant to fair use weighed in favor 
of Koons. 
11 Berne Convention art. 2(4). 
12 !d. art. 2bis(1). 
13 Id. art. 2bis(2). 
14 
15 See generally WIPO Doc. SCCRJ917, supra note 7. 
Id. art. 2(5). 
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"The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous 
facts having the character of mere items of press information.,,!6 
Successive legal instruments, namely the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS,,)!7 and the WIPO Copyright Treaty ("WCT,,)/8 
promote public policy in correspondence with the Berne Convention. Analogous 
exceptions are to be found in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement and Article 1 0 of the 
WCT, adopting and extending the template of the three-step test or conditions in Article 
9(2) of the Berne Convention.!9 Similar scope of copyrightable compilations are to be 
found in Article 11 (2) of the TRIPS Agreement and Article 5 of the WCT, being precise 
and similar to Article 2(5) of the Berne Convention, requiring that compilations of data 
and material that constitute intellectual creations are to be protected as such.2o Though 
these two later treaties contain a list of objectives, some complementary and some 
competing, the essence of public interest is treated much the same as in the Berne 
Convention. While the TRIPS Agreement merely recognizes that "the underlying public 
policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including 
the developmental and technological objectives,,,2! the WCT makes clear that it 
recognizes "the need to maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger 
public interests, particularly education, research and access to information, as reflected in 
16 !d. art. 2(8). 
17 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods, April 15, 1994 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
18 WIPO Copyright Treaty, December 20, 1996 [hereinafter WCT]. 
19 Compare TRIPS art. 13 "Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain 
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder." and WCT art. 10 "Contracting Parties may, in their 
national legislation, provide for limitations and exceptions to the rights granted to authors of literary and 
artistic works under this Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author." with Berne Convention art. 
9(2). 
20 Compare TRIPS art. 10(2) and WCT art. 5 with Berne Convention art. 2(5). 
21 TRIPS Preamble. 
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the Berne Convention.,,22 Both instruments safeguard public interest by providing 
creative material for the scientific enterprise and for the public consumption through fair 
use exceptions, but also keep the free flow of access to facts and information intact. 
The WIPO Draft Database Treaty, on the other hand, maintains its policy for the 
database makers to privatize and control the dissemination and reproduction of such 
facts, data, and information. Similar to Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, Article 5(1) 
of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty specifies fair-use exceptions as states: "Contracting 
Parties may, in their national legislation, provide exceptions to or limitations of the rights 
in this Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict with the normal exploitation of 
the database and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
rightholder.,,23 It is true that Article 5(1) gives Contracting Parties that have different 
views of public interests freedom to provide fair use exceptions to the databases. But it is 
not clear if such fair use exceptions would ensure or fulfill the interests of scientific 
research and education sectors as they operate on the full and open exchange of data and 
information. There is a need for bulk definitions such as "substantiality" and "lawful 
user" to guarantee them the access to data on a non-discriminatory basis at the cost of 
reproduction and distribution. Because facts are not copyrightable, promoting an 
intellectual property right to the factual contents would be against the public needs of the 
free flow of access to information and would lead to the question of whether the sui 
generis right is justifiable. 
22 WeT Preamble. 
23 WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 5(1). 
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B. The Concept of Proper Balance at the National Level 
The U.S. copyright law provides an excellent example of how a government 
should realize the significance of public free access to information. The Intellectual 
Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution vested the public right to information since 
1787: "To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.,,24 Its function is to promote an environment where authors have incentive to 
create by providing copyright protection through which they can protect their creative 
expressions, and where, on the other hand, the public interest of providing creative 
material for the scientific sectors and for public consumption is safeguarded. 
U.S. copyright law which arises from Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution, empowers the Congress to enact a number of copyright laws that are 
currently gathered in Title 17 of the United States Code.25 Title 17 contains provisions 
reflecting flexibility so that the knowledge protected by copyright could also serve as the 
basis of new knowledge. Section 107 prescribes certain fair use exceptions serving as a 
"safe harbor" position in regard to photocopy reproduction of published materials as 
follows: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 and 106A, the fair use of 
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a 




work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted works; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation in the 
copyrighted worked as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. ,,26 
Section 107 is open ended and controversial. In detennining whether a particular 
use of an author's works is fair in accordance with Section 107, the U.S. courts provide a 
case-by-case assessment based on the general facts of fair use exceptions, which is a 
mixture of law and fact. 27 For instance, in Time, Inc. v. Bush Quale '92 General 
26 17 U.S.C.A. § 107. 
27 New Era Publications International, ApS. v. Carol Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152 , 158 (1990). "The 
scope of fair use is greater with respect to factual than non-factual works. While there is no bright-line test 
for distinguishing between these two categories, we have referred to the fonner as works that are 
"essentially factual in nature," or "primarily informational rather than creative." We have some hesitation 
in trying to characterize Hubbard's diverse body of writings as solely "factual" or "non-factual," but on 
balance, we believe that the quoted works-which deal with Hubbard's life, his views on religion, human 
relations, the Church, etc.-are more properly viewed as factual or informationa1." Wainwright Securities, 
Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corporation, 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 
(1987). "The doctrine of "fair use" in copyright law creates privileges in others to use the copyrighted 
material in a reasonable manner without the copyright owner's consent, notwithstanding the legal 
monopoly granted to the owner. The fair use doctrine offers means of balancing the exclusive rights of 
Copyright holder with the copyright public's interest in dissemination of information affecting universal 
concern such as art, science and industry." DORIS ESTELLE LONG AND ANTHONY D'AMATO, 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2000) at 43-44. "Several categories of material are generally 
not eligible for statute copyright protection. These include, among others: 
Works that have not been fixed in a tangible fonn of expression. For example; 
choreographic works which have not been noted or recorded or improvisational speeches or 
performances that have not been written or recorded. 
Titles, trademark, names, short phrases, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere 
variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring; mere listings of ingredients or 
contents. 
Ideas, procedures, methods, systems, processes, concepts, principles, discoveries, or 
devices, as distinguished from a description, explanation or illustration. 
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Committee, Inc. (1992),28 Time Magazine sued the Bush Reelection Campaign for 
copyright infringement by using an image of then Governor Bill Clinton on a copyrighted 
cover of the magazine in a television advertisement in the last weeks of the 1992 
presidential campaign. The Bush advertisement consisted solely of the Time cover with 
an announcer's voice. Time contended that this was not a fair use of its copyright cover, 
and that the cover had been subtly modified as well.29 The correct legal answer to this 
dispute, however, will never be known, inasmuch as the case was settled when, after 
being sued, the Bush Reelection Campaign said it would stop running the ad. 
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises (1985),30 the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that it was not a fair use for The Nation Magazine to publish 
extensive quotations from unpublished memoirs of President Ford without permission. In 
1977, former President Ford contracted with petitioners to publish his as-yet-unwritten 
memoirs. The agreement gave petitioners the exclusive first serial right to license 
prepublication excerpts. Two years later, as the memOIr was neanng completion, 
petitioners, as the copyright holders, negotiated a prepublication licensing agreement with 
Time Magazine under which Time agreed to pay $ 25,000 ($ 12,500 in advance and the 
balance at publication) in exchange for the right to excerpt 7,500 words from Mr. Ford's 
account of his pardon of former President Nixon. Shortly before the Time article's 
scheduled release, an unauthorized source provided The Nation Magazine with the 
unpublished Ford manuscript, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford. 
Works consisting entirely of information that is common property and containing no 
original authorship. For example, standard calendars, height and weight charts, tape measures 
and rules, and lists or tables taken from public documents or other common sources." 
28 Time, Inc. v. Bush Quale'92 General Committee, Inc. et aI., Civ Action No. 92-2299 (D.D.C). 
29 Id. Complaint §§6-17. 




Working directly from this manuscript, an editor of The Nation produced a 2,250-word 
article, a short piece entitled The Ford Memoirs -- Behind the Nixon Pardon, at least 300 
to 400 words of which consisted of verbatim quotes of copyrighted expression taken from 
the manuscript. Time had agreed to purchase the exclusive right to print prepublication 
excerpts from the copyright holders, Harper & Row. As a result of The Nation's article, 
Time canceled its agreement. Petitioners brought a successful copyright action against 
The Nation at the District Court.3! On appeal, the Second Circuit Court reversed the 
lower court's finding of infringement, holding that The Nation's act was sanctioned as a 
fair use of the copyrighted materia1.32 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.33 
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals regarding the relevance of 
the public interest in copyright law: its intention is to increase and not to impede the 
harvest of knowledge.34 The Court believed the Second Circuit erred and gave 
insufficient deference to the scheme established by the copyright law for fostering the 
original works that provide the seed and substance of this harvest. The rights conferred 
by copyright are designed to assure those who contribute to the store of knowledge a fair 
return for their labors. The Court referred to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the 
Congress has the power to "Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their respective 
Writing and Discoveries.,,35 This limited grant was a means by which an important 
public purpose may be achieved. It was intended to motivate the creativity of authors and 
31 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 557 F. Supp. 1067 (1983). 
32 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d 195 (1983). 
33 471 u.s. 539. 
34 !d. at 546. 
35 Id. 
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inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow public access to the products 
oftheir genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired. 
However, the Court recognized that, according to Section 102, no author may 
copyright facts or ideas.36 Creation of a nonfiction work, even compilation of pure facts, 
entailed originality. The copyright holders of A Time to Heal complied with the relevant 
statutory notice and registration procedures.37 Thus, there was no dispute that the 
unpublished manuscript of such a story, as a whole was protected by Section 106 from 
unauthorized reproduction.38 Nor did respondents dispute that verbatim copying of 
excerpts of the manuscript's original form of expression would constitute infringement 
unless excused as a fair use.39 Especially in the realm of factual narrative, copyright law 
was currently unsettled regarding the ways in which uncopyrightable elements combine 
with the author's original contributions to form protected expression.40 The Court held 
that, in using generous verbatim excerpts of Mr. Ford's unpublished manuscript to lend 
authenticity of its account of the forthcoming memoirs, The Nation effectively arrogated 
to itself the right of first publication, an important marketable subsidy right, and such use 
was not a fair use within the meaning of copyright law.41 Section 107 must be reviewed 
in light of the principles of rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, 
and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts.42 Judge Brennan 
asserted that fair use analysis must fall "to the temptation to find copyright violation 
based on a minimal use of literary form in order to provide compensation for the 
36 
105 S.Ct. 2218, at 2242. 




41 Id. at 549. 
42 !d. at 561. 
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appropriation of infonnation from a work of history.,,43 The Court did recognize the 
lower courts' failures to distinguish between infonnation and literary from that penneated 
every aspect of the courts' fair use analysis. In addition, the commercial nature of The 
Nation's use was a separate factor that tended to weigh against a finding of fair use.
44 
In addition, the subsequent decision narrates how far copyright fair use exceptions 
would extend to a use of factual contents created by a scientist and educator. In American 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc. (1994),45 the Second Circuit Court confinned the 
District Court decision but questioned the conventional ideas of fair use in scientific 
research. The publishers of scientific journals claimed that Texaco's 400-500 researchers 
infringed on their copyright by copying articles from their journals.
46 
The Court chose a 
representative scientist from Texaco and analyzed his process of copying the journals.
47 
The scientist, Dr. Donald H. Chickering, II, had eight copies of articles from the journal 
Catalysis for use in his research.48 The use of the protected articles was consistent with 
43 Id. at 626. 
44 Id. at 562. "Many uses Section 107 lists as paradigmatic examples of fair use, including criticism, 
comment, and news reporting, are generally conducted for profit in this country, a fact of which Congress 
was obviously aware when it enacted Section 107. To negate any argument favoring fair use based on news 
reporting or criticism because that reporting or criticism was published for profit is to ender meaningless 
the congressional imprimatur placed on such uses." 
45 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d. Cir. 1994). Dov S. Greenbaum, 
Commentary: The Database Debate: In Support of an Inequitable Solution, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 431, 
459 (2003). "The Second Circuit's holding in this case "casts legitimate doubt on whether a court would 
find similar copying of academic expression by professors and researchers on university campuses a fair 
use."" Maureen Ryan, Fair Use and Academic Expression: Rhetoric, Reality, and Restriction on Academic 
Freedom, 8 CORNELL lL. & PUB. POL'y 541, 565 (1999). "The Texaco court's analysis, in refusing to fmd 
Texaco's copying of academic expression a fair use, casts legitimate doubt on whether a court would find 
similar copying of academic expression by professors and researchers on university campuses a fair use. 
Although the Second Circuit attempted in its amended opinion to reassure the academic community 
through lip service purportedly distinguishing what the court characterized as systematic copying by 
Texaco scientists from a situation where a "professor or an independent scientist engaged in copying and 
creating files for independent research," the court's analysis in Texaco actually leaves little room for 
distinguishing copying of academic scholarship and research in a university context." 
46/d. at 914-915. 
47 Id. at 915. 
48/d. 
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the nonns of the research community.49 Nevertheless, the Court, in "rigidly" applying the 
four statutory tests for finding fair use, held in favor of the publishers even though the 
papers in question were largely factual and as such only worthy of thin protection under 
copyright.50 The Court let the for-profit nature of Texaco's activity weigh against Texaco 
without differentiating between a direct commercial use and the more indirect relation to 
commercial activity. Texaco was not gaining direct or immediate commercial advantage 
from the photocopying at issue in this case, and profits, revenues, and overall commercial 
perfonnance were not tied to its making copies of eight Catalysis articles for Chickering. 
Rather, Texaco's photocopying research might have led to the development of new 
products and technology that could have improved Texaco's commercial perfonnance. 
Texaco did not sell or profit from the copying. Texaco's photocopying was more 
appropriately labeled as "intennediate" use. The commercial/nonprofit dichotomy 
concerned the unfairness that arises when a secondary user makes unauthorized use of 
copyrighted material to capture significant revenues as a direct consequence of copying 
the work. The Court found the copying merely facilitated Chickering's research that 
might have led to the production of commercially valuable products which, based on the 
for-profit nature of the enterprise, Texaco's reaped at least some indirect economic 
advantage from its photocopying. 51 The Second Circuit's holding casts copying of 
scientific articles that are factual as not fair use, based on the indirect economic 
advantage hidden under the for-profit nature ofthe enterprise. 
The U.S. courts have demonstrated sufficient analysis of fair use exceptions in 
accordance with the public need of free flow of access to facts and infonnation. In 
49 Id. 
50 
!d. at 919-927. 17U.S.C.A. § 107. 
51 !d. at 922. 
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Harper & Row, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that, although the compiled facts 
may constitute originality, the reproduction of an unpublished manuscript is not fair 
use.52 The Court focused the commercial nature of The Nation's use.53 Likewise, the 
Court in Texaco case established that taking or copying scientific articles which 
contained factual contents does not constitute an infringement based on the indirect 
purpose and the profit nature of the enterprise. 54 However, in determining whether the 
taking amount of factual contents would be "substantial," the Court in Harper & Row 
provides an examination of the use in relation to the prepublication. 55 The Court refers to 
the Copyright Act which directs that the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole be examined, 56 either quantitatively or 
qualitatively. The Nation quoted only approximately 300 words from a manuscript of 
more than 200,000 words, and the quotes were drawn from isolated passages in disparate 
sections of the work. The Court excerpted: 
"The judgment that this taking was quantitatively "infinitesimal," does 
not dispose of the inquiry, however. An evaluation of substantiality in 
qualitative terms is also required ... The Court places some emphasis on 
the fact that the quotations from the Ford work constituted a substantial 
portion of The Nation's article. Superficially, the Court would thus 
appear to be evaluating The Nation's quotation of 300 words in relation 
52 
471 U.S. 539, at 548. 
53 ld. at 562. 
54 
60 F.3d 913, at 922. 
55 
471 U.S. 539, at 602. 
56 17 U.S.c.A. § 107(3). "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole." 
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to the amount and substantiality of expression used in relation to the 
second author's work as a whole." 57 
The U.S. public policy is clear about the free flow of access to facts and 
information in regard to the copyright protection of compilation works. Section 101 of 
the U.S. Copyright Act recognizes compilation as a work formed by collection of 
preexisting material or data, which mayor may not be separately copyrightable, in such a 
way that it meets the criteria for a work of authorship. 58 The U.S. Supreme Court in Feist 
publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc. (1991)59 addressed the limits of 
copyright in a compilation, holding that the names, towns, and telephone numbers in a 
telephone book were not copyrightable because they were not selected, coordinated, or 
arranged in an original way. The Court reiterated the basic principle that facts themselves 
cannot be copyrighted, but that a particular compilation of facts, if selected, coordinated, 
or arranged in a sufficiently original way, can be copyrighted.6o The Court also responded 
to the U.S. public policy prescribed under the Constitution, "promoting the progress of 
science and useful arts" on one hand, and the Berne Convention, "the free flow of access 
to facts and information, on the other hand. 
57 
471 U.S. 539, at 599-603. 
58 17 U.S.C.A. § 101. "A "compilation" is a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting 
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a 
Whole constitutes an original work of authorship. The term "compilation" includes collective works." 
59 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340,111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991). 
60 Id. at 346. 
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C. Emphasis on Governmental Responsibility to the Public Interest 
u.s. legal history reveals the emphasis of the free flow of access to information 
and its benefits. To liberate the country through scientific innovation and discoveries, the 
u.s. government believes in a notion of "free utilization" as President Jefferson, the 
American founding father stated: 
"If nature has made anyone thing less susceptible than all others of 
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, 
which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to 
himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession 
of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar 
character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other 
possesses the whole of it. 'He' who receives an idea from me, receives 
instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at 
mine, receives light without darkening me. That ideas should freely 
spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual 
instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have 
been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made 
them, like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density 
at any point, and like the air in which we breath, move, and have our 
physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation. 
Inventions then cannot, like nature, be a subject of property." 61 
61 Thomas Jefferson, letter to Isaac Mcpherson, August 13, 1813, reprinted in Writings of Thomas 
Jefferson, 1790-1862, vol. 6 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854) 180-181. An excerpt of Jefferson's statement of 
"free utilization." http://www .objectivistcenter.orglarticlesl dmayer Jorgetten-essentials-thomas-j efferson-
philosophy. asp. "The conservative attempt to co-opt Jefferson has generally been much truer to his political 
thought. For example, in 1938, Samuel Pettengill, a conservative Democratic congressman who was 
appalled by Roosevelt's New Deal, wrote a book called Jefferson the Forgotten Man, which showed how 
far Roosevelt Democrats had departed from the party's Jeffersonian roots. The "forgotten" Jefferson in 
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1"1 
By rejecting the economic justification of intellectual property, Jefferson's theory 
of intellectual property right assured a primary objective of widespread distribution of 
ideas, facts, and information.62 Under his philosophy of free utilization, everyone should 
be free to use and receive information, and such ideas, facts, and information should not 
be subject to privatization: "As ideas are norms andlor natural phenomenon perceivable 
in one's mind, they cannot be captured in one's hand, but only be comprehensible to the 
one who thought of it.,,63 Jefferson's concept of free utilization has been reflected in the 
u.s. Constitution as a means to maximize dissemination and distribution of ideas to and 
increase knowledge wealth in American society. For instance, Jefferson's concept of free 
utilization is reflected in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Intellectual Property Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution, "To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respectful Writings and Discoveries," 64 and, to date, Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright 
Pettengill's book was indeed the Thomas Jefferson of the Declaration ofIndependence and the Virginia 
Statute for Religious Freedom, the Jefferson who profoundly believed in individual liberty and limited 
government. Most important, Pettengill's Jefferson took seriously the constraints that the Constitution 
placed on the powers of the federal government. Pettengill closed his book by quoting one of Jefferson's 
most famous strictures about constitutional interpretation: 'To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus 
specifically drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no 
longer susceptible of any definition.' 'A boundless field of power,' Pettengill observed, was precisely what 
the socialist, communist, and fascist governments of Europe had in 1938. Unfortunately, Pettengill's valiant 
effort to restore the true political Jefferson-and the principles of the American Revolution-failed, and the 
modem welfare state was established." 
62 TOM G. PALMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A NON-POSNERIAN LAW AND ECONOMICS ApPROACH, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, MORAL, LEGAL, AND INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS (1997). (Stating Jefferson's 
theory of intellectual property right provided the primary objective to assure the widespread distribution of 
thought, not profit.) 
63 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 132 (1999). "Technically, Jefferson is 
confusing two different concepts. One is the possibility of excluding others from using or getting access to 
an idea. This is the question whether ideas are "excludable"; Jefferson suggests that they are not. The other 
concept is whether my using an idea lessens your use of the same idea. This is the question of whether 
ideas are "rivalrous"; again, Jefferson suggests that they are not. Jefferson believes that nature has made 
ideas both nonexcludable and nonrivalrous, and that there is little that man can do to change this facts." 
64 U.S. Constitution art. I, sect. 8, cl. 8. V Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Ford ed., 1895), 47. "His view 
ripened, however, and in another letter to Madison (Aug. 1789) after the drafting of the Bill of Rights, 
Jefferson stated that he would have been pleased by an express provision in this form: 
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Act of 1976, the fair use exceptions.65 For over a century, the US. has benefited from 
these laws as it became the most powerful economic country as a result of innovations 
and discoveries and US. citizens benefit from sustainable education and social welfare.66 
Due to the underlying public policy of copyright law, the U.S. policy makers 
promote a proper balance between the interests of authors and creators to enjoy the fruits 
of their creative labor and the public sectors to exploit that knowledge.67 Balancing the 
public interests and private rights is a complex issue, for which the US. government is 
responsible. The concept of the U.S. public policy in copyright (and in other kinds of 
intellectual property) holds: 
(1) One should take care not to kill the goose that lays golden egg. 
Copyright laws are designed to provide stimulus to authors and 
'Art. 9 Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own production in literary, & their own 
inventions in the arts, for a limited of a term not exceeding_years, but for no longer term & no 
other purpose. ' 
And he wrote: 
65 1 
'Certainly an inventor ought to be allowed a right to the benefit of his invention for some certain 
time. Nobody wishes more than I do that ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement. '" 
7 U.S.C.A. § 107-108. 
66 TOM G. PALMER, supra note 62. "For example an appreciable value though the law does not recognize 
them. Imperfect rights of the nature of copyright might exist outside the law by usage and courtesy. Such 
rights did in fact exist in the United States to a certain extent before the Copyright Act of 1891, as regards 
English books made over to American publishers; and they had a certain value to the American publishers, 
and consequently to the British author, although they were wholly unprotected by law, and (as events 
showed) precarious in fact. The goodwill of a business, again, would still have a commercial value if it 
were less efficiently protected by law than it is; and it would probably by no means lose the whole of its 
value even if it were not protected at all. The law began to protect it when it became notoriously valuable 
and not before." 
67 /d. "The rationale was a demand to promote technology infrastructure which played a central role in 
decision-making process in that period of time. Later, IPRs conception was developed to compromise the 
interests between the creator's benefits from his long hard work and the public needs in exploitation of that 
knowledge. Thus, it is notable that the method sorted to allow the creator enjoyment of this benefit for a 
certain period of time." Lawrence Lessig, supra note 63, at 134. "Economists have long understood that 
granting property rights over information is dangerous (to say the least). This is not because of leftist 
leanings among economists. It is because economists are pragmatists, and their objective in granting any 
property right is simply to facilitate production. But there is no way to know, in principle, whether 
increasing or decreasing the rights granted under intellectual property law will lead to an increase in the 
production of intellectual property. The reasons are complex, but the point is not: increasing intellectual 
property's protection is not guaranteed to "promote the progress of science and useful arts"-indeed, often 
doing so will stifle it." 
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publishers, a stimulus that will be destroyed or at least sharply reduced if 
niggardly or unduly restrictive policies are followed.68 
(2) Maximum dissemination and communication are not only 
implicit in the copyright system; they also serve a high public purpose 
such as equality of education and social welfare.69 
(3) Copyright law should normally concentrate upon the 
enforcement and promotion of copyright policy and not, absent unusual 
circumstance, be used to enforce other laws or policies.70 
(4) Since public policy considerations do underline the system, the 
public purposes served by the usage of the copyrighted materials (e.g. 
furtherance of education), are proper matters for consideration in 
formulating copyright law and policy.7! 
The U.S. public policy of copyright law is to promote an environment where 
authors have an incentive to innovate and discover, and the public consumption of 
existing materials is safeguarded. Not only does the u.s. government assure the 
underlying principle of copyright legislation to serve the public interests to exploit 
protected information in a fair sense, but also the freedom to information, the rights of 
everyone "to enjoy the arts, and to participate in the benefits that result from intellectual 
progress, especially scientific discoveries."n The U.S. democracy thrives and its 
68 John C. Stedman, Copyright Developments in the United States, Reports from the United States of 
America on Topics of Major Concern as Established for the IX Congress of the International Academy of 




72 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res XXX, O.A.S. 
Off. Rec. OEAlSer. LNII.4 Rev. (1965) art. XIII "Every person has the right to an education, which should 
be based on the principles of liberty, morality and human solidarity;" and art. XIII "Every person has the 
right to take part in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts, and to participate in the benefits 
from intellectual progress, especially scientific discoveries. He likewise has the right to the protection of his 
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economIC and social welfare is maximized, fostering wide diversity in the creation, 
dissemination, and use of information. In other words, to gain the greatest economic and 
social benefits, such information should be made available to the public in the most 
efficient, timely, and equitable ways possible. 
III. A Human Right Violation Found in Sui Generis Protection 
The databases are recognized as an essential element for promoting economic, 
cultural, and technological advancement.73 The sui generis right is granted for the 
database makers' exclusive rights over every part of the databases they compiled, 
including even the underlying information, which they may not have generated. Creating 
a new intellectual property right over information contained in databases robs from the 
public domain by establishing monopoly control over information that previously had 
been freely available, and producing a negative impact on scientific and educational 
communities. Such a regime is in contrast to human rights in respect to "equality of 
educational opportunity" 74 and a proper balance of the right "to enjoy benefits of 
scientific progress and its application,,75 and "to benefit from the protection of the moral 
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which 
he is the author.,,76 
moral and material interests as regards his invention or any literary, scientific or artistic works of which he 
is the author."American Convention on Human Rights, concluded November 22, 1969, entered into force, 
july 18, 1978, 114 U.N.T.S. 123; O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, O.A.S. Off. Rec. O.E.A./Ser. L/V/1I.23 doc. 21 rev. 6 
(1979) art. 26. 
73 WIPO Draft Database Treaty Preamble Clause. 
74 UDHR art. 26. 
75 
Id. art. 27(1). ICESCR art. 15(1)(b). 
76 UDHR art. 27(2). ICESCR art. 15(1)(c). 
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A. Recognition of the Public Free Flow of Access to Information in 
Human Rights Instruments 
Inasmuch as granting property rights to infonnation contained in databases 
increases a cost to access to such facts and infonnation that once are free and in the 
public domain, the sui generis right constitutes a violation of human rights. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") adopted by the United Nations 
recognizes the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family. The right to education and the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress and literary and artistic production are generally prescribed to ensure the public 
free flow of access to infonnation by which the national governments of member 
countries pledge themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the 
promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Everyone has 
the right to education."n 
Article 27 affinns a proper balance between the interests of authors and the public 
sectors in the free flow of access to infonnation as follows: 
77 Id. art. 26. 
78 Id. art. 27. 
"( 1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and 
its benefits. 
(2) Every one has the right to the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary and artistic production of 
which he is the author.,,78 
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The emphasis of the right to education and the right to enjoy the benefits of 
scientific, cultural, and social progress under the UDHR is made in the subsequent 
instrument, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
("lCESCR,,).79 In assuring the public free flow of access to information, lCESCR is the 
major international human rights instrument guaranteeing "the right to education" 
declared under the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization ("UNESCO,,).80 Likewise, it is the major instrument in regard to 
intellectual property rights, addressing the issue of the proper balance of interests 
between the authors and inventors and the public sectors. 81 The lCESCR, along with the 
UDHR, constitutes the universal bill of human rights and sets the minimal standard of 
decent social and governmental practice. Article 13(1) of the lCESCR binds its member 
countries to provide measures to formulate national policy with the purpose to promote 
equality of opportunity and treatment in dissemination of education as follows: 
"The States Parties to the present Covenant recognizes the right of 
everyone to education. They agree that education shall be directed to the 
full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, 
and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable all persons to 
participate effectively in a free society, promote understandings, 
79ICESCR 
80 Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, adopted November 
16, 1945, at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001255/125590e.pdf#constitution. (The Preamble to 
the Constitution of UNESCO declares that 'since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men 
that the defences of peace must be constructed'. As defined by the Constitution, the purpose of the 
Organization is: "to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among nations through 
education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without 
distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations.) 
81 Compare UDHR art. 27 with ICESCR art. 15(1)(a) and (b). 
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tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or 
religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations for the 
. f ,,82 mamtenance 0 peace. 
Education is a primary concept recognized as an essential tool to development of 
economic and social progress that will bring better standards of life to all in the global 
society.83 It is questionable whether any country today could develop a modem 
infrastructure of social and economic systems and participate in the global community 
without skillful and educated people. Montesquieu states: "No matter what the form of 
government, education should instill in the citizen the mode of behavior supportive of the 
principle without which that government would collapse.,,84 Thomas Hobbes, from his 
pessimistic point of view, sees "state" as anarchic and perilous and as the result of a 
"social contract" in which individuals agree to give up their freedom in exchange for 
security.85 John Lock, on the contrary, declares that "the state is subject to the will of 
people, whose can amend or overthrow it at will.,,86 No matter where the perception of 
"state" falls on this continuum, it is the charge of national governments to promote the 
material well-being of society as a whole, and not just one particular sector. Government 
is obligated and responsible for the rights, security, and freedom of its people; these 
82 ICESCR art. 13(1). 
83 LAWRENCE LESSIG, supra note 63, at 126. "Education was not, however, the most significant indirect 
regulation. More interesting for our purpose was the government's fmancial and legal support for the 
development of copyright management schemes-software that would make it easier to control access to 
and use of copyrighted material." 
84 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 126 (1977). 
85 CHRIS ROHMANN, supra note 2, at 365. "Hobbes viewed the human condition as a "war of everyone 
against everyone" and life in the state of nature as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." He saw the 
social contract, therefore, as inspired by fear, and a sovereign with absolute, irrevocable power as the best 
guarantee against regression into the state of nature. 
86 /d. "Locke believe that people join in the social contract not simply out of fear but in accordance with 
reason, and not only for personal protection but for mutual benefit. Hence, any tyranny that arises can and 
should be opposed; a society should be able to revoke and rewrite its social contract to remedy an abuse of 
power." 
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include social safety net, health care, support of arts, and access to good education. In 
addition, the government must maintain its position in international affairs by living 
together in peace and respect with other nations as good neighbors; government is also 
responsible to promote understanding, tolerance, and friendship without distinction to 
race, sex, language, or religion.87 Promoting education is a way to promote the 
understanding of differences between cultures, religions, beliefs, ways of life, and 
cultural attitudes of all in the global society and, ultimately, bring peace and security to 
the world. 
In tum, Article 15(1) of the ICESCR imposes upon States Parties, which are the 
countries that have ratified or acceded to this instrument, to recognize the right of 
everyone as follows: "(a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress and its applications; (c) To benefit from the protection of the moral 
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which 
he is the author.,,88 
This provision takes a human rights approach to intellectual property that is often 
an implicit balance between the rights of inventors and creators and the interests of the 
wider society within intellectual property paradigms far more explicit and exacting. To 
achieve these goals, the ICESCR mandates that State Parties undertake a series of steps. 
87 UDHR Preamble. "Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffIrmed their faith 
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men 
and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards oflife in larger freedom." 
and art. 2. "Everyone is entitle to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status." Louis Henkin, Gerald L. Neuman, Diane F. Orentlicher and David 
W. Leebron, Human Rights 1180 (1999). "The right to receive an education, as a right to receive 
instructional services at public expense, may be characterized as a social right. Education policy raises a 
variety of complex issues, however, and aspects of educational policy addressing the content of education, 
the provision of private educational services, and choice among available educational options may also be 
viewed as implicating civil, economic, and cultural rights." 
88 
ICES CR. art. 15(1). 
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!'" 
These include "those necessary for the conservation, the development and the diffusion 
of science and culture."S9 More specially, State Parties "undertake to respect the freedom 
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity,,,90 implying the proper balance 
of interests between the authors and inventors and the public need of the free flow of 
access to information. Further, State Parties make the commitment to "recognize the 
benefits to be derived from the encouragement and development of international contacts 
and cooperation in the scientific and cultural fields.,,91 
To be consistent with the norms in the international human rights instruments, a 
human rights approach differs in a number of regards from the standards set by 
intellectual property law. It requires that the type and level of protection afforded under 
any intellectual property regime directly facilitate and promote scientific progress and its 
applications and do so in a manner that will broadly benefit members of society on an 
individual, as well as collective, level. On the other hand, because a human right is a 
universal entitlement, its implementation is measured particularly by the degree to which 
it benefits those who hitherto have been the most disadvantaged and vulnerable. A right 
to the benefits of science and technology assumes that both individuals and communities 
will have easy access. However, governmental policies are usually absent from weighing 
the consideration of the right to the benefits of science and technology against the right of 
protection from their possible harmful effects on both individual and collective levels that 
a human rights approach entails. A significant or meaningful human rights approach 
89 
!d. art. 15(2). 
90 
!d. art. 15(3). 
91 
[d. art. 15(4). 
159 
would reqUIre the considerations of governmental policy in mandating intellectual 
property legislation to go well beyond a simple economic ca1culus.92 
B. The Effect of Sui Generis Protection in connection with Human Rights 
The important goal of advancing the public sector through intellectual property is 
not directly served by sui generis protection. Sui generis protection confers a far broader 
and stronger monopoly on the database makers than is needed to shield them from the 
threat of technological misappropriation. The protection of sui generis databases violates 
the justification to grants of intellectual property rights in terms of the advancement of 
scientific, economIC and social progress, and contributory incentives to artists and 
inventors. This is because the likely effect would be that such a system would jeopardize 
basic scientific research and educational development by imposing costs on use of public 
goods and information. 
92 Audrey R. Chapman, A Human Rights Perspective on Intellectual Property, Scientific Progress, and 
Access to the Benefits of Science, at http://www.wipo.intltk/en/hr/paneldiscussion/papers/pdfi'chapman.pdf 
- 222.1KB - audrey: 1, chapman: 7. "Although more than 130 countries have become State Parties to the 
ICESCR and therefore are legally obligated to comply with these standards, too often, policy makers and 
legislators do not factor human rights considerations into decision-making on intellectual property regimes, 
and instead rely on economic consideration. In part this situation reflects intellectual fragmentation of 
spheres of knowledge and interest. Intellectual property lawyers tend to have little involvement with human 
rights law, and few human rights specialists deal with science and technology or intellectual property 
issues." Rosemary J. Coombe, Symposium: Sovereignty and the Globalization of Intellectual Property 
Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the 
Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 
59 (1998). "What would it mean to recognize intellectual property rights as international human rights? 
This is a speculative question because although there is a case to be made that intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) are already human rights, they are rarely approached in this fashion, either by governments or by 
the holders of such rights. By situating intellectual property in the human rights framework, we may 
consider some of the challenges that full recognition of intellectual property as a human right would pose. 
Conflicts over the meaning and location of culture create fundamental ambiguities with respect to the scope 
of intellectual property protections. An examination of recent controversies over the use of IPRs to protect 
indigenous knowledge and as a means to implement provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
will illustrate the point and demonstrate the limitations of traditional understandings of sovereignty. The 
recognition of IPRs as human rights entails a renewed concern for social justice issues in an era of so-called 
global harmonization of intellectual property protections that further challenges our considerations of 
sovereignty. " 
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The protection of sui generis databases is problematic from a human rights 
perspective because of its insensitivity to human welfare and the public interest. The 
calculation of social benefits is not a factor in determining sui generis right. Unlike 
copyright or patent law, which values novelty, originality, non-obviousness, and 
usefulness, the protection of sui generis databases rests on the outlay of large financial 
investment. "Most intellectual property laws have been formulated under the myth that 
they do not protect investment as such. Rather, these laws are supposed to implement the 
goal of encouraging or rewarding some socially important form of creative contribution 
of achievement.,,93 To the extent that the makers of sui generis databases would have 
rights under Article 15(1)(c) ofICESCR, it is clear that the claim would not be as strong 
as the claims of creators under the traditional copyright or patent regimes. The new 
database regimes would break with this long-established paradigm by shifting the focus 
of intellectual property law from non-economic considerations, like the promotion of 
science and creativity, to the economic consideration of protecting investment. 
The protection of sui generis databases changes the established balance between 
the interests of the authors and inventors and the public sectors in four important aspects. 
First, it shifts the major emphasis from providing incentives and rewards to promote 
innovation in scientific research and pUblication to protecting investment. 94 Second, it 
eliminates the idea/expression distinction, which is the concept that facts are not 
93 J.H. Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 51, 55 
(1997). "These initiatives aim to rescue database producers from the threat of market-destructive 
appropriations by free-riding competitors who contributed nothing to the costs of collecting or distributing 
the relevant data. Unlike the classical intellectual property models, which seek "to promote the Progress of 
Science and the useful Arts," the database laws do not condition protection on a showing of some creative 
or technical achievement. Rather, these laws would protect anyone who makes a substantial investment in 
the development of a database against unauthorized extractions, uses, and reuses of the whole or substantial 
parts of its contents." 
94 I d. 
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protectable, only the characteristic or expression of those facts can be protected.95 Third, 
the concept of fair use exceptions for educational and scientific purposes will be severely 
limited.96 Last, the protection offered by copyright law is traditionally finite but the 
protection of sui generis databases is open-ended.97 
The problem is exacerbated by the limited exceptions for fair use. Under 
copyright law, the fair use doctrine provides limitations on the creator's rights for certain 
purposes. The exception generally provides for limited copying to promote criticism, 
reporting, teaching, and research.98 On the other hand, the exceptions under the protection 
of sui generis databases are insufficient to allow for scientific research and educational 
purposes. For instance, the exceptions that allow for copying "insubstantial" portions are 
not useful to scientists who conduct research using entire databases.99 The end result 
could be that less information is available to scientists, as well as a general chilling effect 
on the sharing and use of data. Committee for a Study on Promoting Access to Scientific 
and Technical Data for the Public Interest, under the auspices of the National Research 
Council, explained: "in fields like Global Climate change, where many different types of 
global data are relevant and where a scientist might not know the legacy of a lot of the 
data, avoiding a breach of the proposed legislation could be very difficult."loO The end 
95 !d. at 89. "The absence of any equivalent to the idea-expression doctrine under the new sui generis 
regime means that investors, in effect, obtain proprietary rights in data as such, a type of ownership that the 
copyright paradigm expressly precludes. Proponents of the sui generis right downplay this fmding by 
insisting that third parties always remain free to generate their own databases.-But this opportunity exists 
only for data that are legally available from public sources and whose cost of independent regeneration is 
not prohibitively high in relation to the gains expected from the exercise. As for proprietary data not legally 
available for second comers to exploit, there is no opportunity to avoid the originator's exclusive rights to 
prevent extraction or re-use of existing data." 
96 Compare Berne Convention arts. 9-10 with WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 5. 
97 Compare Berne Convention art. 7 with WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 8. 
98 Berne Convention 10. 
99 WIPO Draft Database Treaty, Note on Article 5. 
100 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: PRN ATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
IN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATABASES, NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS (1999) at 20-23. Table 1.1 
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result is that scientists would have less access to data than under the sui generis regime 
because of the limited scope of fair use. 
Another important aspect of the protection of sui generis databases is the 
unlimited duration of protection that IS provided. Article 8(3) of the WIPO Draft 
Database Treaty stipulates: 
"Any substantial change to the database, evaluated qualitatively or 
quantitatively, including any substantial change resulting from the 
accumulation of succeSSIve additions, deletions, verifications, 
modifications in organization or presentation, or other alterations, which 
constitute a new substantial investment, shall qualify the database 
resulting from such investment for its own term of protection."] 0] 
Under the meaning of Article 8(3), with each substantial update the databases gam 
renewed protection. Even if only the new portions of the databases were protectable, it 
would be difficult to tell what is protected and what is not within a database that is 
continuously updated. 
The effect of this increased protection could be less availability of data to 
scientists, and therefore a decrease in everyone's ability to benefit from the advances 
Examples of Different Types of S&T Database Activity Discussed in the January 1999 Workshop. 
Memorandum prepared by the International Bureau, Agenda 5: Protection of Databases, Information 
Received from the Intergovernmental and Non-governmental Organizations, WIPO Doc. SCCRl1/INF/3 
(June 30, 1998). International Council for Science (ICSU) asserted: "Such data sharing is possible only 
When the data are affordable within tight budgets. If data are formally made available for scientific access, 
but the prices charged for such access are prohibitively high, the negative impact on science is the same as 
if access had been legally denied. This is especially the case for scientists in developing countries." 
Information Meeting on Intellectual Property in Databases: Observations: Submitted by the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO), WIPO Doc. DB/IM/4 (September 4, 1997). "We believe that the 
prinCiple of the full and open exchange of data and information vital to the protection of life and property, 
safeguarding the environment and addressing global issues should be a recognized principle and contained 
in any international database protection mechanism. In particular, the free and umestricted exchange of 
meteorological and related data should be assured, especially those relating to natural disaster mitigation 
activities such as severe weather warnings." 
]0] 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 8(3). 
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science can make. The culture among scientists, long based on sharing data and 
infonnation, could change as scientists "feel the need to protect their data, either out of a 
sense of unfairness or simply to have something to trade.,,102 Projects that depend on the 
sharing of data worldwide, such as the Human Genome Project, could "grind to halt.,,103 
Scientists may not be able to pay for data, even when the price is detennined by a 
competitive market. For instance, when data for the Landsat satellite was privatized in the 
United States, the price of a single image went from $400 to $4,400. Scientists could not 
afford the data, and research efforts to monitor terrestrial ecosystems through satellite 
imaging were tenninated. 1 04 On the other hand, and particular to the electronic databases, 
"a new open-access online medical journal database teaches African doctors with no 
research budgets about new medicines and surgical techniques. Scientists are able to 
study the 'greenhouse effect' because weather data is made freely available to the public 
102 I.H. Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, supra note 93, at 113. Yet, the level of disagreement about even 
the most rudimentary components of the proposed reforms is very great, and an impartial evaluation of 
them is further complicated by the larger (but often unstated) policy implications of even the most 
seemingly innocuous technical proposals. Under these circumstances, the unseemly haste with which both 
the U.S. and E.U. authorities have moved to implement these measures at the international level raises 
troubling and still unanswered questions about the extent to which the public interest has been sacrificed to 
the private interests of "right owners, who ... are generally very well-represented at the (national and 
international) legislative level. "" 
103 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 39-50. "By making databases more profitable, new 
protectionist legislation could shift responsibility for their creation for the public sector to the private 
sector. The social harm of such a shift would be an increase in the price for access, especially for highly 
specialized databases-such as some S&T databases-with a comparatively small market. A possible 
social benefit would be that the private sector would be subjected to a weak market test of whether the 
value of the databases exceeded their cost." 
104 lH. Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, supra note 93, at 122. "For example, when data from the 
Landsat series of remote sensing satellites were privatized in the 1980s, the prices charged to most users, 
including academic and federal government users increased from $400 to $4,400 per image. When the 
research community pressed to use Landsat data for global exchange research in the early 1990s, 
complaints about high prices persuaded Congress to return the Landsat system to the public sector. 
Consequently, there was a negotiated price reduction to $425 per image for U.S. government and affiliated 
users only. This result nonetheless left non-government researchers, including the academic community, to 
pay $ 4,400 per image, a ten to one price differential that severely limits the use of Landsat data by most 
non-government U.S. scientists, who cannot afford to pay these prices from their limited research budgets. 
While one cannot know which scientific advances were delayed or prevented by this practice, evidence 
gathered by the National Research Council presents a sobering picture of the social costs of this lost 
potential. " 
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over the Internet.,,105 It suggests that the availability of infonnation databases fuels 
innovation by lowering the cost of research and development and spreading knowledge to 
new sectors. 
The effects of any increasing cost to access would be felt especially by scientists 
in developing countries, interfering with the right of everyone to benefit from science. 
Article 2(1) of the leESCR, where State Parties agree to "take steps individually and 
through international assistance, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view to achieving the full realization of the rights,,106 
underscores the global obligations accepted by signatories. While the Internet promises 
easy and less expenSIve access to the latest scientific and educational developments, 
charging for infonnation and data that is now freely accessed at minimal or no cost will, 
once again, widen the distance between the developed and developing countries. 
The State Parties to the ICESCR have undertaken to balance the rights of creators 
with the rights of society as a whole, under Article 15, and the right to education, under 
Article 13. More than economic considerations are at stake. The proper balance must 
provide incentive for scientists to create and for scientific tools such as databases to be 
developed without shifting research by making data available only to wealthier sectors, 
105 Robin Gross, Buy the Numbers Publishers Seek Special Database Monopoly Protections, Multinational 
Monitor, Vol. 25, No. 7&8 (July/August 2004). "The Politic Economy of R&D "A new open-access online 
medical journal database teaches African doctors with no research budgets about new medicines and 
surgical techniques. Scientists are able to study the "greenhouse effect" because weather data is made 
freely available to the public over the Internet. Electronic databases have proliferated in recent years, 
creating new information products and services for the public. The availability of information databases 
fuels innovation by lowering the costs of research and development and spreading knowledge to new 
sectors ... But "too much protection will prevent the creation of new databases that incorporate information 
extracted from existing databases, and this will halt the advancement of knowledge in all realms of human 
endeavor." 
106 
ICESCR art. 2(1). 
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thereby failing to promote the right of everyone to benefit from science and the societal 
right to education. 
C. A Global Picture of a Need for the Free Flow of Access to Information 
The databases are recognized as a vital element in the development of a global 
infonnation infrastructure and an essential tool for promoting economic, cultural, and 
technological advancement. l07 Privatizing the contents of facts, data, and information 
imposes a conflicting interest to public policy. A primary impression is that developing 
countries basically need capital flow for the purpose of national infrastructure and, 
therefore, a legal reform, which is primarily stimulated by cross-border private investors, 
is needed, of which the least developed nations are to be the primarily recipients. Human 
resources are, therefore, essential. If there is knowledge and information but no one 
knows exactly how to use it, it would be wasted: hence, it conflicts the economic theory 
of maximization. l 08 
The economic-political conflicts between countries m the North and South 
inevitably take place in the arena of intellectual property regimes. Most industrialized 
countries maintain that strong intellectual property provisions promote growth and strong 
domestic economy.l09 Developing countries, however, generally do not believe that it is 
in their present economic interests to implement stronger intellectual property 1aws.
llo 
107 WIPO Draft Database Treaty, Preamble. 
108 CHRISTOPHER MAY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS; THE NEW 
ENCLOSURES? 30 (2000). (Stating changes in the distribution and availability of the theoretical or symbolic 
knowledge required to make a full use of information-including the availability to expertise and scientific 
methods, for instance; and changes in the rules governing the ownership and characterization of property in 
knowledge resources.) 
109 ANTHONY D' AMA TO AND DORIS ESTELLE LONG, INTERN A TIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ANTHOLOGY (1996). 
110 Audrey R. Chapman, supra note 92, at 15. 
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Their opposition is based on three factors: (1) the benefits of an intellectual property 
. system tend to be long-tenn and tenuous; (2) in the short-tenn, intellectual property 
protection increases the cost of development, with the protection awarded and resulting 
payments for the use of these technologies going primarily to foreign multi-national 
corporations; and (3) few of these countries have the requisite infrastructure to uphold 
strong intellectual property systems. 11 1 Thus, developing countries sometimes accuse 
former colonizing countries and multinational corporations of seeking to impose 
"technological colonialism." 
Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations obliged member states to achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems such as economic, social and 
cultural problems. 1 12 The principle set forth under Article 1 is reflected in a number of 
subsequent conventions, such as the UDHR's objectives ("Whereas Member States have 
pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations"); 113 Article 2 of 
the ICESCR ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic 
and technical"); 114 and even in Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement ("The protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology to the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations"). 1 15 
In particular to the human rights approach of the free flow of access to infonnation, 
III [d. 
112 U.N. Charter art. l. 
1\3 UDHR Preamble. 
114 ICESCR art. 2(1). 





Article 15(2), 15(3) and 15(4) of the ICESCR impose three sets of obligations on State 
Parties: to undertake the steps necessary for the conservation, development and diffusion 
of science and cultural; to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and 
creative activity; and to recognize the benefits to be derived from encouragement and 
development of international contacts and cooperation in the scientific and cultural 
fields. 116 In tum, Article 13 of the ICESCR obliges its State Parties to provide equal 
opportunity of education. 1 17 Ultimately, in regard to the universal acceptance of Common 
Heritage of Mankind recognized under the Universal Declaration of the Rights to 
Peoples, it affirms that: "Scientific and technical progress, being part of the common 
heritage of mankind, every people has the right to participate in it.,,118 As a result of the 
1974 agreement to join the UN system,119 the WIPO should administer the intellectual 
property conventions and mandate any new treaty by considering the concept of human 
rights approach to intellectual property that often is an implicit balance between the rights 
of inventors and authors and the interests of the wider society. 
IV. Conclusion 
The balance that copyright law, including other kinds of intellectual property 
laws, strikes is between the protections granted to the author to have sufficient incentive 
to produce and to the public use or access granted everyone else. The concept of fair use 
is built into copyright law to limit the power of the author to control use of the ideas he 
has created. Fair use, therefore, is the right to use copyrighted material, regardless of the 
116 ICESCR art. 15(2)-(4). 
117 Id. arts. 13&14. 
118 Universal Declaration of the Right of Peoples, adopted July 1-4, 1976, art. 9. 
119 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, signed July 14, 1967. 
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wishes of the owner of that material, such as to criticize and to reproduce. An appropriate 
balance between the interests of the authors and the public, therefore, is maintained. The 
proposed database treaty, on the other hand, gives more weight to the economic interests 
of investors than does the traditional copyright law, and arguably less weight to moral 
interests than traditional creators and inventors would like. Copyright fair use exceptions 
do not apply to the underlying facts and data contained in an author's work. Constituting 
a fair use of such facts and data sounds odd. If the proposed database treaty were enacted, 
it would create a number of legal questions regarding the standard of substantial taking; 
as it is now, the courts already find it difficult to distinguish and define fair use 
exceptions in each decision. Scientists, researchers, and educators engage primarily in 
data sharing and are often working within limited budgets. If the free flow of access to 
information that once was available to them was withdrawn from the public domain and 
privatized, there would be a tremendous negative impact on society as a whole. 
Balance is attractive. The UDHR and its successor the ICESCR promote the right 
"to education,,,12o the right "to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications" 121 and the right "to benefit from the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the 
author.,,122 Such balance is reflected in intellectual property protection as a means to 
foster scientific, economic, and social development and disseminating knowledge and 
information that profoundly affect the well being of people and an improvement in their 
living standards. National governments absorb the principle of the full and open 
exchange of information to promote vital economic and cultural progress and advance 
120 UDHR art. 26(1). 
121 UDHR art. 27(1). leESeR. art. lS(1)(b). 
122 
UDHR art. 27(2). leESeR. art. lS(1)(c). 
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transfer to all. The protection of sui generis databases does not recognize 
principle; rather, its intention is to benefit particular industries. To be consistent with 
the human rights nonn, the proposed database treaty should be calculated based on 
benefits to all, based on the goals of promoting the progress of scientific ideas and 
innovations and their application, and fair and equal opportunity in education. Granting 
sui generis protection would signify another type of imperialism in modem times by 
allowing entrepreneurs in developed countries to steal the undeveloped knowledge of 
developing and least developed countries, such as the records of ancient Chinese medical 
science and collections of medical plants in developing countries, recompile that 
traditional knowledge, and claim it as their own in protected databases. If the databases 
were priced out of the reach of people in developing and least developed countries, they 
il:: ..... : .. 11 
would not be able to gain access to the infonnation in the databases. The national 
infrastructure would be halted; the gap between the "Haves" and "Have-Nots" would be 
; ······1· 
•. ,,1 
widened. The history of imperialism should not be repeated under a different name: 
globalization. The free flow of access to infonnation to all in the global community 
should be disseminated fairly and safeguarded for all. 
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Chapter V 
Wishful Consideration of Database Protection 
I. Introduction 
Law is politics. The legislative battle between two powerful economic parties, 
Member States of the European Union) and the United States of America,2 led to a 
possible recognition of a sui generis right modeled on investment in the making, 
collection, assembly, verification, organization, or presentation of the contents of 
databases. This political pressure resulted in the World Intellectual Property Organization 
producing and finally adopting, its own version of a draft treaty on databases, "Basic 
Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect 
of Databases" ("WIPO Draft Database TreatY"),3 containing similar sui generis right. 
However, the sui generis right is not an intellectual property right because its unique 
1 The Sui Generis Right Provided for in the Proposal for a Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases, 
WIPO Doc. BCP/CEIV15 (September, 1995). The European Community and its Member States Proposal 
for the International Harmonization of the Sui Generis Protection of Databases, WIPO Doc. BCP/CEIV113 
(February 1996) [hereinafter E.U. Proposal]. 
2 The U.S. Proposal for Sui Generis Protection of Databases, WI PO Doc. BCP/CEIVIII2-INRICEIVII2 
(May 1996) [hereinafter U.S. Proposal]. 
3 Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Databases to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. CRNRlDC/6 (December 1996) 
[hereinafter WIPO Draft Database Treaty]. 
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nature is in contrast the underlying principle of copyright law, the free flow of access to 
information. If enacted, the sui generis right would impact on several public sectors, 
particularly in the fields of education, science, and research, leading to a possible 
violation of human rights norms, the right "to education,,,4 and the right "to enjoy the 
benefits of scientific progress and its applications,"s as set forth in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") respectively. 
Free and open access to facts, data, and information should be promoted for the 
purpose of the development of a global information infrastructure and for the 
development of economic, cultural, and technological advancement around the globe. As 
set forth in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations,6 all member states are 
obligated to promote such objectives and co-operate by virtue of living together with 
peace and security. This obligation is imposed upon a State, and its national government 
is responsible for preserving its constitution and laws, and for striving to achieve 
international co-operation, solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character. The protection of sui generis databases, giving 
database makers a property right in factual contents of databases threatens the public's 
need for free and open access to information and increases problems of socio-economic 
infrastructure. 
4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted December 10,1948, G.A. Res 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd 
Sess., Pt. I, Resolutions, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/81O (1948) [hereinafter UDHR] art. 26(1). International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, concluded December 16, 1966, entered into force 
January 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 1966 U.N.J.Y.B. 170; 1977 U.K.T.S. 6, Comd. 6702 [hereinafter 
ICESCR] art. 13(1). 
5 UDHR art. 27(1). ICESCR art. 15(1)(b). 
6 Charter of the United Nations, concluded June 26, 1945, entered into force October 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. 
XVI, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1043; 1945 Can. T.S. 7; 1945 S.A.T.S. 6; 1946 U.K.T.S. 67, Comd. 7015 B.F.S.P. 
805; U.S.T.S. 993, 59 Stat. 1031 [hereinafter U.N. Charter] art. l. 
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This chapter provides a wishful consideration toward the concept of protection of 
sui generis databases. Section II summarizes the concept of the protection of sui generis 
databases based on three propositions: (1) the concept of sui generis right opposes the 
principle of copyright law, the proper balance between the interests of the authors and the 
public sectors such as scientific and educational institutes that need the free flow of 
access to infonnation; (2) the sui generis right creates unfair competition and is 
economically unjustified to the database industries; and (3) the sui generis right opposes 
human rights, the right to education and the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress and its applications. Section III emphasizes that both national and international 
governmental bodies have duty to promote the public free flow of access to infonnation, 
and suggests a possible remedy for sui generis databases. Section IV concludes on the 
concept of protection of sui generis databases 
II. Summary of the Concept of the Protection of Sui Generis Databases 
The free flow of access to facts, data, and information must be promoted to all. 
The aforementioned chapters have provided detailed analysis, which can be summarized 
in three propositions. First, the sui generis right is in contrast to the principle of copyright 
law, the free flow access to infonnation. Second, the economic rationale of sui generis 
right is not justifiable. Last, the sui generis right does not complement human rights. 
A. Contrasting Concepts of Protection 
The sui generis right is in contrast to the principle of copyright law, the free flow 
of access to infonnation. To constitute justification of sui generis right, the WIPO 
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Committees of Experts consider a possible criterion of human, technical and financial 
resources in the making of databases.7 Under the sui generis regime, Contracting Parties 
are required to extend protection to any database that represents a substantial investment 
in the collection, assembly, verification, organization or presentation of the contents. 8 
This means it embraces all kinds of factual collections and compilations merely if the 
database makers can prove a substantial investment in the making of their databases. The 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886,9 on the other 
hand, provides copyright protection only for creative collections. Article 2(5) of the 
Berne Convention provides copyright on authors' literary and artistic collections "which 
by reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents constitutes an intellectual 
creation.,,10 Although there is no definition of "collections of literary and artistic works," 
Article 2(5) requires that "collections of literary and artistic works," including 
encyclopedias, anthologies, and dictionaries, must contain creativity in the selection and 
arrangement of their contents. 11 It excludes facts, preexisting materials protected under 
copyright or other forms of protection, news of the day,12 and official texts of a 
legislative administrative and legal nature,13 that form part of such collections. Thus, the 
protection of sui generis databases intends to cover facts, data, and information that 
copyright law intends to leave them unprotected. 
In a number of judiciary jurisdictions in copyright protection cases, the national 
courts have made a distinction between creative and tactual collections. In Feist 
7 
WIPO Draft Database Treaty Preamble. 
8 
Id art. 1(1). 
9 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September 9, 1886 (Paris Act of July 
1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
10 Berne Convention art. 2(5). 
II Id art. 2(5). 
12 
Id. art. 2(8). 
13 Id. art. 2(4). 
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publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc. (1991) case,I4 the U.S. Supreme 
Court has demonstrated that, for works to be protected under copyright law, there must be 
an author's creative expression attached to the selection and arrangement of the contents. 
The Court has addressed that facts or raw data, such as names and addresses of 
subscribers appearing in telephone directories, are not copyrightable in nature, but factual 
compilations may be protected under copyright law if there is any creative expression in 
their selection and arrangement. I5 Put simply, in conformity with the Berne Convention, 
the Court requires an author's creative expression to be contained within the collection. 16 
The Court rationalized that copyright law promotes the proper balance of interests 
between the author's incentive to produce creative works and the public's entitlement to 
free flow of access to facts, data, and information. In addition, the U.S. Constitution, the 
Court asserted, promotes "the progress of science and useful arts" by securing the 
protection for a limited duration. I7 Scientific, research and educational sectors rely 
heavily on the free flow of access to facts, data, and information. Granting a property 
right in factual contents opposes the principle of free flow of access to information 
because it increases a cost to view, receive, or use facts, data, and information which 
were free. 
The problem of the protection of sui generis databases between countries derives 
from applicability of principles under the Berne Convention. The Berne Convention 
requires its member countries to provide minimum copyright protection on collections. I8 
14 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, IllS. Ct. 1282 (1991). 
IS Id at 345. 
16 Berne Convention art. 2(8). 
17 U.S. Constitution art. I, sect. 8, cI. 8. 
18 ANTHONY D'AMATO AND DoRIS ESTELLE LONG, INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY (1996) at 228-
229. "Signatory nations must grant protection at a level equal to or above the minimum standards espoused 
by the Convention." PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLE, LAWS AND PRACTICES 
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This means member countries, based upon their legal systems, could provide extra 
protection on other kinds of collections that do not contain creative selection and 
arrangement, such as factual collections or catalogues. 19 On condition, as the principle of 
national treatment applied,2o when the authors of these member countries have their 
factual collections exhibited or exploited in other member countries where no protection 
is afforded, they must be satisfied with that level of protection. 
However, the European Union adopts a different strategy to prevent their sui 
generis databases from unfair competition. First, in British Horseracing Board Ltd. and 
others v. William Hill Organization Ltd. case (2001),21 the Chancery Court, as a result of 
being a member state in the European Union, has recognized that the online compiled 
statistical data regarding horseracing should be protected in accordance with the E.U. 
Database Directive, Article 7(1),22 and granted an injunction against William Hill's 
unlicensed use of online horseracing statistics and data.23 Second, if any third-party 
country wishes its databases to be protected in the Union, the E.U. Commission requires 
reciprocal treatment that becomes political pressure on foreign sui generis databases 
(2001). "Article 2 establishes a floor, not a ceiling, to protectible subject matter, and leaves member 
countries free to add other categories." 
19 Sherif EI-Kassas, Study on the Protection of Unoriginal Databases, WIPO Doc. SCCRl7/3 (April 4, 
2002), at 6. "The survey identified sui generis legal protection for databases which do not meet the criterion 
of originality in the following countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden." Jorg Reinbothe, 
The Legal Protection of Non-Creative Databases, WIPO Doc. EC/CONF/99/SPKl22-A (September, 1999), 
at 3. "Apart from the compilation copyright in the UK and in Ireland, which provided "sweat of the brow" 
databases with true copyright protection, a similar neighboring right existed in the five Nordic States for 
several decades in form of the so-called "catalogue rule"." Michael 1. Bastian, Protection of "Non creative " 
Database: Harmonization of United States, Foreign and International Law, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 
425 (1999). "The Nordic nations-Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden-have instituted a 
system of "neighboring rights" to protect investments of capital and labor in noncreative databases from 
free-riders. " 
20 Berne Convention art. 5. 
2! British Horseracing Board Ltd. V. William Hill Organization Ltd., lSI NJC 271 (Ch. 2001). 
22 Council Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 OJ. L 77/20 [hereinafter Database 
Directi ve ]. 
23 151 NJC 271 (Ch. 2001) paras. 3-20. 
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being exhibited and exploited in the Union. Article 11(3) of the E.U. Database Directive 
imposes: "Agreements extending the right provided for in Article 7 to databases made in 
third countries and falling outside the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be concluded 
by the Council acting on a proposal from the Commission.,,24 The third-party country 
needs to upgrade its national legislation to achieve the same standard as the E.U. 
Database Directive must enter into a special agreement with the E.U. if it wants its 
national database makers to survive legitimate exploitation in the European market. 
The principle of reciprocal treatment used for the protection of sui generis 
databases between countries creates unfair protection. The protection of sui generis 
databases in the United States which is the biggest producer in the world market 
disadvantages U.S. database makers. If their databases entered into the European market, 
European database makers could recompile them, claim the exclusive owner rights under 
the Database Directive, and sell them back to the U.S. The U.S. database makers would 
suffer from this unfair treatment as long as the U.S. government does not upgrade its law 
to the same standard of protection that offered in Europe. Likewise, database makers 
from other part of the globe suffer from this unfair treatment. Member States of the 
European Union are countries with advanced legal systems, but most developing and 
least developed countries are countries with less advanced legal systems. If developing 
and least developed countries cannot comply with the E.U.'s standard of protection, their 
collections, which are mostly based on traditional knowledge and information such as 
collections of medical plants and ancient medical science, would be lost to the European 
market. Such a requirement, to upgrade the protection of sui generis databases, definitely 
and unfairly widens a gap between "Have" and "Have-Not" countries. 
24 Database Directive art. 11(3). 
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B. Economic Justification of Sui Generis Databases 
The economic justification of sui generis databases, through investment schemes, 
creates unfair competition. Article 1(1) of the WIPO Draft Database imposes Contracting 
parties to protect any database that represents a substantial investment in the collection, 
assembly, verification, organization or presentation of the contents of the database?5 
Article 2(i) of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty defines "database" as "a collection of 
independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way 
and capable of being individually accessed by electronic or other means.,,26 The broad 
definition of sui generis databases embraces a wide scope of databases. In addition, 
Article 8(3) of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty stipulates: "Any substantial change to 
the database, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, including any substantial change 
resulting from the accumulation of successive additions, deletions, verifications, 
modifications in organization or presentation, or other alterations, which constitute a new 
substantial investment, shall qualify the database resulting from such investment for its 
own term of protection.,,27 This provision creates unlimited duration of protection if the 
database makers continue to update, change, and develop that database and claim it as a 
new substantial investment. 
D' Amato and Long regard a lengthy duration of protection; the author's life plus 
fifty years, under copyright law, as a temporary monopoly over reproduction and 
dissemination of expressive contents?8 The owner's exclusive rights normally include the 
25 WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 1(1). 
26 I d. art. 2(i). 
27 I d. art. 8(3) 
28 ANTHONY D'AMATO & DORIS ESTELLE LONG, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY; 
UNDERL YING THEORIES 54 (1996). "In a desire to reward the author, and hence encourage production of 
new works, copyright essentially grants the author a monopoly over the reproduction and dissemination of 
his creative expression for a limited period of time." 
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rights to reproduction and dissemination of the contents through a licensing scheme.29 
Based upon the capital economic system, this means consumers have to absorb the 
licensing cost and pay more than they should for licensed products. For the market 
competition perspective, the subsequent compilers will be reluctant to incur the costs by 
starting from scratch, entering a market that is already possessed by the original players, 
or even absorbing monopolistic prices of copyrighted items?O Copyright law promotes a 
proper balance of interests between the authors and the public sectors by limiting the 
ownership of data for a certain period of time and, therefore, contributing to the general 
progress of society. In addition, it promotes the public's need of the free flow of access to 
facts, data, and information, leaving the raw materials for the subsequent compilers to 
gather, collect, compile, produce and develop better works and enter into the market; so 
that competition flourishes. The sui generis system, promoting a property right in 
complied facts, data, and information and an unlimited duration of protection, on the 
other hand, opposes this position and creates a monopoly window to the database 
industries. 
In order to enhance competition in the market, national authorities use 
competition law to ensure the free flow of access to facts, data, and information. In Radio 
Telefis Eireann v. Commission (1995) (Magi/I),3! the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") 
held that a refusal to license copyright in factual contents infringed Article 82 of the E.C. 
Treaty. To prevent the obstruction to the free flow of access to information in the 
Community, the ECl made clear that any abuse, such as direct or indirect imposing of 
29 Id 
30 Id 
31 Court of Justice C-241-241/91 P, RTE & ITP v. EC Commission [1995] ECR 1-743, [1995] 6 CMLR 
718. 
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unfair purchase or selling pnces, or limiting production, markets or technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers, that constitutes a dominant position within 
the common market is prohibited. 
The U.S. Court, in turn, in National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc. 
(NBA v. Motorola) (1997),32 held that, using its own expenses to collect purely factual 
information, Motorola neither constitute unfair competition nor free-ride on NBA' s 
product since it expended its own resources to collect purely factual information. The 
Second Circuit Court utilized an application of the doctrine of misappropriation to 
produce a result that: (1) the subject matter must result from the plaintiff's own 
contribution, expenses, and labor in generating or collecting information; (2) the 
information was time sensitive, (3) the defendant's use of the information must constitute 
free-riding status; (4) the defendant's use of the information was in competition with a 
product or service offered by the plaintiff or likely to be offered by the plaintiff, and (5) 
the ability of other parties to free ride on the efforts of the plaintiff would so reduce the 
incentive to produce the product or service that the existence or equality of the product 
would be substantially threatened. 33 The Second Circuit Court found that Motorola had 
not engaged in unlawful misappropriation because the information transmitted to 
SportsTrax was not precisely contemporaneous, but was, in fact, time sensitive.34 
Besides, the NBA failed to show any competitive effect from SportsTrax on the 
following grounds: first, the product was generating the information by playing the 
games; second, the product was transmitting live, full descriptions of those games; and 
third, the product was collecting and retransmitting strictly factual information about the 
32 National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F. 3d 841 (2nd Cir. 1997). 
33 Id. at 845. 
34 Id. at 853. 
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games.35 The Court also found that the NBA' s primary product-producing basketball 
games with live attendance and licensing copyrighted broadcasts of those games-was 
not infringed upon nor did it involve a free-ride, inasmuch as Motorola markets 
SportsTrax as being designed for those times when a person could not be at the arena, 
watch the game on TV or listen to it on the radio.36 In addition, the Court asserted that 
transmitting contents of live events such as baseball games was not copyrightable and, 
therefore, survived the Copyright Act's preemptive effect.37 The U.S. courts recognize 
the substantial investment in compiled facts, data, and information, using competition law 
to ensure competition, and explicitly demonstrate that the economic justification of the 
protection of sui generis databases must be considered based upon free competition of the 
database industries. 
For the judicial authorities to assert the extraterritorial jurisdiction, the U.S. and 
the European courts provide examples of how far they can assert such extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. By adopting the principle of effect doctrine, both parties share this similarity 
imposing conditions that: (1) there must be agreement(s) or concerted practice(s) that 
create a direct and immediate restriction of competition; (2) the effect of the conduct 
must be reasonably foreseeable; and (3) that the effect produced on the territory must be 
substantial. 38 Though there is no supportive evidence of how the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction could apply directly to the databases subject-matter, the courts in both 
jurisdictions have presented a satisfactory interpretation of the useful effect doctrine that 
35 Id at 854. 
36 Id 
37 Id at 846. 
38 Court of Justice, C-89, 104, 114, 116-II7, 125-129/85, A Ahl~trom Osakeyhtio v. Commission [1993] 
ECR 1-1307. (Concerning price-fixing in the wood pulp industry). Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of 
America, 549 F 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). (Concerning conspiracy to exclude u.s. company from the 
Honduran lumber market). 
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could be adjusted to prevent unlawful reproduction and dissemination of sui generis 
databases in the global dimension. 
Although the database makers claim technological impacts on the reproduction 
and dissemination of sui generis databases, the free-riding problem of databases, whether 
non-electronic or electronic, is normally solved by market mechanisms.39 In general, the 
market mechanisms, the Demand-Supply and the Profit-Maximization, allow competition 
to flourish in the market. In a consumer-supplier relation, the price mechanism dictates 
demand and supply of databases.4o At the same time, in a relation between suppliers, the 
maximization of profit motivates competition and brings about innovation.41 The market 
flourishes only if the underlying facts, data, and information are available to the 
subsequent compilers. This is because the cost advantage drives competition. On the 
global scale, however, if the protection of sui generis databases meant to enhance and 
stimulate the socio-economic infrastructure for all in the global society, the underlying 
facts, data, and information must be freely available and accessible to allow competition 
to flourish. 
39 WI PO Draft Database Treaty Preamble. 
40 BRAD R. SCHILLER, THE ECONOMY TODAY (8th ed. 2000). 
41 ld. at 462. 
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C. Human Rights Violation 
The sui generis right does not complement human rights. Article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention safeguards the public interest in creative contents, providing fair use 
exceptions to the author's works for purposes such as criticisms, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.42 The fair use exceptions under Article 9(2) 
of the Berne Convention are drafted to complement human rights in respect to the right to 
"equality of educational opportunity,,43 and the right "to enjoy benefits of scientific 
progress and its application,,44 and "to benefit from the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he 
is the author,,45 under the auspices of the UDHR and ICSCR respectively. Granting a sui 
generis right, which constitutes owner exclusive right to authorize or prohibit the 
extraction or utilization of the contents,46 for the database makers is in contrast to these 
norms. Although Article 5(1) of the WIPO Draft Database Treaty provides exceptions or 
limitations of the sui generis right,47 such exceptions or limitations are vague because 
Article 5(1) obliges Contracting Parties to provide exceptions or limitations of sui generis 
right based upon national legal systems. Therefore, there is no general scope of 
exceptions or limitations to the sui generis right structured in the draft treaty. The 
national courts have already encountered the difficulty in providing interpretation of 
42 Id. art. 9(2). Known as the three-step test, Article 9(2) imposes conditions: First, the criteria permit 
exceptions only in certain special cases; second, the exceptions may never conflict with normal exploitation 
of the works; and third, the exceptions may not unreasonably impair or prejudice the legitimate interests, 
including economic interests ofthe author. 
43 UDHR art. 26(1). 
44 Id. art. 27(1). ICSCR art. 15(1)(b). 
45 UDHR art. 27(2). ICSCR art. 15(l)(c). 
46 WIPO Draft Database Treaty art. 3(1). 
47 Id. art. 5(1). "Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation, provide exceptions to or limitations of 
the rights provided in this Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict with the normal exploitation of 
the database and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder." 
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copyright fair use exceptions. To provide interpretation for exceptions or limitations of 
sui generis right would further complicate matters. If the databases are recognized as an 
essential element for promoting economic, cultural, and technological advancement,48 
one must observe how far the exceptions or limitations of sui generis right would benefit 
the larger public sectors, such as scientific and educational communities around the 
globe. 
III. Emphasis and Suggestion on the Protection of Sui Generis Databases 
The legislative battle derives not only from the political pressure between nations, 
but from internal pressure exerted by lobbyists who represent industries that are making 
every effort to approach legislatures to consider an enactment of database legislation.49 
However, based upon the concept of government duty, for the purpose of promulgating 
legislation, governmental bodies must emphasize the proper balance of interests between 
the public and private sectors. Similarly, the government duty regards not only a 
relationship between government and its citizens, but also between countries. Any 
legislation which benefits industries at the expense of individuals should be considered 
irresponsible. Again, if databases are recognized as essential tools to promote socio-
economic infrastructure around the globe, the use of computer technology suggests a self-
help solution to support this proposition. 
4. WI PO Draft Database Treaty Preamble Clause. 
49 A number of draft legislations regarding the protection of sui generis databases have been proposed in 
Congress since 1996 as follows: Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act, H.R. 3531, 
104th Congo (1996). Former Rep. Carlos J. Moorhead of California introduced this bill on May 23, 1996. 
Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H. R. 2652, 105th Congo (1998). Collections of Information 
Antipiracy Act. H.R. 354, 106th Congo (1999). Representative Howard Coble introduced this bill. 
Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act, H.R. 1858, I06th Congo (1999). Representative Bliley 
introduced this bill. Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 326 I, I08th 
Congo (introduced Oct 8, 2003). 
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A. Emphasis on Government's Duty 
1. Duty to Citizens 
Democratic government, as elected by its citizens, is responsible to preserve the 
"freedom" of its citizens. The constitution derives from a need for mutual benefit and 
security, such as individual rights, equality of opportunity, and liberties, of citizens who 
have joined in and formed the social contract. 50 The national government is obligated to 
establish and maintain order, and enhance the reliability of expectations; to protect 
persons and their property, and other interests; to promote the welfare of individuals; and 
to further social value-justice, the good life, and the good society.51 Any attempt to 
extend legal protection that benefits a particular sector but creates a negative impact on 
other parts of society is unconstitutional. 
In the United States, there is a growing amount of evidence of how private entities 
have placed influences on legislation and consequently created negative impacts on 
larger public sectors. Throughout U.S. legal history, the battle between the interests of 
private sectors to maximize profit in their business opportunities and the public sectors' 
needs for value has been ongoing. Time and time again corporate power has sought to 
manipulate Congress and indeed the U.S. Constitution. In Santa Clara County v. 
Southern Pacific Railroad Co. (1886),52 the U.S. Supreme Court exempted the state tax 
assessment on the fences on the line of railroads in favor of defendant corporations. 53 The 
Court reasoned, under the constitution and laws of California, relating to taxation, fences 
erected upon the line between the roadway of a railroad and the land of coterminous 
50 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATIES ON GOVERNMENTS (1690). 
51 Id 
52 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394, 6 S. Ct. 1132 (1886). 
53 I d. 
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proprietors were not part of "the roadway," to be included by the State Board in its 
valuation of the property of the corporation, but were "improvements" assessable by the 
local authorities of the proper county. 
In Lochner v. New York (1905),54 the U.S. Supreme Court delivered judgment in 
favor of the employer, a corporation engaged in the bakery business, holding that: "under 
Section 110 of the labor law of the State of New York, no employee shall be required or 
permitted to work in bakeries more than sixty hours in a week, or ten hours a day. 
However, the State could not legitimately exercise any police power unnecessarily and 
arbitrarily to interfere with the right and liberty of the individual to contract. ,,55 The 
police power of the State was in conflict with the Federal Constitution and, therefore, 
void. The Court reasoned that "there was no reasonable ground, on the score of health, 
for interfering with the liberty of the person or the right of free contract, by determining 
the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker. Nor can a law limiting such hours be 
justified as a health law to safeguard the public health, or the health of the individuals 
following that occupation.,,56 
The most recent incident, the Enron case, shows how governrnent who once 
designed laws to protect the public interest from private or corporate misdeeds has 
subsequently scaled them down. 57 Based upon facts reported by the pubic media, Enron 
54 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905). 
55 Id. 
56 I d. 
57 JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 98-102 (2004). 
http://www.cnn.comlSPECIALS/2002/enron/stories/archive/archive.html#l. "A second kind of 
deregulation involves the actual repeal of regulations. This phenomenon too is pervasive throughout the 
regulatory system. Laws designed to protect the public interest from corporate misdeeds are being scale 
back and are sometimes disappearing altogether. There is better illustration of the dangers of this trend that 
the Enron debacle." Alternative to Economic Globalization: A Better World is Possible, A Report of the 
International Forum on Globalization 127 (2002). "Hundreds of years ago, state characters contained 
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had used political influence to remove government restrictions on its operations and then 
exploited its resulting freedom to engage in dubious activities which resulted in their 
being able to make considerable profits. 58 Through the 1990s, the company and its 
officials dumped huge amounts of money into the political process to help transform an 
unremarkable pipeline company into a powerhouse energy trader.59 It successfully 
lobbied for deregulation of electricity markets in several states, among them California, 
and continued to campaign to deregulate the trading of energy futures. 6o In the early 
1990s, it and several other energy companies sought to exempt themselves from the 
Commodity Exchange Act's requirement that energy traders disclose information about 
their futures contracts to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), the 
agency responsible for enforcing the act. 61 The result was that the trading in energy 
futures was no longer subject to CFTC oversight. 
The Enron case challenged a proposition whether energy futures trading should 
remain in regulated markets because supply and price manipUlation would almost 
certainly occur if it did not.62 Enron persisted. It continued to lobby to deregulate auction 
significant restrictions and much higher standards of accountability and responsibility that they do today. 
But as the landmark research of Richard Grossman and Frank Adams of the Program on Corporations, Law 
and Democracy (POCLAD) has revealed, corporations have managed over the centuries to wear down the 
kind and quality of state character rules as well as the state and federal laws that govern their existence. By 
now, these directives contain relatively few restrictions, and even when corporations violate these 
restrictions their permanent existence is rarely threatened. Governing bodies today, beholden to 
corporations for campaign finance support, are loath to enforce any sanctions except in cases of extreme 
political embarrassment, such as has occurred with Enron, Arthur Anderson, and others. Even then, 
effective sanctions may be few and small." 
http://www.time.comltime/nationlarticie/O.8599 ,193907 ,00.html. 
http://www.time.comltimeibusiness/printoutlO.8816.193520.00.html. 
http://news.findlaw.comllegalnews/litlenronl. 
58 JOEL BAKAN, supra note 57, at 98-102. 
59 Id. 
60 I d. 
61 Id. 
62 I d. 
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requirements, resulting in the passing of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act.63 
Enron had won; the Act was signed on December 21, 2000, gaining Enron an ability to 
run its own auctions on its own trading floor hidden from governmental scrutiny and the 
public view.64 It took full advantage of its new freedom by targeting California's energy 
markets for manipulation.65 It manufactured an artificial energy shortage that drove the 
price of electricity, and consequently its own profits, sky high. The consequence of such 
governmental deregulation was the first blackout in California on December 7, 2000, an 
event that occurred thirty-eight more times over the following six months after the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act was signed.66 The commodities deregulation law 
allowed Enron to control electricity in California, wreak havoc on the state and its 
citizens, pocket billions in extra revenues and force millions of California residents to go 
hundreds of hours without electricity and pay outrageous prices.67 The Enron case proves 
the danger of granting the private sector an excessive right over public utilities. In this 
case the electricity, the kind of public utilities government has to control to ensure the 
welfare of all its people. Enron is not a person, with feelings and life. It is only a legal 
entity, a kind of corporation dictated by a group of covetous executives with 
inexhaustible desire for wealth, that sucks and lives in the blood stream of an economic 
system and intends only to maximize the profit making without shame or remorse. 
The corporate lobbyists have also won legal battles with regard to intellectual 







In Eric Eldred v. John ·D. Ashcroft (2003),68 the U.S. Supreme Court extended the 
copyright duration of 20 years after its expiration. In the 1998 Copyright Term Extension 
Act (CTEA), Congress extended the duration of copyright by 20 years. Under the 1976 
Copyright Act (1976 Act), copyright protection generally lasted from a work's creation 
until 50 years after the authors death; under the CTEA, most copyright now run from 
creation until 70 years after the author's death.69 
Petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have 
entered the public domain, brought this suit seeking a determination that the CTEA failed 
constitutional review under both the Copyright Clause's "limited times" prescription and 
the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. 70 Petitioners did not challenge the CTEA' s 
"life-plus-70-years" time span itselC1 They maintained that Congress went awry not with 
respect to newly created works, but in enlarging the term for published works with 
existing copyrights. 72 The limited time in effect when a copyright is secured, petitioners 
urged, becomes the constitutional boundary, a clear line beyond the power of Congress to 
extend. As to the First Amendment, petitioners contended that the CTEA was a content-
neutral regulation of speech that failed inspection under the heightened judicial scrutiny 
appropriate for such regulations. 73 The District Court entered judgment on the pleadings 
for the Attorney General, holding that the CTEA did not violate the Copyright Clause's 
"limited times" restriction because the CTEA's terms, though longer than the 1976 Act's 
terms, were still limited, not perpetual, and, therefore, fit within Congress' discretion. 74 
68 Eric Eldred et. al v. John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General, 537 U.S. 186, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). 
69 17 U.S.c. §302(a). 
70 Eldred v. Janet Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1,3 (1999). 
71 Id. at 5. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 6. 
74 I d. 
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The court also held that there were no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted 
works of others. 75 
The Court of Appeals affirmed.76 The court reasoned that copyright does not 
impermissibly restrict free speech, for it grants the author an exclusive right "only to the 
specific form of expression;" it does not shield any idea or fact contained in the 
copyrighted work, and it allows for "fair use" even of the expression itself.77 A majority 
of the court also rejected petitioners' Copyright Clause claim.78 The court ruled that 
Circuit precedent precluded petitioners' plea for interpretation of the "limited times" 
prescription with a view to the Clause's statement of purpose: "To promote the Progress 
of Science.,,79 The court found nothing in the constitutional text or history to suggest that 
a term of years for a copyright was not a "limited time" if it may later be extended for 
another limited time.8o Recounting that the First Congress made the 1790 Copyright Act 
applicable to existing copyrights arising under state copyright laws, the court held that 
that construction by contemporaries of the Constitution's formation merited almost 
I · . h 81 conc USlve welg t. 
The Supreme Court recognized that the Court of Appeals made it plain that the 
Copyright Clause permits Congress to amplifY an existing term.82 The Court added that 
this Court has been similarly deferential to Congress' judgment regarding copyright 83 
Concerning petitioners' assertion that Congress could evade the limitation on its authority 
75 1d. 
76 Eldred v. Reno, 345 U.S. App. D.C. 89,239 F.3d 372 (2001). 
77 ld. at 376. 
78 1d. 
79 1d. at 375. 
80 1d. 
811d. 
82 537 U.S. 186, 123 S. Ct. 769. 
83 1d. 
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by stringing together an unlimited number of limited times, the Court stated that such 
legislative misbehavior clearly was not before it. 84 Rather, the Court emphasized, the 
CTEA matched the baseline term for United States copyrights with the European Union 
. d . 85 term III or er to meet contemporary cIrcumstances. 
Another example of Congress manipulation of legislation after lobbying by 
powerful corporate interests centers on the Disney organization.86 Disney lobbied hard to 
extend the duration of protection, additional twenty years after the end of the author's life 
plus fifty years, so that it was be able to prevent the image of Mickey Mouse, its mascot, 
and other cartoon characters, entering the public domain, rather it was thus able to retain 
ownership rights and to continue to profit greatly from its cartoon characters. 87 Without 
this extension, Mickey's copyrights would have begun expiring in 2003.88 The extension 
of this legislation covers 400,000 books, movies and songs, including early works by 
Robert Frost, Ernest Hemingway and George Gershwin. 89 
84 fd. 
85 fd. at 697. "A key factor in the CTEA's passage was a 1993 European Union directive instructing EU 
members to establish a baseline copyright term of life plus 70 years and to deny this longer term to the 
works of any non-EU country whose laws did not secure the same extended term. By extending the 
baseline United States copyright term, Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive the 
same copyright protection in Europe as their European counterparts. The CTEA may also provide greater 
incentive for American and other authors to create and disseminate their work in the United States. 
Additionally, Congress passed the CTEA in light of demographic, economic, and technological changes, 
and rationally credited projections that longer terms would encourage copyright holders to invest in the 
restoration and public distribution oftheir works." 
86 Face Value; Free Mickey Mouse, The Economist, October 12th, 2002. 
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/print_ version/shuman II 02.asp. "Why, in 1998, did Congress 
feel the urgent need to extend copyright? The legislators certainly weren't being lobbied by the Dead Poets 
Society. The plain fact is that this was a corporate giveaway. The beneficiaries are big publishing 
conglomerates including AOL Time Warner and movie studios such as Disney. The first Mickey Mouse 
character, copyrighted in 1928, was set to revert to the public domain in 2003. Now thanks to Congress, 
Disney can keep Mickey until 2023. Considering that the cash cow mouse helps earn the company billions 





Lessig argued that Congress' latest extension of copyright is unconstitutional, 
because it ignores the balance between the interests of copyright holders and those of the 
public.90 The constitution grants Congress the power to grant copyright and patents only 
for "limited of times" in order to "promote the progress of science and the useful arts.',9l 
How, he asked, can the retrospective extension of the rights of dead authors be an 
incentive to present-day creativity?92 He has a point. The courts answer by extending the 
extra duration of protection, even though Lessig has assured that creativity in a media-
obsessed culture relies on easy access to existing creative works.93 Disney itself, he 
pointed out, has thrived in large part by exploiting stories already in the public domain, 
such as Snow White, Mulan, Little Mermaid, Pinocchio, and Cinderella.94 Disney uses 
public information by reincarnating it into its own versions, so that it can obtain exclusive 
rights over that information and thus become an impetus to the creativity cycle of 
innovation and invention. Granting additional duration actually lessens the opportunity 
for innovation and invention. Government must be responsible to the larger public, 
promoting a free flow access to facts, data, and information, to complement the creativity 
cycle and thus promote the progress of science and useful arts. Otherwise, it could be 
warned that American's mighty entertainment industries might face a genuine dilemma; 
how to use the digital revolution to make loads of money when new technology can tum 
customers into their biggest enemy. 
90 1d. 
,i U.S. Constitution art. I, sect. 8, cl. 8. 
92 Face Value; Free Mickey Mouse, supra note 86. "He claimed that Congress's 11 extensions of copyright 
in the past 40 years amounts to a "perpetual term on the installment plan," not the limited time authorized 





In further support, based upon John Locke's Two Treaties on Governments,95 
governments are responsible for citizens' fundamental rights, protection of their property 
and other interests, promoting their welfare, and to further social value-the ideals of 
justice, the good life and the good society. Like other countries' constitutions, the U.S. 
Constitution reflects fundamental rights such as free speech, assembly, press, the right to 
privacy of one's person and property, freedom of conscience and religion, and protection 
from arbitrary laws and governmental powers. Fundamental rights are recognized for 
persons and their property including legal persons such as corporations. Thus, when it 
turns to a question of the justification of sui generis protection, granting a property right 
in compiled facts and information for a purpose of investment recovery, but posing a 
numerous socio-economic issues; the government must draw a line to minimize the 
impact on the larger public. 
The final argument comes from an economist's perspective on fundamental rights 
and freedom. Milton Friedman commented on President Kennedy's inaugural address: 
"Ask not what your country can do for you-ask what you can do for your country" that 
though the passage expressed a relation between the citizen and his government which is 
worthily ideal of free men in a free society, at odds, it implies that government is the 
master or the deity and that the citizen is the servant or votary.96 To a free man, he 
explained, the country is a collection of the individuals who comprise it, not something 
over or above them.97 Government is regarded as a means, an instrumentality, neither a 
95 JOHN LOCKE, supra note 50. 
9b MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM: THE CLASSIC STATEMENT OF MILTON FRIEDMAN'S 
ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY 1-3 (1982). 
97 Id at 2. 
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grantor of favors or gifts, nor a master or god to be blindly worshipped and served.98 The 
citizen recognizes no national goal except that it is the consensus of the goals that other 
citizens severally serve.99 Instead, he would rather ask "What can I and my compatriots 
do through government to help us discharge our individual responsibilities, to achieve our 
several goals and purposes, and above all, to protect our freedom?" And he should 
accompany this question with another: "How can we keep the government we create 
from becoming a Frankenstein that will destroy the very freedom we establish it to 
protect?"IOO For Friedman, "freedom" is a rare and delicate plant and the greatest threat to 
freedom is the concentration of power. Government is necessarily responsible to preserve 
freedom as laid down in its constitution but it needs to protect freedom from being 
abused, particularly to protect it from those who take advantage of such freedom. 
Again and again, we experience corporate lobbyists making efforts to control the 
world. In the past, when industries groups have been unsuccessful in creating new 
intellectual property rights at the national level, they have simply lobbied to include those 
measures in international treaties and then forced unpopular legislative change at 
home. 101 A growing amount of evidence shows the attempts of private entities to gain 
private rights in public assets. The attempt to gain a property right in databases is not 
exceptional. Whereas the European database industries have succeeded in lobbying the 
European Parliament to issue them an absolute right in the factual or data contents,102 and 
to extend the sui generis regime outside the Union; 103 the U.S. database makers failed to 
98 I d. 
99 I d. 
100Id. 
101 Robbin Gross, Buy the Numbers Publishers Seek Special Database Monopoly Protections, The Political 
Economy of R&D, Multinational Monitor, July/August 2004, vol. 25, no. 7 & 8. 
102 Database Directive art 7. 
103 WIPO Doc. BCP/CE/v/5, supra note I. E.U. Proposal. 
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achieve this goal at the national level, but succeeded at the international level. This 
corporate virus, taking global traditional knowledge and wealth to be its own, is 
spreading around the globe. 
2. Duty to the Global Community 
Government duty also refers to an ability to carry out its obligation of 
international co-operation. 104 Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations sets forth the 
purposes to which all member states are bound: 
"1. To maintain international peace and security ... ; 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations ... ; 
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and 
in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedom for all ... ,,105 
The U.N. Charter binds its member states to an obligation to give effect to its Charter. 
Member states must co-operate to solve socio-economic problems between countries and 
to promote fundamental freedom to all in the global society. Any action or omission, 
done by state's agents or nationals, which has a negative impact to all in the global 
society, is considered as an act of the state thereby establishing a breach of international 
104 LOUIS HENKIN, RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, OSCAR SCHACHTER AND HANS SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
CASES AND MATERIALS 545 (Third ed. 1993). "As these statement indicates, responsibility arises whenever 
there is a breach of an international obligation, whatever its origin. There is no distinction in this respect 
between breach of an agreement and a violation of a rule of international law. Moreover, since any 
violation of an obligation resulting in injury to another state gives rise to international responsibility, the 
substantive grounds for such responsibilities are as numerous and varied as the norms of international law." 
105 Charter of the United Nations, concluded June 26, 1945, entered into force October 24, 1945, 1 
U.N.T.S. XVI, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1043; 1945 Can. T.S. 7; 1945 S.A.T.S. 6; 1946 U.K.T.S. 67, Comd. 7015 
B.F.S.P. 805; U.S.T.S. 993, 59 Stat. 1031 [hereinafter U.N. Charter] art. 1. 
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obligation. 106 This is because an ideal global community under the U.N. Charter IS 
established in the basis of humanity, freedom, and equality of its members. The most 
important and difficult task for all in the global society is the attainment of a universally 
just society based upon equality and respect, in which all people would be treated as ends 
in themselves rather than means to others' ends. 
The corporate influence on a government's national policy of global engagement 
is often found to aim at expanding its political influence and economic markets. One 
clear example of how an irresponsible conduct affects all in the global society is the U.S. 
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol.107 The Kyoto Protocol sets legally-binding targets 
for developed countries to reduce greenhouse emissions within 7 years, to about 5% 
below 1990 levels. To reach this goal, countries must put greenhouse emissions controls 
on its largest polluters, which are corporations and militaries. Shockingly, the U.S. 
accounts for 25% of all greenhouse emissions in the world. 
106 I d. at 546-7. "Since the State can act physically only through actions or omissions by human beings or 
human collectivities, the problems posed by this fundamental notion of the "act of the State" which have to 
be resolved in the present chapter have a common denominator. The basic task is to establish when, 
according to international law, it is the State which must be regarded as acting: what actions or omissions 
can in principle be considered as conduct of the State, and in what circumstances, such conduct must have 
been engaged in, if it is to be actually attributable to the State as a subject of international law. In that 
connexion, it must first of all be pointed out that, in theory, there is nothing to prevent international law 
from attaching to the State the conduct of human beings or collectivities whose link with the State might 
even have no relation to its obligations; for example, any actions or omissions taking place in its territory 
could be considered acts of the State. In practice, however, we fmd that what is, as a general rule, attributed 
to the State at the international level are the acts of members of its "organization," in other words, the acts 
of its "organs" or "agents."" 
107 http://www.time.com/time/woridiarticie/O.8599.168701.OO.html. "The real significance of Bonn was 
that the Europeans decided to stand up to what many view as a dangerous U.S. unilateralism on an issue in 
which American domestic decisions are deemed to have a global impact. And the need to send Washington 
a message would certainly have added incentive for the Europeans, Japanese, Canadians and others to sort 
out their own differences on Kyoto. Whatever the treaty's imperfections, there was a collective sense of 
achievement among the overwhelming majority of the world's industrialized and developing nations at the 
fact that they'd fashioned an epic international consensus on global warming despite the objections of the 
one nation that still aspires to globalleadership ... President Bush may have spoken loftily about American 
leadership on global warming, but the reality is that he has missed the boat - instead, the international 
community will now be focusing its efforts on bringing Washington on board, as unlikely as that may look 
right now. And the Kyoto decision will have given the Europeans and other industrialized nations a sense 
of collective power and confidence to act independently of the U.S. that is likely to grow rather than ebb." 
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Vice President Al Gore was a main participant in putting the Kyoto Protocol 
together in 1997. President Bill Clinton signed the agreement in 1997, but the U.S. Senate 
refused to ratify it, citing potential damage to the U.S. economy required by compliance. 
The Senate also balked at the agreement because it excluded certain developing 
countries, including India and China, from having to comply with new emissions 
standards. President Bush, speaking in 2000 promised to regulate carbon dioxide as a 
pollutant. However, in 2001, after winning the presidential election, President Bush 
pulled the U.S. out of the Kyoto Protocol as one of the first acts of his presidency as 
stated: "I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of the world, 
including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would 
cause serious harm to the U.S. economy.,,108 The reason was, in fact, that it is too costly 
as described as "an unrealistic and ever-tightening straitjacket," and as the Congress 
questioned on the validity of the science behind global warming, "that millions of jobs 
will be lost if the U.S. joins in this world pact.,,109 In fact, the national policy of 
international affairs was pressured by corporate influence, the U.S. gas industries in this 
case. 
108 http://www.asiasource.orglnews/at_mp_ 02.cfm?newsid=59931 "Prior to the Bonn summit, the Bush 
administration had decided to withdraw from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, for which the US received 
widespread condemnation, most notably from the European Union and Japan. In explaining the reasons for 
US withdrawal, President Bush said, "I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of the 
world, including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause 
serious harm to the US economy." ... The effects of climate change will arguably be felt most in the South, 
where marginal populations will be made more vulnerable in the face of extreme events such as floods, 
droughts and cyclones, which are all likely to occur with greater frequency." 
109 http://usliberals.about.com/od/environmentaIconcems/plKyotoProtocol.htm. "George Bush made 
campaign promises in 2000 to regulate carbon dioxide as a pollutant. However, in 2001, George Bush 
pulled the US out of the Kyoto accords as one of the first acts of his presidency. Bush dismissed Kyoto 
Protocol as too costly, describing it as "an unrealistic and ever-tightening straitjacket." Lately, the White 
House has even questioned the validity of the science behind global warming, and claims that millions of 
jobs will be lost if the US joins in this world pact." 
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",II 
The scientific community believes that the global climate is warming because of 
greenhouse gas emissions from human activities, including industrial and manufacturing 
processes, fossil fuel combustion (gas) and changes in land use, such as deforestation. 
While u.s. industries are busy making strategies of how to maximize profit, the scientists 
suggest that productivity will only be maintained if the polluters seek cleaner, renewable 
alternative energies to replace fossil fuel or gas energy.IIO Solar, wind, and geothermal 
energy are examples of renewable sources. III The term "globalism" or "globalization" is 
applied to the view that problems derived from a lack of international co-operation, the 
ozone depletion and global warming in this case, cannot be effectively dealt with in a 
local or regional scale but must be attacked globally. 
In addition, we should note, the government willingness and ability to carry out 
international obligations is prescribed under the constitution. Article VI, Section 1, 
Clause 2 of the United States Constitution stipulates: "This Constitution, and the Laws of 
the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supremacy 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound by thereby, and Thing of 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.,,1l2 The U.S. 
Constitution does not impose prohibitions or prescribe limits on the Treaty Power, nor 
does it patently imply that there is any.l13 No provision on any treaty has been held 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and few have been seriously challenged there. 
110 PAUL HAWKEN, AMORY LOVINS, L. HUNTER LOVINS, NATURAL CAPITALISM; CREATING THE NEXT 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 22-47 (1999). (Suggesting on how the world's dominant business could be 
transformed to become profoundly less harmful to the biosphere.) 
lllId 
1I2 U.S. Constitution art. VI, sect. 1, d. 2. 
ll3 LOUIS HENKIN, RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, OSCAR SCHACHTER AND HANS SMIT, supra note 104, at 










International orgaJrizations are also bound by international law. The WIPO, as a 
result of joining the U.N. system in 1974,114 sets its objectives to promote "the protection 
of intellectual property throughout the world" incorporating the U. N. objectives, "to 
achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, 
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedom for all.,,1l5 The WIPO maintains its position to 
promote economic and social progress to all in the global society by helping developing 
and least developed countries to establish intellectual property rules and regulations, at 
the same time, addressing that education, freedom to receive information, and a proper 
balance of right to enjoy benefits of scientific progress and its application must be 
highlighted as apriority. Granting a property right in the contents of facts, data and 
information is in contrast to this goal. 
The emphasis on the principle of the public free flow of access to facts, data, and 
information must be stressed for the purpose of global socio-economic infrastructure 
development. Particularly, Article 2(5) of the Berne Convention recognizes the 
significance of these fundamental rights, promoting the public free flow of access to 
information; copyright protection extends only to collections of literary and artistic works 
"which, by reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents, constitute 
intellectual creations.,,116 It promotes the public free flow of access to information by 
only referring to the creative structure of collections and compilations, not the data or 
its limitations. The doctrine, propagated even by eminent authority, found its origins, no doubt, in the 
language of the Supremacy Clause (Article VI, section 2)." 
114 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, signed July 14, 1967, amended 
September 28, 1979 at http://www.wipo.intitreaties/eniconventionitrtdocs_wo029.html. 
115 U.N. Charter art. 1. 
116 Berne Convention art. 2(5). 
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other material contained within. The Berne Convention intends to leave the underlying 
facts available to the public, taking into account a serious need of the scientific research 
and educational communities for the free flow of access to information and of developing 
countries that need this available access for purposes of national infrastructure. 
The WIPO Draft Database Treaty, influenced by the European Unionl17 and the 
United Sates/ 18 is just politics between two powerful economic parties. Like its 
predecessors, the WIPO Draft Database Treaty holds propositions: (l) the sui generis 
right derives from an investment criterion alone, and (2) the technology affords new 
methods of manipulation of contents of databases and creates the free-riding problem. I 19 
However, the E.U. version of draft database treaty, which comes into force in the Union, 
goes further; Article 11 (3) of the E. U. Proposal requires reciprocal treatment between 
nations. 12o The E.U. approach is protectionist and irresponsible. If any Contracting Party 
could not upgrade its legal system to the level of the E.U's system, their database 
industries could suffer as the European database makers can claim exclusive rights on 
the contents of their databases. For instance, if the U.S. database makers sell the cliental 
databases for pharmaceuticals products to an individual who resides in the Community, 
this person can recompile and sell these databases to local companies who engage in 
online business soliciting or spamming, the U.S. database makers would, therefore, be 
disadvantaged suffering investment loss and indeed the loss of their databases forever to 
the European market. This would be the consequence of the U.S. government failing to 
upgrade its law to the point of compatibility with E.U. law. 
117 E. U. Proposal. 
118 U.S. Proposal. 
119 WIPO Draft Database Treaty Premble. 
120 E.U. Proposal art. 11(3). 
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An increasing cost of access to facts and information impacts on global social and 
economic infrastructure. The database is recognized as a vital element in the development 
of a global information infrastructure and an essential tool for promoting economic, 
cultural and technological advancement. 121 It is true that the sui generis system fulfills 
economIC expectations of the database industries, particularly those in developed 
countries. The sui generis system directly affects people in developing and least 
developed countries by reducing their opportunity to receive and access information. For 
instance, farmers in African countries will have less chance to learn new techniques to 
improve agricultural yields. They won't be able to learn about new thinking regarding 
e.g. irrigation systems, crop selection, soil improvement and weather conditions or to 
access available information to study trends and demands for agriculture products. 122 An 
open-access to information would help to improve living conditions. The opportunity to 
learn, improve, and develop should be much greater now because so much new thinking 
is available online. The online medical journal database teaches African doctors with no 
research budgets about new medicines and surgical techniques. 123 
Open-access to information is essential. The Thai government has, since 1951, 
launched a series of initiatives on hill tribe development, with the objective of providing 
121 [d. Preamble Clause. 
122 http://www.une.edu.aulagronomy /agsystems/ organic/links/other Jegions.html# Africa. (Providing 
information and links on an issue of sustainable agriculture resources-Africa, Middle East and Central & 
South America.) http://ppathw3 .cals.comell.edulmba ---'projectiCIEPCAlhome.html "The Cover Crops 
Information and Seed Exchange Center for Africa (CIEPCA) assisted researchers and development 
specialists to develop, target, and test appropriate cover cropping systems in Africa from 1998 through 
2001. Beginning in 2002, CIEPCA was reconfigured as a web-based cover crops information center which 
continues to provide access to on-line newsletters, Africa-based extension material and the French language 
cover crops electronic discussion group (EVECS-L)." 
123 Robin Gross, Buy the Numbers Publishers Seek Special Database Monopoly Protections, Multinational 
Monitor, Vol. 25, No. 7&8 (July/August 2004). "The Politic Economy of R&D "A new open-access online 
medical journal database teaches African doctors with no research budgets about new medicines and 
surgical techniques. Scientists are able to study the "greenhouse effect" because weather data is made 
freely available to the public over the Internet. 
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general welfare services III remote, relatively inaccessible communities affected by 
poverty.124 Their initiatives include both online education via satellite and more 
traditional teaching and support. Hill tribe people are unskilled and unprepared for a new 
environment, they are thus susceptible to exploitation and unlawful conduct that creates 
problems in both national and international levels, such as HIV / AIDS epidemic, 
prostitution, drug addiction as well as degradation in agriculture and income. 125 Having 
received more education, the younger generations have become a force, a human resource 
able to improve their own lives and the lives of those in their communities. The success 
of promoting education enables them to enjoy better living standards, employment, and 
health care; it promotes national policy and stimulates socio-economic potential, the idea 
124 Case Study on Education Opportunity for Hill Tribe in Northern Thailand, Implications for Sustainable 
Rural Development, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Regional Office for Asia 
and the Pacific, Bangkok, Thailand (2002), at 
http://www.fao.orgldocuments/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/DOCREP/004/AC383E/AC383EOO.HTM 
[hereinafter F AO Case Study]. "Education, for F AO, is a prerequisite to building a food-secure world, 
reducing poverty and conserving and enhancing natural resources. This research is as an attempt to analyse 
the impact of support activities by the Royal Thai Government in promoting education opportunities for hill 
tribe people. Government initiatives on hill tribe development date back to 1951, with the objective to 
provide general welfare services in remote, relatively inaccessible communities affected by poverty. In 
1959 the government established the National Committee for the Hill Tribes as the first national-level 
organization in charge of formulating policies focusing on hill tribe development. To date, the government 
policy towards the hill tribes is based on the Cabinet resolution of 6 July 1976. The resolution states the 
government's intention to integrate hill tribe people into the Thai state as self-reliant Thai citizens. In 
addition, the Master Plan on Community Development, Environment and Narcotic Crop Control in 
Highland Areas provides the basis for the government's support of hill tribe people, with emphasis on 
natural resource conservation in highland development. Furthermore, the national economic and social 
development plans are the key plans underpinning government assistance to hill tribe communities." 
http://www.maefahluang.orglmaefahluanglroyatpatronleducation.asp. "Illiteracy due to the lack of 
educational opportunity is the main obstacle in human resource development, which further affects national 
development. .. The Princess Mother knew from her experience that a large number of hill tribe children did 
not have the opportunity to learn within the school system. They could neither read nor write, and were, 
therefore, unable to improve their lives and communities." 
125 F AO Case Study. "Most of these people are unskilled and unprepared for a new environment, and thus 
susceptible to exploitation and unlawful conduct. HIV/AIDS, prostitution, drug addiction as well as 
degradation in agriculture and income are other serious problems ... Education, along with infrastructure, 
communication and health care, is an indispensable enabling factor for enhancing rural livelihood. It 
enables hill tribe people to take fuller advantage of employment and training opportunities, whether they 
choose to stay in their communities or decide to earn income in urban areas. Consequently, hill tribe 
people, based on the skills they acquired, would be in a position to reinforce their income-generating 
capacities and socio-economic potential, which will be the foundation of sustainable rural development." 
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of sustainable rural development is now understood and practiced; ultimately such 
development contributes to a reduction in socio-economic problems around the globe. 126 
National and inter-governmental bodies must co-operate to promote the principle of free 
flow of access to information. 
B. Suggestion of Technological Mechanism to the Database Industries 
Technology suggests sufficient means to safeguard economic losses of the 
database industries. The database industries thirst for database legislation because of free-
riding problems. However, Leonardo Chiariglione, Head of Multimedia Technologies 
and Services at Centro Studi e Laboratori Telecomunicazioni ("CSELT"), Telecom 
Italia's R&D center in Torino, Italy,127 suggests a technology self-help solution. He refers 
to the digital recording technology that has been developed by the Moving Picture 
Experts Group ("MPEG"),128 a committee of the International Organization for 
Standardization, in 1988. The technology, MPEG standard, which is the technology 
behind MP3, enables storage of compressed digital video and audio on compact discs and 
their transmission over the Internet. 
MP3 technology is incredibly effective because it overcomes the clumsy 
traditional way of distributing contents based on the sale of a physical objective such as a 
126 Jd. "In enhancing assistance to hill tribe people, integrated approaches to highland development would 
need to be emphasized as a means to address a wide range of problems. Particularly, quality of life issues 
that include education and health care would need to be given higher prominence, as they would contribute 
to the human potential and self-reliance of highland communities. Enhancement of education opportunities 
in such a way as to contribute to improved agricultural production, employment and income generation 
should be based on efforts to harmonize modern knowledge and technologies with local wisdom and 
practices. In supporting such efforts in Thailand, international development agencies would need to 
strengthen partnership in advocating sustainable highland development." 
127 Leonardo Chiariglione, The Value o/Content, MIT's Magazine of Innovation, Technology Review, vol. 
103, no. 2 (March-April 2000) at 79. http://www.telecomitalialab.coml. "Technologies applied to digital 
contents will play an important role in the future of our network society." 
128 http://cseltitlmpeg. 
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vinyl record or CD. It causes problems too, however, because as the technology advances 
so the ease of copying and distributing increases, piracy by another word; musical and 
other database contents are now widely available on the Internet. Users justify their 
action with a philosophy that holds: "Bits are bits, content should be free.,,129 If such a 
philosophy is true, artists and authors could not earn a living. Could the contents be used 
as a vehicle for a message that has a monetary value? These questions could be answered 
by the protection technologies such as a specification for portable devices that plays 
digital contents in a secure form 130 or a specification for the secure download of 
proprietary protection systems that will enable Web surfers to consume whatever type of 
protected content they may encounter. 13l He advocated: "When content can no longer be 
indiscriminately copied, it recovers its lost value. And instead of being the cause of its 
devaluation, the Internet becomes the place where content's value is enhanced because 
everybody can post works in a protected form and be compensated for them. Artists will 
have a better way to reach their fans, and consumers will be able to acquire the right to 
consume a piece of work in more ways than it is possible today. Instead of buying a CD, 
for instance, a consumer might buy the right to 10 playbacks." 132 
In addition, in a world where anybody can be author, performer, producer, value-
adder reseller and consumer all in one, how will it be possible to acquire the rights for a 
specific work, possibly worth a few cents, for reuse under some given conditions, unless 
all these negotiations and transactions are rendered automatically? The Foundation for 
129 Leonardo Chiariglione, supra note 127. 
130 http://www.sdmi.org. The Secure Digital Music Initiative is a nonprofit organization with 150 corporate 
members whose shared goal is to develop specifications for secure digital music. So far, SDMI has 




Intelligent Physical Agents who developed Agent Communication Language which 
defines a lingua franca which all intelligent agents will speak by the same standard, 
MPEG. 133 The modified version, MPEG-21 Multimedia Framework, generates two 
critical objectives: how consumers can search for and get content---directly by 
themselves or through the use of intelligent agents-and how the contents can be 
decoded for consumption according to usage rights. For example, one can send an 
intelligent agent to search for a picture of the Golden Gate Bridge and it will negotiate to 
buy for the lowest price. 
Technology has a profound effect on legislative improvement. At the end of the 
Twentieth Century new means of dissemination and communication evolved, more and 
more advanced technology has assisted every field of endeavor; computer software, 
entertainment products (motion pictures, videos, garnes, sound recordings), information 
services (electronic database, online newspaper), technical information, product licenses, 
financial services, and professional services (business and technical consulting, 
accounting, architectural design, legal advice, travel services). Legislatures have adopted 
new definitions of technological forms to accommodate loopholes in legal interpretation 
and public demands for protection. Some successful endeavors evidently reflect in, for 
instance, protection attained for sound recording and film industries, broadcasters, 
performers. Most new regulations are a result of modification and extension of existing 
copyright law. For the protection of sui generis databases, the question arises in a manner 
of the database's unique nature that conflicts the principle of the public free flow of 
access to information under copyright law. As the database makers are aware of 
technological impact on the reproduction and dissemination of the contents of 
133 http://www.figa.org. 
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databases,134 the above-narration has demonstrated that technological means, like MP3, 
have provided a satisfactory solution. In addition, to justify legal principles for the 
protection of databases, as Conley pointed out, "the legal principles of protection are 
predicted and foreseen to be the same whether the subject is a simple paper database like 
a telephone book or a complex aggregation dispersed through cyberspace.,,135 Rather, he 
added, "The way in which those principles are applied will be heavily dependent on the 
nature of the subject matter.,,136 Like copyrightable collections that are justified by 
creative selection and arrangement, the appropriate focus of protection for a given 
database should be considered upon the basis whether the primary value placed by its 
creator consists in the underlying data structure or in the search and organization tools. 
IV. Conclusion 
The free flow of access to information must be promoted for all. The problem of 
the protection of sui generis databases is that it promotes an intellectual property right in 
factual compilations and collections that copyright law crafted out from its scope over 
centuries. Copyright law is meant to encourage innovation and creation, and to subsidize 
socio-economic and human resource development in every country around the globe. 
Thus, the database industries are aware of the advent of new technology that creates free-
ride problem, and trying to lobby legislatures to pass the law in favor of them, proving 
throughout the legal history countless examples of corporate entities influencing 
134 John M. Conley, Database Protection in a Digital World, 6 Rich. 1. L. Tech. 2 (Symposium 1999). "A 
lack of confidence in protections may drive some database proprietors to use technological means to 
prevent certain user activities. For information service providers, the general business conducts may 
stimulate self-interested database owner to utilize certain mechanism by way of: (I) permitting authorized 
persons to use the database fully, (2) preventing unauthorized persons from using it, and (3) preventing 




legislation. The compilation or collection of factual contents is unexceptional and a new 
episode of legislative battles that challenge legislature to take a careful consideration 
toward legal revolution. By granting the database industries a sui generis right, such a 
regime safeguards them from economic losses, but, at the same time, increases a cost to 
the large public sectors' access. The ultimate concept is that government, whether 
national, regional or international, must be responsible to the larger public sectors, the 
citizens, by taking a position to reserve and maintain law and justice, as Pollock 
mentioned: "In short the conception of law, many of its ideas, and much even of its form, 
are prior in history to the official intervention of the State, save in the last resort, to 
maintain law. True it is that in modem States law tends more and more to become 
"II 
,,,,,I 
identified with the will of the State as expressed by the authorities instructed with the 
direction of the common power. But to regard law as merely that which the State wills or 
commands is eminently the mistake of a layman, as one of the greatest modem jurists has 
hinted; and, we may add, of a layman who has not considered the difference between 
modem and archaic societies, or the political and social foundations of law." 137 
However, law is not only politics between private and public sectors, but also 
between states. The legislative battle between two powerful economic imperialisms, the 
United States and the European Union, has resulted in a possible draft database treaty at 
the forum of the WIPO which aims to govern all the global knowledge assets. 
Developing and least developed countries demand that all knowledge and information be 
treated as a "common" and be made available free of charge to all in the global 
community. Databases are an essential building block of the Information Society. 
I believe that if the free flow of access to facts, data, and information is allowed intact, 
137 Sir Frederick Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence, 1896. 
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national infrastructure would benefit and increasingly progress as a result of human 
resources development and overall global infrastructure. Promoting the principle of the 
free flow of access to information is long-term investment. Once the contents are no 
longer discriminated and people have equal opportunity to learn and be educated, they 
would become a new force of human resource readily and competitively to participate in 
every single economic mechanism, creators, inventors, suppliers and even consumers. 
Competition and marketplace of ideas flourish. Like other kinds of intellectual property, 
the protection of sui generis databases is, therefore, seen as a means of dominating and 
exploiting the socio-economic progress of developing and least developed countries. By :'i\ 
:111'11 
promoting the principle of the public free flow of access to information, the WIPO must ;::::::1 
::':1;;: 
11,,1 
take a position to administer international agreements, to achieve international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and to promote and encourage respect for human rights and 
,'I 
freedom for all. Therefore, in addressing the question what are the most appropriate goals 
for intellectual property system in an age of information, we must ask ourselves first: 
"What kind of society would we like to live in?" 
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ANNEX 
Preamble 
The Contracting Parties, 
Desiring to enhance and stimulate the production, distribution and international trade in 
databases, 
Recognizing that databases are a vital element in the development of a global 
information infrastructure and an essential tool for promoting economic, cultural and 
technological advancement, 
Recognizing that the making of databases requires the investment of considerable 
human, technical and financial resources but that such databases can be copied or 
accessed at a fraction of the cost needed to design them independently, 
Desiring to establish a new form of protection for databases by granting rights adequate 
to enable the makers of databases to recover the investment they have made in their 
databases and by providing international protection in a manner as effective and uniform 
as possible, 
Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty shall derogate from existing obligations that 
Contracting Parties may have to each other under treaties in the field of intellectual 
property, and in particular, that nothing in this Treaty shall in any way prejudice the 
rights granted to authors in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, 







(1) Contracting Parties shall protect any database that represents a substantial investment 
in the collection, assembly, verification, organization or presentation of the contents of 
the database. 
(2) The legal protection set forth in this Treaty extends to a database regardless of the 
form or medium in which the database is embodied, and regardless of whether or not the 
database is made available to the public. 
(3) The protection granted under this Treaty shall be provided irrespective of any 
protection provided for a database or its contents by copyright or by other rights granted 
by Contracting Parties in their national legislation. 
(4) The protection under this Treaty shall not extend to any computer program as such, 
including without limitation any computer program used in the manufacture, operation or 
maintenance of a database. 
F or the purposes of this Treaty: 
Article 2 
Definitions 
(i) "database" means a collection of independent works, data or other materials arranged 
in a systematic or methodical way and capable of being individually accessed by 
electronic or other means; 
(ii) "extraction" means the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial part of 
the contents of a database to another medium by any means or in any form; 
(iii) "maker of the database" means the natural or legal person or persons with control 
and responsibility for the undertaking of a substantial investment in making a database; 
(iv) "substantial investment" means any qualitatively or quantitatively significant 
investment of human, financial, technical or other resources in the collection, assembly, 
verification, organization or presentation of the contents of the database; 
(v) "substantial part", in reference to the contents of a database, means any portion of the 
database, including an accumulation of small portions, that is of qualitative or 
quantitative significance to the value of the database; 
(vi) "utilization" means the making available to the public of all or a substantial part of 
the contents of a database by any means, including by the distribution of copies, by 
renting, or by on-line or other forms of transmission, including making the same 




(1) The maker of a database eligible for protection under this Treaty shall have the right 
to authorize or prohibit the extraction or utilization of its contents. 
(2) Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation, provide that the right of 
utilization provided for in paragraph (1) does not apply to distribution of the original or 
any copy of any database that has been sold or the ownership of which has been 





(1) The rights provided under this Treaty shall be owned by the maker of the database. 
(2) The rights provided under this Treaty shall be freely transferable. 
Article 5 
Exceptions 
(l) Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation, provide exceptions to or 
limitations of the rights provided in this Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict 
with the normal exploitation of the database and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the rightholder. 
(2) It shall be a matter for the national legislation of Contracting Parties to determine the 
protection that shall be granted to databases made by governmental entities or their 
agents or employees. 
Article 6 
Beneficiaries of Protection 
(1) Each Contracting Party shall protect according to the tenns of this Treaty makers of 
databases who are nationals of a Contracting Party. 
(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) shall also apply to companies, finns and other legal 
entities formed in accordance with the laws of a Contracting Party or having their 
registered office, central administration or principal place of business within a 
Contracting Party; however, where such a company, firm or other legal entity has only its 
registered office in the territory of a Contracting Party, its operations must be genuinely 
linked on an on-going basis with the economy of a Contracting Party. 
Article 7 
National Treatment and Independence of Protection 
(1) The maker of a database shall enjoy in respect of the protection provided for in this 
Treaty, in Contracting Parties other than the Contracting Party of which he is a national, 
the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals as 
well as the rights specially granted by this Treaty. 
(2) Protection of a database in the Contracting Party of which the maker of the database is 
a national shall be governed by national legislation. 
(3) The enjoyment and the exercise of rights under this Treaty shall be independent of the 
existence of protection in the Contracting Party of which the maker of a database is a 
national. Apart from the provisions of this Treaty, the extent of protection, as well as the 
means and extent of redress, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the Contracting 
Party where protection is claimed. 
(4) Makers of databases who are not nationals of a Contracting Party but who have their 
habitual residence in a Contracting Party shall, for the purposes of this Treaty, be 
assimilated to nationals of that Contracting Party. 
11l 
Article 8 
Term of Protection 
(1) The rights provided for in this Treaty shall attach when a database meets the 
requirements of Article 1(1) and shall endure for at least 
Alternative A: 25 
Alternative B: 15 
years from the first day of January in the year following the date when the database first 
met the requirements of Article 1 (1). 
(2) In the case of a database that is made available to the public, in whatever manner, 
before the expiry of the period provided for in paragraph (1), the term of protection shall 
endure for at least 
Alternative A: 25 
Alternative B: 15 
years from the first day of January in the year following the date when the database was 
first made available to the public. 
(3) Any substantial change to the database, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, 
including any substantial change resulting from the accumulation of successive additions, 
deletions, verifications, modifications in organization or presentation, or other alterations, 
which constitute a new substantial investment, shall qualify the database resulting from 
such investment for its own term of protection. 
Article 9 
Formalities 
The enjoyment and exercise of the rights provided for in this Treaty shall not be subject 
to any formality. 
Article 10 
Obligations concerning Technological Measures 
(1) Contracting Parties shall make unlawful the importation, manufacture or distribution 
of protection-defeating devices, or the offer or performance of any service having the 
same effect, by any person knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that the 
device or service will be used for, or in the course of, the exercise of rights provided 
under this Treaty that is not authorized by the rightholder or the law. 
(2) Contracting Parties shall provide for appropriate and effective remedies against the 
unlawful acts referred to in paragraph (1). 
(3) As used in this Article, "protection-defeating device" means any device, product or 
component incorporated into a device or product, the primary purpose or primary effect 
of which is to circumvent any process, treatment, mechanism or system that prevents or 
inhibits any of the acts covered by the rights under this Treaty. 
Article 11 
Application in Time 
(1) Contracting Parties shall also grant protection pursuant to this Treaty in respect of 
databases that met the requirements of Article 1(1) at the date of the entry into force of 
this Treaty for each Contracting Party. The duration of such protection shall be 
determined by the provisions of Article 8. 
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(2) The protection provided for in paragraph (1) shall be without prejudice to any acts 
concluded or rights acquired before the entry into force of this Treaty in each Contracting 
Party. 
(3) A Contracting Party may provide for conditions under which copies of databases 
which were lawfully made before the date of the entry into force of this Treaty for that 
Contracting Party may be distributed to the public, provided that such provisions do not 
allow distribution for a period longer than two years from that date. 
Article 12 
Relation to Other Legal Provisions 
The protection accorded under this Treaty shall be without prejudice to any other rights 
in, or obligations with respect to, a database or its contents, including laws in respect of 
copyright, rights related to copyright, patent, trademark, design rights, antitrust or 
competition, trade secrets, data protection and privacy, access to public documents and 
the law of contract. 
Article 13 
Special Provisions on Enforcement of Rights 
Alternative A 
(1) Special provisions regarding the enforcement of rights are included in the Annex to 
the Treaty. 
(2) The Annex fonns an integral part of this Treaty. 
Alternative B 
Contracting Parties shall ensure that the enforcement procedures specified in Part III, 
Articles 41 to 61, of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Annex 1 C, of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, concluded on April 15, 1994 (the "TRIPS 
Agreement"), are available under their national laws so as to pennit effective action 
against any act of infringement of the rights provided under this Treaty, including 
expeditious remedies to prevent infringements, and remedies that constitute a deterrent to 
further infringements. To this end, Contracting Parties shall apply mutatis mutandis the 
provisions of Articles 41 to 61 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Alternative A 




1. Contracting Parties shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Annex 
are available under their law so as to pennit effective action against any act of 
infringement of rights covered by this Treaty, including expeditious remedies to prevent 




procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to 
legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse. 
2. Procedures concerning the enforcement of rights covered by this Treaty shall be fair 
and equitable. They shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail 
unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays. 
3. Decisions on the merits of a case shall preferably be in writing and reasoned. They 
shall be made available at least to the parties to the proceeding without undue delay. 
Decisions on the merits of a case shall be based only on evidence in respect of which 
parties were offered the opportunity to be heard. 
4. Parties to a proceeding shall have an opportunity for review by a judicial authority of 
final administrative decisions and, subject to jurisdictional provisions in a Contracting 
Party's law concerning the importance of a case, of at least the legal aspects of initial 
judicial decisions on the merits of a case. However, there shall be no obligation to 
provide an opportunity for review of acquittals in criminal cases. 
5. It is understood that this Annex does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial 
system for the enforcement of rights covered by this Treaty distinct from that for the 
enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect the capacity of Contracting Parties to 
enforce their law in general. Nothing in this Annex creates any obligation with respect to 
the distribution of resources as between enforcement of rights covered by this Treaty and 
the enforcement of law in general. 
SECTION 2 
CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES 
Article 2 
Fair and Equitable Procedures 
Contracting Parties shall make available to the right holders1 civil judicial procedures 
concerning the enforcement of any right covered by this Treaty. Defendants shall have 
the right to written notice which is timely and contains sufficient detail, including the 
basis of the claims. Parties shall be allowed to be represented by independent legal 
counsel, and procedures shall not impose overly burdensome requirements concerning 
mandatory personal appearances. All parties to such procedures shall be duly entitled to 
substantiate their claims and to present all relevant evidence. The procedure shall provide 
a means to identify and protect confidential information, unless this would be contrary to 
existing constitutional requirements. 
Article 3 
Evidence 
1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority, where a party has presented 
reasonably available evidence sufficient to support its claims and has specified evidence 
relevant to substantiation of its claims which lies in the control of the opposing party, to 
order that this evidence be produced by the opposing party, subject in appropriate cases 
to conditions which ensure the protection of confidential information. 
2. In cases in which a party to a proceeding voluntarily and without good reason refuses 
access to, or otherwise does not provide necessary information within a reasonable 






Contracting Party may accord judicial authorities the authority to make preliminary and 
final determinations, affirn1ative or negative, on the basis of the information presented to 
them, including the complaint or the allegation presented by the party adversely affected 
by the denial of access to information, subject to providing the parties an opportunity to 
be heard on the allegations or evidence. 
Article 4 
Injunctions 
1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party to desist from an 
infringement, inter alia to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in their 
jurisdiction of imported goods that involve the infringement of a right covered by this 
Treaty, immediately after customs clearance of such goods. Contracting Parties are not 
obliged to accord such authority in respect of protected subject matter acquired or 
ordered by a person prior to knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that dealing 
in such subject matter would entail the infringement of a right covered by this Treaty. 
[Paragraph 2 of Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement is not reproduced here.] 
Article 5 
Damages 
1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the infringer to pay the right 
holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered 
because of an infringement of that person's right covered by this Treaty by an infringer 
who knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in infringing activity. 
2. The judicial authorities shall also have the authority to order the infringer to pay the 
right holder expenses, which may include appropriate attorney's fees. In appropriate 
cases, Contracting Parties may authorize the judicial authorities to order recovery of 
profits and/or payment of pre-established damages even where the infringer did not 
knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engage in infringing activity. 
Article 6 
Other Remedies 
In order to create an effective deterrent to infringement, the judicial authorities shall have 
the authority to order that goods that they have found to be infringing be, without 
compensation of any sort, disposed of outside the channels of commerce in such a 
manner as to avoid any harm caused to the right holder, or, unless this would be contrary 
to existing constitutional requirements, destroyed. The judicial authorities shall also have 
the authority to order that materials and implements the predominant use of which has 
been in the creation of the infringing goods be, without compensation of any sort, 
disposed of outside the channels of commerce in such a manner as to minimize the risks 
of further infringements. In considering such requests, the need for proportionality 
between the seriousness of the infringement and the remedies ordered as well as the 




Right of Information 
Contracting Parties may provide that the judicial authorities shall have the authority, 
unless this would be out of proportion to the seriousness of the infringement, to order the 
infringer to inform the right holder of the identity of third persons involved in the 
production and distribution of the infringing goods or services and of their channels of 
distributi on. 
Article 8 
Indemnification of the Defendant 
1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party at whose request 
measures were taken and who has abused enforcement procedures to provide to a party 
wrongfully enjoined or restrained adequate compensation for the injury suffered because 
of such abuse. The judicial authorities shall also have the authority to order the applicant 
to pay the defendant expenses, which may include appropriate attorney's fees. 
2. In respect of the administration of any law pertaining to the protection or enforcement 
of rights covered by this Treaty, Contracting Parties shall only exempt both public 
authorities and officials from liability to appropriate remedial measures where actions are 
taken or intended in good faith in the course of the administration of that law. 
Article 9 
Administrative Procedures 
To the extent that any civil remedy can be ordered as a result of administrative 
procedures on the merits of a case, such procedures shall conform to principles equivalent 




1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order prompt and effective 
provisional measures: 
(a) to prevent an infringement of any right covered by this Treaty from occurring, and in 
particular to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in their jurisdiction of 
goods, including imported goods immediately after customs clearance; 
(b) to preserve relevant evidence in regard to the alleged infringement. 
2. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to adopt provisional measures inaudita 
altera parte where appropriate, in particular where any delay is likely to cause irreparable 
harm to the right holder, or where there is a demonstrable risk of evidence being 
destroyed. 
3. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to require the applicant to provide any 
reasonably available evidence in order to satisfy themselves with a sufficient degree of 
certainty that the applicant is the right holder and that the applicant's right is being 
infringed or that such infringement is imminent, and to order the applicant to provide a 
security or equivalent assurance sufficient to protect the defendant and to prevent abuse. 
Vlll 
4. Where provisional measures have been adopted inaudita altera parte, the parties 
affected shall be given notice, without delay after the execution of the measures at the 
latest. A review, including a right to be heard, shall take place upon request of the 
defendant with a view to deciding, within a reasonable period after the notification of the 
measures, whether these measures shall be modified, revoked or confirmed. 
5. The applicant may be required to supply other information necessary for the 
identification of the goods concerned by the authority that will execute the provisional 
measures. 
6. Without prejudice to paragraph 4, provisional measures taken on the basis of 
paragraphs 1 and 2 shall, upon request by the defendant, be revoked or otherwise cease to 
have effect, if proceedings leading to a decision on the merits of the case are not initiated 
within a reasonable period, to be determined by the judicial authority ordering the 
measures where a Contracting Party's law so permit or, in the absence of such a 
determination, not to exceed 20 working days or 31 calendar days, whichever is the 
longer. 
7. Where the provisional measures are revoked or where they lapse due to any act or 
omission by the applicant, or where it is subsequently found that there has been no 
infringement or threat of infringement of a right covered by this Treaty, the judicial 
authorities shall have the authority to order the applicant, upon request of the defendant, 
to provide the defendant appropriate compensation for any injury caused by these 
measures. 
8. To the extent that any provisional measure can be ordered as a result of administrative 
procedures, such procedures shall conform to principles equivalent in substance to those 
set forth in this Section. 
SECTION 4 
SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO BORDER MEASURES 2 
Article 11 
Suspension of Release by Customs Authorities 
Contracting Parties shall, in conformity with the provisions set out below, adopt 
procedures1 to enable a right holder, who has valid grounds for suspecting that the 
importation of [words omitted] pirated goods1 may take place, to lodge an application in 
writing with competent authorities, administrative or judicial, for the suspension by the 
customs authorities of the release into free circulation of such goods. [A clause omitted]. 
Contracting Parties may also provide for corresponding procedures concerning the 
suspension by the customs authorities of the release of infringing goods destined for 
exportation from their territories. 
Article 12 
Application 
Any right holder initiating the procedures under Article 11 shall be required to provide 
adequate evidence to satisfy the competent authorities that, under the laws of the country 
of importation, there is prima facie an infringement of the right holder's right covered by 
this 
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Treaty and to supply a sufficiently detailed description of the goods to make them readily 
recognisable by the customs authorities. The competent authorities shall inform the 
applicant within a reasonable period whether they have accepted the application and, 
where determined by the competent authorities, the period for which the customs 
authorities will take action. 
Article 13 
Security or Equivalent Assurance 
1. The competent authorities shall have the authority to require an applicant to provide a 
security or equivalent assurance sufficient to protect the defendant and the competent 
authorities and to prevent abuse. Such security or equivalent assurance shall not 
unreasonably deter recourse to these procedures. 
[Paragraph 2 of Article 53 of the TRIPS Agreement is not reproduced here.] 
Article 14 
Notice of Suspension 
The importer and the applicant shall be promptly notified of the suspension of the release 
of goods according to Article 11. 
Article 15 
Duration of Suspension 
If, within a period not exceeding 10 working days after the applicant has been served 
notice of the suspension, the customs authorities have not been informed that proceedings 
leading to a decision on the merits of the case have been initiated by a party other than 
the defendant, or that the duly empowered authority has taken provisional measures 
prolonging the suspension of the release of the goods, the goods shall be released, 
provided that all other conditions for importation or exportation have been complied 
with; in appropriate cases, this time-limit may be extended by another 10 working days. 
If proceedings leading to a decision on the merits of the case have been initiated, a 
review, including a right to be heard, shall take place upon request of the defendant with 
a view to deciding, within a reasonable period, whether these measures shall be modified, 
revoked or confirmed. Notwithstanding the above, where the suspension of the release of 
goods is carried out or continued in accordance with a provisional judicial measure, the 
provisions of paragraph 6 of Article 10 shall apply. 
Article 16 
Indemnification of the Importer and of the Owner of the Goods 
Relevant authorities shall have the authority to order the applicant to pay the importer, 
the consignee and the owner of the goods appropriate compensation for any injury caused 
to them through the wrongful detention of goods or through the detention of goods 
released pursuant to Article 15. 
Article 17 
Right of Inspection and Information 
Without prejudice to the protection of confidential information, Contracting Parties shall 
provide the competent authorities the authority to give the right holder sufficient 
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opportunity to have any goods detained by the customs authorities inspected in order to 
substantiate the right holder's claims. The competent authorities shall also have authority 
to give the importer an equivalent opportunity to have any such goods inspected. Where a 
positive determination has been made on the merits of a case, Contracting Parties may 
provide the competent authorities the authority to inform the right holder of the names 
and addresses of the consignor, the importer and the consignee and of the quantity of 
goods in question. 
Article 18 
Ex Officio Action 
Where Contracting Parties require competent authorities to act upon their own initiative 
and to suspend the release of goods in respect of which they have acquired prima facie 
evidence that a right covered by this Treaty is being infringed: 
(a) the competent authorities may at any time seek from the right holder any information 
that may assist them to exercise these powers; 
(b) the importer and the right holder shall be promptly notified of the suspension. Where 
the importer has lodged an appeal against the suspension with the competent authorities, 
the suspension shall be subject to the conditions, mutatis mutandis, set out at Article 15; 
(c) Contracting Parties shall only exempt both public authorities and officials from 




Without prejUdice to other rights of action open to the right holder and subject to the right 
of the defendant to seek review by a judicial authority, competent authorities shall have 
the authority to order the destruction or disposal of infringing goods in accordance with 
the principles set out in Article 6. [A clause not reproduced here.] 
Article 20 
De Minimis Imports 
Contracting Parties may exclude from the application of above provlSlons small 
quantities of goods of a non-commercial nature contained in travellers' personal luggage 




Contracting Parties shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at 
least in cases of wilful [words omitted] piracy on a commercial scale. Remedies available 
shall include imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, 
consistently with the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity. In 
appropriate cases, remedies available shall also include the seizure, forfeiture and 
destruction of the infringing goods and of any materials and implements the predominant 
use of which has been in the commission of the offence. [A clause not reproduced here.] 
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1 For the purpose of this Annex, the term "right holder" includes federations and associations having legal 
standing to assert such rights. 
2 Where a Contracting Party has dismantled substantially all controls over movement of goods across its 
border with another Contracting Party with which it forms part of a customs union, it shall not be required 
to apply the provisions of this Section at that border. 
3 It is understood that there shall be no obligation to apply such procedures to imports of goods put on the 
Market in another country by or with the consent of the right holder, or to goods in transit. 
4 For the purposes of this Annex: 
"pirated goods" shall mean any goods which are copies made without the consent of the right holder or 
person duly authorized by the right holder in the country of production and which are made directly or 
indirectly from an article where the making of that copy would have constituted an infringement of a right 




DIRECTIVE 96/9IEC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular 
Article 57 (2), 66 and 100a thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1), 
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (2), 
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 189b of the Treaty (3), 
(1) Whereas databases are at present not sufficiently protected in all Member States by 
existing legislation; whereas such protection, where it exists, has different attributes; 
(2) Whereas such differences in the legal protection of databases offered by the 
legislation of the Member States have direct negative effects on the functioning of the 
internal market as regards databases and in particular on the freedom of natural and legal 
persons to provide on-line database goods and services on the basis of harmonized legal 
arrangements throughout the Community; whereas such differences could well become 
more pronounced as Member States introduce new legislation in this field, which is now 
taking on an increasingly international dimension; 
(3) Whereas existing differences distorting the functioning of the internal market need to 
be removed and new ones prevented from arising, while differences not adversely 
affecting the functioning of the internal market or the development of an information 
market within the Community need not be removed or prevented from arising; 
(4) Whereas copyright protection for databases exists in varying forms in the Member 
States according to legislation or case-law, and whereas, if differences in legislation in 
the scope and conditions of protection remain between the Member States, such 
unharmonized intellectual property rights can have the effect of preventing the free 
movement of goods or services within the Community; 
(5) Whereas copyright remains an appropriate form of exclusive right for authors who 
have created databases; 
(6) Whereas, nevertheless, in the absence of a harmonized system of unfair-competition 
legislation or of case-law, other measures are required in addition to prevent the 
unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization of the contents of a database; 
(7) Whereas the making of databases requires the investment of considerable human, 
technical and financial resources while such databases can be copied or accessed at a 
fraction of the cost needed to design them independently; 
(8) Whereas the unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization of the contents of a database 
constitute acts which can have serious economic and technical consequences; 
(9) Whereas databases are a vital tool in the development of an information market within 
the Community; whereas this tool will also be of use in many other fields; 
(10) Whereas the exponential growth, in the Community and worldwide, in the amount of 
information generated and processed annually in all sectors of commerce and industry 
calls for investment in all the Member States in advanced information processing 
systems; 
(11) Whereas there is at present a very great imbalance in the level of investment in the 
database sector both as between the Member States and between the Community and the 
world's largest database-producing third countries; 
(12) Whereas such an investment in modem information storage and processing systems 
will not take place within the Community unless a stable and uniform legal protection 
regime is introduced for the protection of the rights of makers of databases; 
(13) Whereas this Directive protects collections, sometimes called "compilations", of 
works, data or other materials which are arranged, stored and accessed by means which 
include electronic, electromagnetic or electro-optical processes or analogous processes; 
(14) Whereas protection under this Directive should be extended to cover non-electronic 
databases; 
(15) Whereas the criteria used to determine whether a database should be protected by 
copyright should be defined to the fact that the selection or the arrangement of the 
contents of the database is the author's own intellectual creation; whereas such protection 
should cover the structure of the database; 
(16) Whereas no criterion other than originality in the sense of the author's intellectual 
creation should be applied to determine the eligibility of the database for copyright 
protection, and in particular no aesthetic or qualitative criteria should be applied; 
(17) Whereas the term "database" should be understood to include literary, artistic, 
musical or other collections of works or collections of other material such as texts, sound, 
images, numbers, facts, and data; whereas it should cover collections of independent 
works, data or other materials which are systematically or methodically arranged and can 
be individually accessed; whereas this means that a recording or an audiovisual, 
cinematographic, literary or musical work as such does not fall within the scope of this 
Directive; 
(18) Whereas this Directive is without prejudice to the freedom of authors to decide 
whether, or in what manner, they will allow their works to be included in a database, in 
particular whether or not the authorization given is exclusive; whereas the protection of 
databases by the sui generis right is without prejudice to existing rights over their 
contents, and whereas in particular where an author or the holder of a related right 
permits some of his works or subject matter to be included in a database pursuant to a 
non-exclusive agreement, a third party may make use of those works or subject matter 
subject to the required consent of the author or of the holder of the related right without 
the sui generis right of the maker of the database being invoked to prevent him doing so, 
on condition that those works or subject matter are neither extracted from the database 
nor re-utilized on the basis thereof; 
(19) Whereas, as a rule, the compilation of several recordings of musical performances 
on a CD does not come within the scope of this Directive, both because, as a compilation, 
it does not meet the conditions for copyright protection and because it does not represent 
a substantial enough investment to be eligible under the sui generis right; 
(20) Whereas protection under this Directive may also apply to the materials necessary 
for the operation or consultation of certain databases such as thesaurus and indexation 
systems; 
(21) Whereas the protection provided for in this Directive relates to databases in which 
works, data or other materials have been arranged systematically or methodically; 
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whereas it is not necessary for those materials to have been physically stored in an 
organized manner; 
(22) Whereas electronic databases within the meaning of this Directive may also include 
devices such as CD-ROM and CD-i; 
(23) Whereas the term "database" should not be taken to extend to computer programs 
used in the making or operation of a database, which are protected by Council Directive 
9l1250lEEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs (4); 
(24) Whereas the rental and lending of databases in the field of copyright and related 
rights are governed exclusively by Council Directive 921100lEEC of 19 November 1992 
on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of 
intellectual property (5); 
(25) Whereas the term of copyright is already governed by Council Directive 93/98IEEC 
of 29 October 1993 harmonizing the term of protection of copyright and certain related 
rights (6); 
(26) Whereas works protected by copyright and subject matter protected by related rights, 
which are incorporated into a database, remain nevertheless protected by the respective 
exclusive rights and may not be incorporated into, or extracted from, the database without 
the permission of the rightholder or his successors in title; 
(27) Whereas copyright in such works and related rights in subject matter thus 
incorporated into a database are in no way affected by the existence of a separate right in 
the selection or arrangement of these works and subject matter in a database; 
(28) Whereas the moral rights of the natural person who created the database belong to 
the author and should be exercised according to the legislation of the Member States and 
the provisions of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; 
whereas such moral rights remain outside the scope of this Directive; 
(29) Whereas the arrangements applicable to databases created by employees are left to 
the discretion of the Member States; whereas, therefore nothing in this Directive prevents 
Member States from stipulating in their legislation that where a database is created by an 
employee in the execution of his duties or following the instructions given by his 
employer, the employer exclusively shall be entitled to exercise all economic rights in the 
database so created, unless otherwise provided by contract; 
(30) Whereas the author's exclusive rights should include the right to determine the way 
in which his work is exploited and by whom, and in particular to control the distribution 
of his work to unauthorized persons; 
(31) Whereas the copyright protection of databases includes making databases available 
by means other than the distribution of copies; 
(32) Whereas Member States are required to ensure that their national provisions are at 
least materially equivalent in the case of such acts subject to restrictions as are provided 
for by this Directive; 
(33) Whereas the question of exhaustion of the right of distribution does not arise in the 
case of on-line databases, which come within the field of provision of services; whereas 
this also applies with regard to a material copy of such a database made by the user of 
such a service with the consent of the rightholder; whereas, unlike CD-ROM or CD-i, 
where the intellectual property is incorporated in a material medium, namely an item of 
goods, every on-line service is in fact an act which will have to be subject to 
authorization where the copyright so provides; 
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(34) Whereas, nevertheless, once the rightholder has chosen to make available a copy of 
the database to a user, whether by an on-line service or by other means of distribution, 
that lawful user must be able to access and use the database for the purposes and in the 
way set out in the agreement with the rightholder, even if such access and use necessitate 
performance of otherwise restricted acts; 
(35) Whereas a list should be drawn up of exceptions to restricted acts, taking into 
account the fact that copyright as covered by this Directive applies only to the selection 
or arrangements of the contents of a database; whereas Member States should be given 
the option of providing for such exceptions in certain cases; whereas, however, this 
option should be exercised in accordance with the Berne Convention and to the extent 
that the exceptions relate to the structure of the database; whereas a distinction should be 
drawn between exceptions for private use and exceptions for reproduction for private 
purposes, which concerns provisions under national legislation of some Member States 
on levies on blank media or recording equipment; 
(36) Whereas the term 'scientific research' within the meaning of this Directive covers 
both the natural sciences and the human sciences; 
(37) Whereas Article 10 (1) of the Berne Convention is not affected by this Directive; 
(38) Whereas the increasing use of digital recording technology exposes the database 
maker to the risk that the contents of his database may be copied and rearranged 
electronically, without his authorization, to produce a database of identical content which, 
however, does not infringe any copyright in the arrangement of his database; 
(39) Whereas, in addition to aiming to protect the copyright in the original selection or 
arrangement of the contents of a database, this Directive seeks to safeguard the position 
of makers of databases against misappropriation of the results of the financial and 
professional investment made in obtaining and collection the contents by protecting the 
whole or substantial parts of a database against certain acts by a user or competitor; 
(40) Whereas the object of this sui generis right is to ensure protection of any investment 
in obtaining, verifying or presenting the contents of a database for the limited duration of 
the right; whereas such investment may consist in the deployment of financial resources 
and/or the expending oftime, effort and energy; 
(41) Whereas the objective of the sui generis right is to give the maker of a database the 
option of preventing the unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization of all or a 
substantial part of the contents of that database; whereas the maker of a database is the 
person who takes the initiative and the risk of investing; whereas this excludes 
subcontractors in particular from the definition of maker; 
(42) Whereas the special right to prevent unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization 
relates to acts by the user which go beyond his legitimate rights and thereby harm the 
investment; whereas the right to prohibit extraction and/or re-utilization of all or a 
substantial part of the contents relates not only to the manufacture of a parasitical 
competing product but also to any user who, through his acts, causes significant 
detriment, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, to the investment; 
(43) Whereas, in the case of on-line transmission, the right to prohibit re-utilization is not 
exhausted either as regards the database or as regards a material copy of the database or 








(44) Whereas, when on-screen display of the contents of a database necessitates the 
pennanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial part of such contents to another 
medium, that act should be subject to authorization by the rightholder; 
(45) Whereas the right to prevent unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization does not in 
any way constitute an extension of copyright protection to mere facts or data; 
(46) Whereas the existence of a right to prevent the unauthorized extraction and/or re-
utilization of the whole or a substantial part of works, data or materials from a database 
should not give rise to the creation of a new right in the works, data or materials 
themselves; 
(47) Whereas, in the interests of competition between suppliers of infonnation products 
and services, protection by the sui generis right must not be afforded in such a way as to 
facilitate abuses of a dominant position, in particular as regards the creation and 
distribution of new products and services which have an intellectual, documentary, 
technical, economic or commercial added value; whereas, therefore, the provisions of this 
Directive are without prejudice to the application of Community or national competition 
rules; 
(48) Whereas the objective of this Directive, which is to afford an appropriate and 
unifonn level of protection of databases as a means to secure the remuneration of the 
maker of the database, is different from the aim of Directive 95/461EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (7), 
which is to guarantee free circulation of personal data on the basis of hannonized rules 
designed to protect fundamental rights, notably the right to privacy which is recognized 
in Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms; whereas the provisions of this Directive are without prejudice to 
data protection legislation; 
(49) Whereas, notwithstanding the right to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of all 
or a substantial part of a database, it should be laid down that the maker of a database or 
rightholder may not prevent a lawful user of the database from extracting and re-utilizing 
insubstantial parts; whereas, however, that user may not unreasonably prejudice either the 
legitimate interests of the holder of the sui generis right or the holder of copyright or a 
related right in respect of the works or subject matter contained in the database; 
(50) Whereas the Member States should be given the option of providing for exceptions 
to the right to prevent the unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization of a substantial 
part of the contents of a database in the case of extraction for private purposes, for the 
purposes of illustration for teaching or scientific research, or where extraction and/or re-
utilization are/is carried out in the interests of public security or for the purposes of an 
administrative or judicial procedure; whereas such operations must not prejudice the 
exclusive rights of the maker to exploit the database and their purpose must not be 
commercial; 
(51) Whereas the Member States, where they avail themselves of the option to pennit a 
lawful user of a database to extract a substantial part of the contents for the purposes of 
illustration for teaching or scientific research, may limit that pennission to certain 
categories of teaching or scientific research institution; 
(52) Whereas those Member States which have specific rules providing for a right 
comparable to the sui generis right provided for in this Directive should be pennitted to 
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retain, as far as the new right is concerned, the exceptions traditionally specified by such 
rules; 
(53) Whereas the burden of proof regarding the date of completion of the making of a 
database lies with the maker of the database; 
(54) Whereas the burden of proof that the criteria exist for concluding that a substantial 
modification of the contents of a database is to be regarded as a substantial new 
investment lies with the maker of the database resulting from such investment; 
(55) Whereas a substantial new investment involving a new term of protection may 
include a substantial verification of the contents of the database; 
(56) Whereas the right to prevent unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization in respect 
of a database should apply to databases whose makers are nationals or habitual residents 
of third countries or to those produced by legal persons not established in a Member 
State, within the meaning of the Treaty, only if such third countries offer comparable 
protection to databases produced by nationals of a Member State or persons who have 
their habitual residence in the territory of the Community; 
(57) Whereas, in addition to remedies provided under the legislation of the Member 
States for infringements of copyright or other rights, Member States should provide for 
appropriate remedies against unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization of the contents 
of a database; 
(58) Whereas, in addition to the protection given under this Directive to the structure of 
the database by copyright, and to its contents against unauthorized extraction and/or re-
utilization under the sui generis right, other legal provisions in the Member States 
relevant to the supply of database goods and services continue to apply; 
(59) Whereas this Directive is without prejudice to the application to databases composed 
of audiovisual works of any rules recognized by a Member State's legislation concerning 
the broadcasting of audiovisual programmes; 
(60) Whereas some Member States currently protect under copyright arrangements 
databases which do not meet the criteria for eligibility for copyright protection laid down 
in this Directive; whereas, even if the databases concerned are eligible for protection 
under the right laid down in this Directive to prevent unauthorized extraction and/or re-
utilization of their contents, the term of protection under that right is considerably shorter 
than that which they enjoy under the national arrangements currently in force; whereas 
harmonization of the criteria for determining whether a database is to be protected by 
copyright may not have the effect of reducing the term of protection currently enjoyed by 
the rightholders concerned; whereas a derogation should be laid down to that effect; 
whereas the effects of such derogation must be confined to the territories of the Member 
States concerned, 







1. This Directive concerns the legal protection of databases in any form. 
2. For the purposes of this Directive, "database" shall mean a collection of independent 
works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and 
individually accessible by electronic or other means. 
3. Protection under this Directive shall not apply to computer programs used in the 
making or operation of databases accessible by electronic means. 
Article 2 
Limitations on the scope 
This Directive shall apply without prejudice to Community provisions relating to: 
(a) the legal protection of computer programs; 
(b) rental right, lending right and certain rights related to copyright in the field of 
intellectual property; 




Object of protection 
1. In accordance with this Directive, databases which, by reason of the selection or 
arrangement of their contents, constitute the author's own intellectual creation shall be 
protected as such by copyright. No other criteria shall be applied to determine their 
eligibility for that protection. 
2. The copyright protection of databases provided for by this Directive shall not extend to 




1. The author of a database shall be the natural person or group of natural persons who 
created the base or, where the legislation of the Member States so permits, the legal 
person designated as the rightholder by that legislation. 
2. Where collective works are recognized by the legislation of a Member State, the 
economic rights shall be owned by the person holding the copyright. 
3. In respect of a database created by a group of natural persons jointly, the exclusive 
rights shall be owned jointly. 
Article 5 
Restricted acts 
In respect of the expression of the database which is protectable by copyright, the author 







(a) temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in 
part; 
(b) translation, adaptation, arrangement and any other alteration; 
( c) any form of distribution to the public of the database or of copies thereof. The first 
sale in the Community of a copy of the database by the rightholder or with his consent 
shall exhaust the right to control resale of that copy within the Community; 
(d) any communication, display or performance to the public; 
(e) any reproduction, distribution, communication, display or performance to the public 
of the results of the acts referred to in (b). 
Article 6 
Exceptions to restricted acts 
1. The performance by the lawful user of a database or of a copy thereof of any of the 
acts listed in Article 5 which is necessary for the purposes of access to the contents of the 
databases and normal use of the contents by the lawful user shall not require the 
authorization of the author of the database. Where the lawful user is authorized to use 
only part of the database, this provision shall apply only to that part. 
2. Member States shall have the option of providing for limitations on the rights set out in 
Article 5 in the following cases: 
(a) in the case of reproduction for private purposes of a non-electronic database; 
(b) where there is use for the sole purpose of illustration for teaching or scientific 
research, as long as the source is indicated and to the extent justified by the non-
commercial purpose to be achieved; 
(c) where there is use for the purposes of public security of for the purposes of an 
administrative or judicial procedure; 
(d) where other exceptions to copyright which are traditionally authorized under national 
law are involved, without prejudice to points (a), (b) and (c). 
3. In accordance with the Berne Convention for the protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, this Article may not be interpreted in such a way as to allow its application to be 
used in a manner which unreasonably prejudices the rightholder's legitimate interests or 
conflicts with normal exploitation of the database. 
CHAPTER III 
SUI GENERIS RIGHT 
Article 7 
Object of protection 
1. Member States shall provide for a right for the maker of a database which shows that 
there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the 
obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents to prevent extraction and/or re-
utilization of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or 
quantitatively, of the contents of that database. 
2. For the purposes ofthis Chapter: 
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(a) "extraction" shall mean the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial part 
of the contents of a database to another medium by any means or in any form; 
(b) "re-utilization" shall mean any form of making available to the public all or a 
substantial part of the contents of a database by the distribution of copies, by renting, by 
on-line or other forms of transmission. The first sale of a copy of a database within the 
Community by the rightholder or with his consent shall exhaust the right to control resale 
of that copy within the Community; Public lending is not an act of extraction or re-
utilization. 
3. The right referred to in paragraph 1 may be transferred, assigned or granted under 
contractual licence. 
4. The right provided for in paragraph 1 shall apply irrespective of the eligibility of that 
database for protection by copyright or by other rights. Moreover, it shall apply 
irrespective of eligibility of the contents of that database for protection by copyright or by 
other rights. Protection of databases under the right provided for in paragraph 1 shall be 
without prejudice to rights existing in respect of their contents. 
5. The repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-utilization of insubstantial parts of the 
contents of the database implying acts which conflict with a normal exploitation of that 
database or which unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker of the 
database shall not be permitted. 
Article 8 
Rights and obligations of lawful users 
1. The maker of a database which is made available to the public in whatever manner 
may not prevent a lawful user of the database from extracting and/or re-utilizing 
insubstantial parts of its contents, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, for any 
purposes whatsoever. Where the lawful user is authorized to extract and/or re-utilize only 
part ofthe database, this paragraph shall apply only to that part. 
2. A lawful user of a database which is made available to the public in whatever manner 
may not perform acts which conflict with normal exploitation of the database or 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker of the database. 
3. A lawful user of a database which is made available to the public in any manner may 
not cause prejudice to the holder of a copyright or related right in respect of the works or 
subj ect matter contained in the database. 
Article 9 
Exceptions to the sui generis right 
Member States may stipulate that lawful users of a database which is made available to 
the public in whatever manner may, without the authorization of its maker, extract or re-
utilize a substantial part of its contents: 
(a) in the case of extraction for private purposes of the contents of a non-electronic 
database; 
(b) in the case of extraction for the purposes of illustration for teaching or scientific 
research, as long as the source is indicated and to the extent justified by the non-
commercial purpose to be achieved; 
(c) in the case of extraction and/or re-utilization for the purposes of public security or an 
administrative or judicial procedure. 
IX 
Article 10 
Tenn of protection 
1. The right provided for in Article 7 shall run from the date of completion of the making 
ofthe database. It shall expire fifteen years from the first of January of the year following 
the date of completion. 
2. In the case of a database which is made available to the public in whatever manner 
before expiry of the period provided for in paragraph 1, the tenn of protection by that 
right shall expire fifteen years from the first of January of the year following the date 
when the database was first made available to the pUblic. 
3. Any substantial change, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, to the contents of a 
database, including any substantial change resulting from the accumulation of successive 
additions, deletions or alterations, which would result in the database being considered to 
be a substantial new investment, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, shall qualify 
the database resulting from that investment for its own tenn of protection. 
Article 11 
Beneficiaries of protection under the sui generis right 
1. The right provided for in Article 7 shall apply to database whose makers or 
rightholders are nationals of a Member State or who have their habitual residence in the 
territory of the Community. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall also apply to companies and finns fonned in accordance with the law 
of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal 
place of business within the Community; however, where such a company or finn has 
only its registered office in the territory of the Community, its operations must be 
genuinely linked on an ongoing basis with the economy of a Member State. 
3. Agreements extending the right provided for in Article 7 to databases made in third 
countries and falling outside the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be concluded by 
the Council acting on a proposal from the Commission. The tenn of any protection 
extended to databases by virtue of that procedure shall not exceed that available pursuant 





Member States shall provide appropriate remedies in respect of infringements of the 
rights provided for in this Directive. 
Article 13 
Continued application of other legal provisions 
This Directive shall be without prejudice to provisions concerning in particular copyright, 
rights related to copyright or any other rights or obligations subsisting in the data, works 
or other materials incorporated into a database, patent rights, trade marks, design rights, 
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the protection of national treasures, laws on restrictive practices and unfair competition, 
trade secrets, security, confidentiality, data protection and privacy, access to public 
documents, and the law of contract. 
Article 14 
Application over time 
1. Protection pursuant to this Directive as regards copyright shall also be available in 
respect of databases created prior to the date referred to Article 16 (1) which on that date 
fulfill the requirements laid down in this Directive as regards copyright protection of 
databases. 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, where a database protected under copyright 
arrangements in a Member State on the date of pUblication of this Directive does not 
fulfill the eligibility criteria for copyright protection laid down in Article 3 (1), this 
Directive shall not result in any curtailing in that Member State of the remaining tenn of 
protection afforded under those arrangements. 
3. Protection pursuant to the provisions of this Directive as regards the right provided for 
in Article 7 shall also be available in respect of databases the making of which was 
completed not more than fifteen years prior to the date referred to in Article 16 (1) and 
which on that date fulfill the requirements laid down in Article 7. 
4. The protection provided for in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall be without prejudice to any 
acts concluded and rights acquired before the date referred to in those paragraphs. 
5. ill the case of a database the making of which was completed not more than fifteen 
years prior to the date referred to in Article 16 (1), the tenn of protection by the right 
provided for in Article 7 shall expire fifteen years from the first of January following that 
date. 
Article 15 
Binding nature of certain provisions 
Any contractual provision contrary to Articles 6 (1) and 8 shall be null and void. 
Article 16 
Final provisions 
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive before 1 January 1998. 
When Member States adopt these provisions, they shall contain a reference to this 
Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their official 
publication. The methods of making such reference shall be laid down by Member States. 
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the provisions of 
domestic law which they adopt in the field governed by this Directive. 
3. Not later than at the end of the third year after the date referred to in paragraph 1, and 
every three years thereafter, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Economic and Social Committee a report on the application of this 
Directive, in which, inter alia, on the basis of specific infonnation supplied by the 
Member States, it shall examine in particular the application of the sui generis right, 
including Articles 8 and 9, and shall verify especially whether the application of this right 
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has led to abuse of a dominant position or other interference with free competition which 
would justify appropriate measures being taken, including the establishment of non-
voluntary licensing arrangements. Where necessary, it shall submit proposals for 
adjustment of this Directive in line with developments in the area of databases. 
Article 17 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Strasbourg, 11 March 1996. 
For the European Parliament 
The President 
K. HANSCHFor the Council 
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u.s. Proposal for Sui Generis Protection of Databases 
1.1 The legal protection under this [Instrument] extends to databases embodied in any 
form. 
1.2 Contracting Parties shall protect substantial investment in databases in accordance 
with the provisions of this [Instrument]. 
1.3 Contracting Parties shall protect all databases that represent a substantial 
investment in the collection, assembly, verification, organization, or representation of the 
database contents, whether or not such databases is commercially available or otherwise 
made to the public, regardless of the form or medium in which the database is embodied, 
and regardless of whether the database or any of its contents are intellectual creations or 
are protected under the other domestic legislation. 
1.4 The protection under this [Instrument] shall not extend to any computer programs 
including without limitation any computer programs used in the manufacture, operation 
or maintenance of a database. However, a database incorporated into a computer program 
shall be protected under this [Instrument]. 
Article 2 
Definitions 
2.1 A "database' is a collection, assembly, or compilation of works, data, information or 
other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way. 
2.2 "Extraction" means the permanent or temporary transfer to the same or anther 
medium, by any maens now known or later developed, of all or a substantial part of the 
database contents. 
2.3 The "maker of database" is the natural or legal person or persons making a substantial 
investment in the collection, assembly, verification, organization, or presentation of the 
contents of the database. 
2.4 "Substantial Investment" means any qualitatively or quantitatively significant 
investment of human, financial, technical or other resources in the making of a database. 
2.5 "Substantial Part" means any portion of the database that is of qualitative or 
quantitative significance when evaluated in relation to the entire database. 
2.6 "Use" and "reuse" mean the making available, by means now known or later 
developed, including by the distribution of copies, by renting, or by online or other forms 
of transmission of all or substantial part of the contents of a database, or making available 
all or a substantial part of the database to members of the public at a place and at a time 
chosen by each member of the public, whether or not for direct or indirect commercial 




Rights in Respect of Database Contents 
3.1 The maker of a database eligible for protection under this [Instrument] shall have the 
right to do, authorize or prohibit acts of extraction, use or reuse of all or substantial art of 
the contents of the databases. 
3.2 The protection provided under this [Instrument] shall not preclude any person from 
independently collecting, assembling, or compiling works, data or material any source 
other than a protected database. 
Article 4 
Rightholders 
4.1 The rights provided under this [Instrument] shall be owned by the maker of the 
database or where there is more than one maker, jointly by the makers. 
4.2 The rights provided under this [Instrument] shall be freely transferable. 
Article 5 
Exceptions to Rights 
5.1 A lawful user of a database made commercially available or otherwise made available 
to the public may extract, use or reuse insubstantial parts of its contents for any purpose 
whatsoever. 
5.2 The repeated or systematic extraction, use or reuse of insubstantial parts of the 
contents of a database in a manner that cumulatively conflicts with the normal 
exploitation of the database or adversely affects the actual or potential market for the 
database shall not be permitted. 
5.3 Contracting Parties may, in their domestic legislation, provide for exceptions to or 
limitations on the rights provided in this [Instrument] so long as such limitations or 
exceptions do not unreasonably conflicts with a normal exploitation of the database and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder. 
5.4 It shall be a matter for legislation in the Contracting Parties to determine the 
protection to be granted to databases made by a government entity or its gents or 
employees. 
Article 6 
Term of Protection 
6.1 The rights provided under this [Instrument] shall be attach when the database meets 
the requirements of Article 1.3 and endure for at least 25 years. 
6.2 For databases that have been made commercially available or otherwise made 
available to the public, the rights of the maker of the database shall endure for at least 25 
years from the first of January following whichever of such acts has occurred earlier. 
6.3 Any significant change, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, to the database, 
including to any significant change resulting from the accumulation of successive 
additions, deletions, verifications or re-verifications, alterations, resulting modifications 
in organization or presentation, or other modifications, shall qualify the resulting 




Relation to Other Laws 
7.1 The protection under this [Instrument] shall be without prejudice to provIsIons 
concerning copyright, rights related to copyright or any other rights or obligations in the 
database or its contents, including laws in respect to patent, trademark, design rights, 
antitrust or competition, trade secrets, data protection and privacy, access to public 
documents, and the law of contract. 
7.2 No Contracting Parties shall impair the ability to vary by contract the rights and 
exceptions to rights set forth herein. 
Article 8 
Prohibition of Protection-Defeating Devices 
Contracting Parties shall make it unlawful to import, manufacture or distribute any 
device, product, or component incorporated into a device or product, or effect or perform 
any service, the primary purpose or effect of which is to avoid, bypass, remove, 
deactivate, or otherwise circumvent, without authority, any process, treatment, 
mechanism or system which prevents or inhibits the unauthorized exercise of any the 
rights under [Instrument]. 
Article 9 
Application to Existing Databases 
9.1 Databases eligible for protection under this [Instrument] that are in existence at the 
time this [Instrument] comer in force in respect of a Contracting Parties shall be 
protected. The duration of such protection shall be determined under Article 6. 
9.2 The rights under this [Instrument] shall not prejudice any acts of exploitation 
performed prior to its effective date. It shall be a matter of domestic legislation to provide 




10.1 Contracting Parties shall provide for the implementation of this [Instrument] in 
domestic legislation by its effective date in their territories. 
10.2 The means by which this [Instrument] is implemented shall be a matter of national 
legislation, and may include protection under the laws related to intellectual property, 
unfair competition, misappropriation or other laws or recognition of a specific right. 
Articlell 
National Treatment 
11.1 Databases whose makers are at the time of the making of the database either 
nationals of or habitual residents of a Contracting Party shall be protected under this 
[Instrument] . 
11.2 Rightholders shall enjoy, in respect of databases that qualify for protection under 
this [Instrument]. In Contracting Parties other than the country of the nationality or the 
habitual residence of the maker, the rights which their respective laws do now or may 
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hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this 
[Instrument] . 
11.3 Protection in the country of the nationality or habitual residence of the maker shall 
be governed by domestic law. 
11.4 The enjoyment and the exercise of the rights hereunder shall not be subject to any 
formality; such enjoyment and exercise shall be independent of the existence of 
protection in the country of the database maker's nationality or habitual residence. Apart 
from the provisions of this [Instrument], the extent of protection, as well as the means 
and extent of redress shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the Contracting Party 
where protection is claimed. 
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